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FEDERAL ANTITRUST LEGISLATION: GUIDEPOSTS TO A
REVISED NATIONAL ANTITRUST POLICY
S. Chesterfield Oppenheim*

I
RE-EXAMINATION AND APPRAISAL OF

ANTITRusT

PoLICY URGENTLY

NEEDED

A. Introduction

T

HE year 1952 finds various cqrrents of controversy in the antitrust field converging toward the necessity for a survey and reappraisal of the body of congressional legislation generally known as the
"federal antitrust laws."1 The foundation stone in the trio of principal

,.. Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
BURNs, THE D.ncLINE OP CoMPETITION (1936); Clark, "Toward a Concept of
Workable Competition," 30 AM. EcoN. R.Ev. 241 (1940); Final Report, TNEC, 34-40
(1941); Hamilton and Till, "Antitrust in Action," TNEC MoNOGRAPH No. 16 (1940);
Handler, "A Study of the Construction and Enforcement of the Federal Antitrust Laws,"
TNEC MoNOGRAPH No. 38 (1941); United States Versus Economic Concentration and
Monopoly, A Staff Report to the Monopoly Subcommittee, H. Res. 64, 79th Cong. (1946);
Edwards, "An Appraisal of the Antitrust Laws," 36 AM. EcoN. R.Ev. (Part 2, Supplement) 172
(1946); Cahill, "Anti-Trust Laws-Some Recent Trends and Developments," 1 THE R.EcORD (N.Y.C. Bar) 201 (1946); Harbeson, "A New Phase of the Antitrust Law," 45 MlcH.
L. R.Ev. 977 (1947); Levi, "The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly," 14 UNIV. Cm. L. REv.
153 (1947); Rostow, "The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress," 14
Umv. Cm. L. R.Ev. 567 (1947); Adelman, ''Effective Competition and the Antitrust
Laws," 61 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1289 (1948); Wright, ''Toward Coherent Anti-Trust," 35 VA.
L. R.Ev. 665 (1949); Callmann, "The Essence of Anti-Trust," 49 CoL. L. REv. lIOO
(1949); EnwARDs, MAINTAINING CoMP.BTITION (1949); LoEVINGER, THE LAw oP FREE
ENTERPRISE (1949); Mason, ''The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United
States,'' 62 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1265 (1949); Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Study of
Monopoly Power of the Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st sess., Serial No. 14,
Pt. 1 (1949); The Effectiveness of the Federal Antitrust Laws: A Symposium, 39 AM. EcoN.
R.Ev. 689 (1949); Chadwell and McLaren, "The Current Status of the Antitrust Laws,''
Umv. Iu.. LAw FORUM 491 (1950); Clark, ''The Orientation of Antitrust Policy,'' 40 AM.
EcoN. R.Ev. 93 (1950) (Papers and Proceedings of Amer. Econ. Assn.); GRIFFIN, AN EcoNOMIC APPROACH TO ANn-rnusT PROBLEMS, American Enterprise Assn. (1951); Letter of
Transmittal and Memorandum for the President's Committee on Business and Government
Relations, N.Y. State Bar Assn. Section on Anti-Trust Law (1950); McDonald, "Businessmen and the Sherman Act,'' 41 FoR'l'UN.B MAGAZINE 104 (Jan. 1950); Oppenheim, "A
New Look at Antitrust Enforcement Trends," CCH ANnnuST LAW SYMPOSIUM 69
(1950); H. Doc. No. 599, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (1950) and Supplement (1951); Carlston,
"Antitrust Policy: A Problem in Statecraft," 60 YALE L. J. 1073 (1951); Handler, "AntiTrust-New Frontiers and New Perplexities," 6 THE R.Econn (N.Y.C. Bar) 59 (1951);
Jacoby, "Antitrust Policy Re-Examined," 58 J. PoL. EcoN. 61 (1950); Smith, ''Effective
Competition: Hypothesis for Modernizing The Antitrust Laws,'' 26 N.Y. UNiv. L. REv. 405
(1951); STOCKING AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE (1951); Sunderland,
"Changing Legal Concepts in the Antitrust Field,'' 3 SYRACUSE L. R.Ev. 60 (1951); H.R.
5015, A Bill For the Establishment of a Commission on Revision of the Antitrust Laws of the
United States, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951); S. 1944, A Bill For the Establishment of a
1
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antitrust statutes is the Sherman Act of 1890.2 Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission-Act' and the Clayton Act of 1914, as amended,4
are the other two members of this major group of antimonopoly laws.
While differing in particulars in its impact upon the American economy, each of these basic statutes is avowedly designed to maintain competition in American interstate and foreign commerce.
The antitrust laws in their totality cover a wider area, however, than
these three major statutes. Out of the congressional law-making process
in the sixty-two year period since the Sherman Act was adopted has
come a surrounding cluster of antitrust enactments of narrower scope.
These include specific antitrust provisions in special federal regulatory
laws covering segments of the economy,5 as well as separate statutes
and clauses providing various exemptions from the operation of the
federal antitrust laws.6 The pattern of the totality of these laws, as
.set forth in a recent compilation of congressional action in this field, 7
covers a broad diversity of subject matter and provides a complex system of vesting enforcement authority in various agencies of the federal
government. Inevitably, proposals for amendments and supplements
to some of these antitrust statutes have been made periodically. since
the genesis of the Sherman Act.
This area of public law has substantial direct and indirect impact8
upon the operation of the economy of the nation. Yet growing unCommission on Revision of the Antitrust Laws of the United States, 82d Cong., 1st sess.
(1951); S. Res. 86, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951); Madison, "Proposed Amendments of the
Federal Antitrust Law and Its Relation to 'Big Business,'" CCH ANnrausT I.Aw Sn1POSIUM 106 (1952); Lilienthal, "Our Anti-Trust Laws Are Crippling America," CoLLIER's
15 (May 31, 1952).
2 26 Stat. L. 209 (1890), as amended by 50 Stat. L. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. (1946)
§§1-7.
s 38 Stat. L. 717 (1914), as amended by 52 Stat. L. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. (1946)
§§41-58.
.
4 38 Stat. L. 730 (1914), as amended by 49 Stat. L. 1526 (1936) and 64 Stat. L.
1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §§12-27, and 15 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1951) §18.
5 H. Doc. No. 599, 81st Cong., 2d sess. 10-12 (1950).
6 See Suggested Guides to Re-examination of Antitrust Exemptions, infra Part VI.
7 H. Doc. 599, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (1950) and Sl!pplement (1951).
s The whole body of American legislation embracing phases of the private competitive
enterprise system on the local, state and national levels is staggering in scope and diversity.
Government has intervened through the legislative and administrative processes in areas
related to entry into an occupation, business, or market, illustrated especially by licensing
restrictions in state and municipal legislation. Some bodies of laws are aimed at the enforcement and regulation of competition. Other statutes have dealt with money, banking,
and credit mechanisms; fiscal, taxation, and tariff policies; regulation of security issues and
organized exchanges; governmental commodity and price controls; labor-management relations; and similar legislative enactments. In another area, government has ventured to
intervene by legislation designed to facilitate and promote economic and social objectives in
agricultural production, marketing, and prices; in housing facilities; in assistance to low·
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certainty as to just where the federal government is headed in its administration· and enforcement of this mass of antitrust laws is casting the
shadow of an enormous question mark over many important business
decisions which are made today.
In the various public forums debate continues on whether the three
basic antitrust statutes, and the accompanying group of special antitrust regulatory statutes, or specific provisions thereof, represent a sound
and workable congressional body of legislative formulations of the public policy in that sphere. Here there are still unreconciled differences
of opinion about the objectives, the substantive content, and the
semantic quality of the congressional art in drafting the words of the
antitrust statutes to make reasonably plain the goals to be sought and
the means of attaining them in a coherent and u,nified manner.
The congressional statutory structure of antitrust has produced interacting views in criticism of its inconsistencies and compromises.9
Some of the statutory provisions "soften" the "hard" competition of
other statutory provisions.10 Exemptions of private interests in some
areas, based on political as well as economic considerations, are contrasted with a discriminatory strengthening of the antitrust sanctions
against private interests in other areas. Debate also continues regarding the procedures and remedies of federal antitrust laws.11 Finally,
the overlapping in jurisdiction of federal antitrust agencies, highlighted especially by the overlaps in jurisdiction of the Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, has generated demands
for congressional action to centralize antitrust administration and enforcement in one source of authority or, at least, to coordinate through
a central agency the concurrent jurisdictions of the several federal
agencies.12
income consumer groups; in social security and insurance programs; in laws designed to
facilitate marketing mechanisms. Government has even intervened in certain areas as a
competitor of private enterprise. Finally, by way of an exception to ordinary competitive
enterprise, government has regulated by statutes the whole field of public utilities and all
forms of transportation, with expansion at times to businesses deemed sufficiently affected
with a public interest to justify reasonable exercises of the so-called "police power" as a
basis of governmental regulation consistent witli the due process clauses of the state and
federal constitutions. See generally, LYON AND AssOOIATES, GoVERNMENT AND EcoNOMIC
LIPE, VoL. I (1939), Vol. II (1940); SToCXING AND WATKINS, MoNOPOLY AND Frum
ENTERPRISE, c. 12 (1951); MCND, GOVERNMENT AND BusINBss (1950). On state antitrust laws, see MAmcm:Nc LAws StraVEY, STATE ANn-TnuST LAws (1940); 32 CoL. L.
R:sv. 347 (1932) and comment by Markham, 40 AM. EcoN. R:sv. 167 (1950).
Supra note I.
for example, Proposals for Reconciling Robinson-Patman Act With Antitrust
Policy, infra Part V.
11 See note 257 infra.
12 See Jurisdictional Overlaps in Antitrust Enforcement, Part VIII infra.
9

10 See,
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Within the recent past, the critical literature on antitrust has
brought to the exploding point pressures pushing toward a complete
re-examination of this field of national public policy. Among the significant questions being raised are these:
Are the congressional policies embodied in these laws intrinsically
sound in approach? Have the laws been drafted with skill in clearly
expressing the objectives, boundaries, and substantiative content of
the legislation?· Have procedures for both the administration and
the enforcement of these laws been wisely conceived and properly
executed? Are the separate provisions of these statutes and their
relation to one another sufficiently consistent and coordinated to effectuate a unified federal public policy of maintaining competition? What
kind, quantum, and quality of competition do these statutes protect?
Is it necessary to recast the earlier classical concepts of competition
.reflected in interpretations of these laws against newer concepts of
"effective" or "workable" competition now widely accepted by economists?
Despite the persistence and the cumulative effect of these widespread questions concerning the existing mass of congressional antitrust enactments, revision of these laws in the past has been on a
piecemeal basis reflecting the transient political pressure upon· the
Congress of one group or another concerned about a particular issue.
No attempt has yet been made by the Congress to survey the entire
field of antitrust law with a view toward ,comprehensive revision and
coordination of these basic laws. Yet the wisdom and, indeed, the
irresistible necessity, of such fundamental inquiry into the question
of where the country is heading in enforcing the antitrust laws, and
what changes are needed in national antitrust policy, appears undeniable.
This article suggests guideposts for such an appraisal.1 3 It is writ13 As in all appraisals of a controversial problem, subjective value judgments are bound
to enter. Cold neutrality on disputed antitrust issues would be a mere pretense. The present article is no exception to the rule that one's estimate of a complex subject like antitrust
is predominantly guided by relative values even when they are geared to a minimum core
of absolute values. What objectivity is claimed for this paper lies in the purpose to make
a fair evaluation that gives due attention to the relevant interacting viewpoints on which
no one person can hope to comer the "right" answers. The appraisal also offers whatever
elements come from the opportunity the writer has had to witness, at first hand over the
past two decades in the Nation's Capital, the functioning of the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, the two major agencies of federal antitrust enforcement.
The ultimate yardstick of this evaluation is a judgment concerning whether the congressional body of antitrust enactments over the past sixty-two years has been worth the
price of the federal appropriations and the manpower resources of the federal government
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ten as the personal credo of the writer, to present both an analysis of the
main trends under these laws, as seen in retrospect, and a formulation
of conclusions and recommendations believed to be helpful toward
achievement of a revised and coordinated national antitrust policy.14
It may contribute to the clarity of the tenor of my views, set forth
in subsequent pages, to present a preview of the general threads in the
pattern of an approach to the enormous task of revision.

B. Recommended Steps Toward Revision
Committee on Revision of Antitrust Policy. Evaluation of the
functioning of the antitrust laws since their inception has convinced
me of the pressing need for ·a comprehensive and impartial study of
our national policy in that field. Such a review and analysis, in my
opinion, can best be made initially by a Committee on Revision of
National Antitrust Policy, organized and financed as a private body.
This committee would act in the role of an Amicus of the Congress
in laying the foundation for a sound revision and coordination of the
antitrust policy of the United States. The organization and functions
of this proposed committee are suggested at the end of this article.
Congressional Declaration of National Antitrust Policy. There
should be a formulation of a congressional declaration of national antitrust policy as a frame of reference for clarification of the congressional
intention concerning the goals of antitrust and the primary means of
achieving them. There is ample precedent since 1933 of like declarations of national policy in various leading regulatory statutes.1 11 It is
devoted to carrying out the public policy objectives of the legislation. In making that value
judgment, the wisdom of the approaches which Congress has followed must be measured
against the alternative method, which might have been followed, of placing exclusive reliance upon the judicial process in the courts of common law and equity. Furthermore, the
appraisal must take into account the interactions of the federal legislative process with the
federal administrative and judicial system of which the antitrust legislation is an integral
part.
14 For supplementary documentation of cases and materials relating to topics covered
in this paper, see my CASEs ON Fl!DERAL ANnTRuST LAws (1948) and UNFAIR TIW>B
PnAcnCEs-CAsEs, CoMMBNTS AND MATI!IIIALS 1-41, c. 11 (1950).
111 See Federal Communications Act, 48 Stat. L. 1064 (1934), 50 Stat. L. 189 (1937),
47 U.S.C. (1946) §151; Public Utilities Holding Company Act, 49 Stat. L. 803 at 812
(1935), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §79d; Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. L. 899 (1940), 49
U.S.C. (1946) notes preceding §§1, 301, 901; McCarran-Walter Act, 59 Stat. L. 33
(1945), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §1011; Employment Act of 1946, 60 Stat. L. 23 (1946), 15
U.S.C. (1946) §1021; Labor-Management RelatiollS Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L 136 (1947),
29 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1951) §141; Anti-Inflation Act of 1947, 61 Stat. L. 945 (1947),
50 U.S.C. App. (Supp. IV, 1951) §1911; Universal Military Training and Service Act,
62 Stat. L. 604 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. (Supp. IV, 1951) §451, and 50 U.S.C.A. App.
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ironical that Congress has never attempted to declare a similar over-

all policy for antitrust. The suggested declaration of policy should
contain three constituent elements of prime significance.
At the outset, the declaration should state the distinctive characteristics of the fundamental ideology of private competitive enterprise under American c~pitalism. This would not be a gesture in meaningless
abstractions and generalities. It would select and reduce to orderly
statement the chief features defining the meaning and functions of
the private enterprise competitive system upon which there has been
a persistent general agreement. This in itself would have a clarifying
effect by embodying for the first time an express congressional avowal
of the public policy of maintaining competition derived from basic
American beliefs reflected in the Constitution and supported by common law and statutory traditions of the United States.
. Secondly, the declaration should expressly state that the competition which the antitrust laws seek to foster and maintain is Workable
Competition.16 Economists differ on the definition and content of
that concept but there is a consensus that the American economy is
characterized by imperfect competition of which Workable Competition is one form. A subsequent section of this article treats this topic
in detail. Suffice it to say at this point that, in my opinion, Workable
Competition is the most promising concept yet evolved by economists
by which the _realities of competition in particular industries or markets
(1951) §451; Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, 63 Stat. L. 714 (1949), 22 U.S.C.
(Supp. IV, 1951) §1571; Defense Production Act of 1950, 64 Stat. L. 798 (1950), 50
U.S.C. App. (Supp. IV, 1951) §2062.
A congressional declaration of policy is not to be confused with a technical preamble.
The declaration follows the enacting clause and becomes an integral part of the specific
statutes to which it is made applicable. It should also declare that all of the provisions of the
statutes shall be administered and enforced with a view to carrying out the declaration of
policy.
One decided advantage of a declaration of policy is found in the guidance it gives as
evidence of congressional intention. The Supreme Court has repeatedly relied heavily upon
such declarations of policy in what may be characterized as the "whole-statute interpretation" approach to congressional intent as against a section-by-section interpretation of a
statute. See OPPENHEIM, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION P01.1CY AND lNTI!n-C,uumm CoMPBTITIVB RATBs, c. II (1945). Ambiguities of meanings of specific provisions and apparent
inconsistencies between specific provisions may be better resolved when measured against
the over-all declaration. Administrative and judicial interpretations guided by a general
declaration of policy are more likely to bring statutes or parts of statutes into a more workable and harmonious whole.
16 In this article Workable Competition is used in the same sense as Effective Competition. See STOCKING AND WAT.KINS, MONOPOLY AND FRBB ENTERPRISE, cc. 4, 5 (1951).
There is a considerable degree of coincidence between my ·thinking about the utilization
of the concept of Workable Competition and the Rule of Reason and the views expressed
by Blackwell Smith, "Effective Competition: Hypothesis for Modernizing the Antitrust
Laws," 26 N.Y. Umv. L. RBv. 405 (1951).
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can be translated into working tools of a modernized approach to antitrust enforcement by the administrative agencies and the courts.
Third, the declaration should expressly adopt the Rule of Reason
as the master yardstick of interpretation and application of the general
standards of the federal antitrust laws. From my point of view, it has
long been disturbing to observe the drift away from this approach in
the administration and enforcement of national antitrust policy. In its
place, there has been increasing resort to the rigid confines of per se
violation rules-a delusive certainty through mechanized enforcement
at the expense of the flexibility needed to deal with the actualities of
imperfect competition and especially the problems of industrial concentration in big business units among both sellers and buyers. In the
respects shown later, the Rule of Reason would provide the central
artery of a procedural device for considering all relevant legal and economic factors in any given factual situation. Thereby the concept of
Workable Competition can be given the substance and reality demanded by the contemporary American economic system.
These three elements of a congressional declaration of national
antitrust policy would represent a substantial net gain in closing the
currently existing gap between legal and economic concepts of competition and monopoly. Out of that framework of explicit congressional
intention can be built bridges for greater reconcilation of conflicting
viewpoints. The declaration would be a master map for ·directionfinding of basic objectives and means out of which may come a more
consistent and better coordinated national antitrust policy.
Revision of Basic Antitrust Statutes. It would be the responsibility
of the suggested committee to formulate proposals for revision of the
basic antitrust statutes in line with the proposed declaration of national
antitrust policy.
The next pages outline the extent to which the proposed declaration
would consolidate a great deal of common ground on which government
and business may meet.

C. Suggested Boundaries of Common Ground Between Government
and Business

In characterizing the controversies on antitrust one writer aptly
said: ''The public debate shows signs of being disorderly. It needs an
agenda, a common language, and a common graund."17
17 MacDonald, "Businessmen and the Sherman Act," 41 FonTUNE
(Jan. 1950).
·
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The wisdom of this recommendation is evident. In va,rious parts
of this article the task of antitrust revision will he suggested with reference to the above three elements. What follows marks out the metes
and hounds of the common ground which government and business
should recognize and occupy as a springboard for exploration of conHictihg issues.
I. It is academic to debate repeal of the major components of the
federal, antitrust laws. There is general acceptance in public opinion
that so long as American private competitive enterprise endures, the
people will continue to regard a national antitrust policy as an unexpendahle article of faith in a political and economic democracy. This
is so regardless of whether that gospel is expressed in terms of maintaining freedom of competition or in terms of condemning monopolistic
aggression. Furthermore, this public opinion remains unshaken no matter how competition and monopoly may be defined in popular, or technical legal, economic, or business usage.
2. Despite cynical references to a "cartel" virus that is alleged to be
driving many American businessmen to restrictive agreements and a
feverish hunger for monopoly power, American business generally joins
the public in support of a federal antitrust policy. This is true of businessmen collectively, even though numerous antitrust cases themselves
attest to individual deviations from the essentials of a competitive
· struggle accm;ding to the legal "rules of the game." That is the area
in which antitrust policing is obviously needed. Yet, it is not imputing .
too much to American industrial leadership to say that· it has come of
age m knowing that it cannot have the cake of competition and eat the
competitors too.
3. To say that the public and business generally stand four-square
behind the antitrust laws does not mean that there is indifference to
the content and effects of that national public policy. Businessmen
have made vocal then: insistence that the proper function of government in relation to ordinary private business in this sphere should be
limited in the following respects with which this writer concurs:
a. Congressional antitrust policy should continue to place major
reliance upon negative proscriptions rather than affirmative prescriptions. It should retain the orthodox pattern of a series of "thou shalt
nots." These "don'ts" are the hard kernel of governmental intervention that today gives government and businessmen a firm common
ground of concurrence in approaches to antitrust.
b. The experience of over 160 years of American competitive enterprise teaches the lesson that the antitrust laws should not try to dis-
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place the organic checks and balances of the opposing factors and forces
of the economic system upon which we depend to bring into rough
balance the private and public interests. Any attempt by government
to substitute as a ·long-range public policy a spurious omniscience of
planned controls for the essentially impersonal and automatic processes of competition in private business would invite a mirage of frustrated hopes. The cross-currents of the ramified American economic
order issue from economic freedom of private enterprise in deciding
· what kind and how much of goods and services to produce, and how, to
whom, and at what price, to sell and distribute the fruits of technology,
invention, and innovation through private risk entrepreneurship for
profit. This quintessence of private discretion is the_ fundamental reason
for adhering to the general use of negative prohibitions upon unlawful
antitrust conduct rather than a series of positive mandates of lawful
competitive conduct.
4. The antitrust prohibitions mentioned in the preceding paragraphs should be couched in terms of general standards of forbidden
conduct rather than by specifi~ enumeration of types of outlawed conduct. This has been the pattern of the congressional approach in the
Sherman and Federal Trade Commission Acts and, for the most part,
in the Clayton Act, the third of the major federal antitrust laws. A
subsequent part of this article sketches the evolution of this aspect of
antitrust policy.
5. These general prohibitions should be interpreted by application of the dominant yardstick of the Rule of Reason rather than by
resort to administrative and judicial per se violation rules which currently tend to nullify the standard of reasonableness. The shifts back
and forth between these two measuring rods of antitrust violation are
pictured in another part of this article.
6. There is considerable evidence of widespread recognition of
·two beliefs regarding the effectiveness of the federal antitrust laws.
One is that they have been a potent force in preventing the American
industrial system from developing according to a blueprint of a cartel
economy like those of other countries which have never had an antitrust policy. The other is the belief, especially since large-scale dramatization of antitrust enforcement began to make itself felt after 1938,
that big bus!tiess throughout the land has made no important managerial
policy or decision without conscious consideration of the prohibitions
of the antitrust laws.
7. Antitrust has played a creditable role in the remarkable achievements of the American technological and industrial economy, but can-
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not alone give us the kind of society we cherish. Government and
. business, and the public generally, nevertheless look to the antitrust
symbols as keeping alive the greater probabilities of a wider scope and
better kind and quality of competition under antitrust than under any
alternative consistent with the set of beliefs of American political and
economic democracy.

II
Tue oF WAR BETWEEN PER SE VIOLATION

DocTRINE

AND

RuLE OF REASON

A. A Few Threads in Historical Perspective
The first step taken by Congress in inaugurating its national policy
·on competition and monopoly was the Sherman Act of 1890. In 1914
the Federal Trade Commission and Clayton Acts supplemented the
Sherman Act. The Federal Trade Commission was introduced as an
administrative agency endowed with powers of investigation and adjudication. In the Clayton Act, specific forms of transactions were
outlawed where certain effects upon competition are shown. In the
intervening years, these three basic statutes have been amended in
certain respects.
·
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has shared
with the Federal Trade Commission responsibility for enforcement
of the Sherman Act. By a series of judicial interpretations, the Supreme Court has firmly established the Commission's jurisdiction to
proceed under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act against
violations of the Sherman Act as "unfair methods of competition."
Under the same section 5 of its organic act, the Commission also has
. a zone of exclusive authority to resa;ain in their incipiency practices
which threaten to ripen into Sherman Act violations. Concurrent
jurisdiction for enforcement of sections 3, 7, and 8 of the Clayton Act
is vested in the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. To the Commission falls the prime responsibility for enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act amendment to section 2 of the Clayton Act. All of these· aspects are considered later in this article.
To attain proper perspective, it is necessary first to notice a major
distinction in the policy objectives of these laws. The Sherman, Federal Trade Commission, and Clayton Acts comprise a set of principal
federal statutes designed to maintain competition by insuring that
competition will not be eliminated or drastically reduced. These con-
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trols correspond to the area generally described as restraints of trade,
monopoly, and monopolistic practices. Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act and the Robinson-Patman Act amendment to section
2 of the Clayton Act are also in some aspects part of a different set of
federal statutes designed to regulate competition by marking out a
plane of competitive rivalry to insure that the quality of competition
is not impaired by the practices prohibited by these laws. These controls correspond to the area generally designated as unfair trade practices. Thus, the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts and practices
and the Robinson-Patman Act proscribes various species of price and
service discriminations.
The distinction between these two sets of laws is not a water-tight
one. They constitute both opposite and complementary phases of the
public policy of fostering competition in open markets. The two sets
of laws may be applicable separately or concurrently, depending upon
the types of business conduct in issue in any particular case. Unfair
methods of competition may be used to reinforce forbidden restraints
of trade and monopoly. The effects of the unfair methods of competition may be measured by their impact upon the competitive system.
In between, there ID:ay be a range of permissible business conduct that
does not substantially injure or lessen competition and does not result
in excessive competition. In this article, only a few of these differentiations and interactions are considered insofar as they are relevant
to the strictly antitrust issues.
It is obviously not feasible to compress within the limits of this
paper an analysis of the whole body of federal antitrust legislation.
The Sherman Act, the concurrent antitrust jurisdiction under the Federal Trade Commission Act, and sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act
will therefore be given most attention because of their preponderant
role. The significant trends in the administration and enforcement
of these major statutes must necessarily be viewed in a broad sweep
in keeping with the purpose of appraisal of important trends in antitrust rather than a compilation of annotated case law in great detail.
Throughout these principal antitrust statutes runs a common problem of a tug-of-war between two rival methods of administrative and
judicial determination of when the public policy expressed in the particular law has been violated by the course of conduct challenged by
the government.
Antitrust reflects the never-ending conflict between the desire for
certain!Y and the desire for flexibility that is as old as the processes of
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law itself. The desire for certainty motivates businessmen to insist
upon explicit guides to what is lawful and what is unlawful in any
given course of conduct within the orbit of the antitrust laws.18 At the
same time, government's interest in expeditious enforcement of the
antitrust laws similarly tempts it to seek certainty-this time in absolute rules of per se violation. 10 There is, of course, no paradox in the
fact that what the businessmen regard as desirable certainty is not
that sought by the government in arguing for the desirability of per se
violation rules of enforcement.

B. Per Se Violation• Doctrine
Per se violation means that certain types of conduct or the existence
of certain market conditions are in and of themselves declared unlawful.20 In antitrust proceedings, rules of per se violation pe~it the
government to sustain its burden of proof merely by showing the existence of the particular operative facts to which the legal consequences
of the rule automatically attach. The defendant is thereafter foreclosed from adducing evidence to prove o~er factors by way of affirmative defenses. He can only join issue with the government with respect
to the existence of the basic fact which brings the per se violation rule
1s See HENDERSON, FEDERAL TRADE CoMMissroN, c. 1 (1924); MILLER, UNFAIR
CoMPETlTION passim (1941); LoEVINGER, THE I.Aw OF FREE ENrnRPRISE, c. IV (1949);
STOCKING AND WATKINS, MoNOPOLY AND FREE ENrnRPRisE, cc. 8-11, 16 (1951); Letter
of Transmittal and Memorandum for President's Committee on Business and Government
Relations, N.Y. State Bar Assn. Section on Anti-Trust Law 62 (1950); Simon, "The Case
Against the Federal Trade Commission," 19 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 297 at 298-301 (1951);
Madison, "Proposed Amendments of the Federal Antitrust Law and its Relation to 'Big
Business,'" CCH .ANn'I'nuST I.Aw SYMPosmM 106 (1952); Austem, "Inconsistencies in
the Law," CCH BuSINEss PRACTICES UNDER FEDERAL .ANn'I'nuST LAWS 158, 169 (1951);
FAIRLESS, GUILn:- BEFORE TRIAL 6, 14 (1950); Jacoby, "Antitrust Policy Re-examined,"
58 J. PoL. Eco:i-.. 61 at 62 (1950).
19 Timberg, "The Antitrust Laws from the Point of View of a Government Attorney,"
PRACTICING LAw lNSTITOTE 31 at 39-40 (1949).
20 For application of the per se violation doctrine, see United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392, 47 S.Ct. 377 (1927); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150, 60 S.Ct. 811 (1940); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S.
211, 71 S.Ct. 259 (1951); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 68 S.Ct. 550
(1948); Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 68 S.Ct. 793
(1948); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 71 S.Ct. 745 (1951);
Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457, 61
S.Ct. 703 (1941); United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 67 S.Ct. 1634
(1947); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 71 S.Ct. 971 (1951);
United States v. Pullman Co., (D.C. Pa. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 123, various subsequent
proceedings culminating in 330 U.S. 806, 67 S.Ct. 1078 (1947); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416; American Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 328 U.S. 781, 66 S.Ct. ll25 (1946); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334
U.S. 131, 68 S.Ct. 915 (1948); Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc.,
(1st Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 484.
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into operation. He cannot show the effects of that fact in the gestalt
of its economic context. In the field of restrictive agreements among
competitors, the price fixing agreement is the classic example of an
operative fact of a per se violation rule. In the field of industrial concentration, the existence of monopoly power is presently the leading
instance of another operative fact of illegality per se.
This per se doctrine obviously works mechanically once the fact
of the practice or the market condition is proved. From proof of that
fact Hows a conclusive presumption-a rule of law-that the effects
prohibited by the antitrust laws exist. No evidence to the contrary
is- admissible. From the standpoint of administration and enforcement of the antitrust laws, the per se doctrine offers an inviting escape
hatch from the vagaries of a standard of reasonableness. The question
remains nevertheless whether these automatic rules of law do not
defeat the true objectives of the antitrust legislation.
C. Rule of Reason
Diametrically opposed to the per se illegality approach is the Rule
of Reason. Against the demand for certainty is counterpoised the
desire for the comprehensive coverage and B.exibility allowed by application of the general standards of antitrust to specific factual situations
through the utilization of a standard of reasonableness.
The Rule of Reason draws the line between zones of legal and
illegal conduct under the antitrust laws by consideration of all the factors and circumstances in any given situation.21 It petmits consideration ~d analysis of any transaction or market condition in the light of
all the record evidence admitted for its materiality, relevancy, and probative value in relation to the antitrust issues in the case. Whereas a
per se rule immediately brands the operative fact embraced by it as
unreasonable, the Rule of Reason opens the way to reliance upon a
broad range of discretion in weighing the evidence of defenses of justification compatible with the purposes of the antitrust statutes. The
Rule of Reason operates through a process of inclusion and exclusion
in a case-by-case consideration of all the facts. The per se illegality
21 See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 68 S.Ct. 1107 (1948);
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 53 S.Ct. 471 (1933); Standard
Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 51 S.Ct. 421 (1931); United States
v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 40 S.Ct. 293 (1920); Board of Trade of the
City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 38 S.Ct. 242 (1918). Cf. Tag Mfrs.
Institute v. Federal Trade Commission, (1st Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 452. On remedies,
see United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) ·91 F. Supp. 333.

1152

MrcmGAN LAw REvmw -

[ Vol. 50

doctrine operates by converting predetermined single-fact categories
into fixed rules of law.
This dichotomy of antitrust doctrine caine about as a result of
judicial interpretations of the general standards which are present in
most of the provisions of the three principal federal antitrust laws.
Antitrust is no exception to the established practice of the courts, when
seeking the intended legislative meaning of the general words of statutes, to resort to rules of statutory interpretation that sometimes have
around them an aura of judicial. legis1ation.22 The Supreme Court
has many times had to £11 in the interstices of the generality of the
language in the Sherman, Federal Trade Commission, and Clayton
Acts. · In so doing, the Court poured into the vessels of these general
words the meanings it thought Congress had intended. There has
been no stricfronsistency in this reading of the statutes by the Court.23
.To this day, the Supreme Court still wavers between the delusive rule
of statutory construction that plain words have a plain meaning and
the use of extrinsic aids in the legislative history of the statute to ascertain the actual intention of the Congress. 24 How this see-sawing
process of statutory construction explains the emergence of the conflicting per se violation and Rule of Reason · approaches to antitrust
will now ·be ~xamined.
·

D.. Generality of Standards in Principal Antitrust Laws
.

In the Sh~rman Act of 1890, Congress chose to .use general standards of prohibition. Section l of the act declares illegal every contract
or combination in the form of a trust .or otherwise, or conspiracy
in restraint of interstate and foreign c;ommerce.25 Section 3 does likewise for the kinds of commerce more specifically mentioned therein.26

22 See Adams-Mitchell Co. v. Cambridge DistribU:ting Co., (2d Cir. 1951) 189 F.
(2d) 913,. 922.
·
23 See .Austern, "Inconsistencies in the Law," CCH BusINEss PRAcnCEs UNDER
FEDERAL ANnrnusT LAws 158 (1951 Symposium).
24 Frank, ''Words and Musk: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation," 47 CoL. L.
REv. 1259 (1947); Handler, "A Study of the Construction and Enforcement of the Feileral Antitrust Laws," TNEC MONOGRAPH No. 38, 2-9 (1941); note, "A Re-evaluation of
the Use of Legislative History in the Federal Courts," 52 CoL. L. REv. 125 (1952).
25 "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal..•." 26 Stat. L. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §1.
26 ''Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in.restraint
· of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or of the District of Columbia;
or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such Territory and anoi:her, or between
any such Territory or Territories and any State or States or the District of Columbia or
with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia .and any State or States or
foreign nations; is hereby declared illegal..••" 26 Stat. L. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1946)
§3.
-
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The legal pitfall was in the stilling word "every." For twenty years
it produced conflicting judicial interpretations until the Rule of Reason
dicta in the Standard Oil and Tobacco opinions of 1911 27 imported into
the sweeping language of the statute the limitation that violations must
· ·
·
te
om "
und
ue"or"unreasonabl"
e restnct:J.ons
of compet:Ih ave resuldfr
tion. This was the genesis of the Rule of Reason, but not its final
acceptance.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act contains similar generality of legislative standards.28 Once again a choice is offered between interpreting
the sweeping language of the section inside the rigid framework of a
per se violation approach or within the broad and B.exible approach of
Rule of Reason tests. The choice must be made whenever judicial
meaning is to be given such concepts as monopoly power, monopolizing,
or attempts to monopolize any part of the interstate and foreign commerce of the United States. The present status of the administrative
and judicial construction of these terms is discussed in a later section of
this article.
When the Federal Trade Commission Act was passed in 1914,
Congress again adhered to the formulation of general standards by
using the words "unfair methods of competition."29 These are now
interpreted .. by the courts to embrace Sherman Act violations so that
their judicial construction coalesces at many points with the trends in
judicial interpretation of that basic antitrust statute. 30
In the various sections of the Clayton Act,31 Congress in the same
manner adhered to general standards so far as proof of effects on competition of the transactions covered in the Clayton Act is concerned. As
will be shown later, the Robinson-Patman Act:3 2 standards do not en27 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S.Ct. 502 (1911);
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 31 S.Ct. 632 (19ll).
2 8 ''Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars,
or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion
of the court." 26 Stat. L. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §2.
2 9 The substantive provision of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as
amended, reads: ''Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." 38 Stat. L. 717 (1914)
amended by 52 Stat. L. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §45.
30Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 334 U.S. 839, 68 S.Ct. 1492
(1948).
81 See section 3 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. L. 730 at 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1946)
§14; section 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. L. 731 (1914), as amended by 64 Stat. L. 1125
(1950), 15 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1951) §18.
3249 Stat. L. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §13.
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tirely fit this pattern. With that exception, and the further qualification that the Clayton Act specifies by description the practices it is intended to reach, Congress adhered to the course of formulating its antitrust prohibitions in legislative standards phrased in general terms.

E. Dilution of Rule of Reason Approach

If Congress had explicitly adopted the Rule of Reason in each of
these three basic antitrust statutes, it would have provided the guiding
unifying standard that would have foreclosed the evolution of the
queer hybrid of inelastic per se violation rules for some aspects of
antitrust enforcement and Rule of Reason flexibility for others that
characterizes enforcement at the present time.
These opposing approaches in federal antitrust statutory interpretations have had an impact upon judicial decisions at every level of the
American economy. In the scope of application of each of these two
trends in judicial interpretations, there is a significant differentiation
in two fields. One relates to restrictive agreements among competitors
confederated in loose forms of arrangement for joint action, discussed
below. Such practices are commonly designated as "cartel" agreements.
The other concerns the knotty public policy issues of concentration of
economic power through industrial mergers, internal growth, including
vertical and conglomerate integration, and other forms of expansion of
a business enterprise. ·This is now popularly known as the problem of
Bigness or "Giantism," as explained in a subsequent part of this paper.
With respect to restrictive agreements among competitors, the
pendulum of judicial interpretations of the three principal federal antitrust statutes has swung between the extremes of per se violation rules
and the Rule of Reason.88 As of 1952, the trend is decidedly toward
application of per se illegality in this segment of antitrust practices.
as For differing views on these two doctrines, see: Timken Roller Bearing Co. v.
United States, 341 U.S. 593, 71 S.Ct. 971 (1951); Standard Oil Co. of California v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293, 69 S.Ct. 1051 (1949); Apex Hosiezy Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469, 489-500, 60 S.Ct. 982 (1940); Chadwell and McLaren, "The Current Status
of the Antitrust Laws," Umv. Iu.. LAw FoRuM 491, 511 (1950); Handler, "A Study of
the Construction and Enforcement of the Federal Antitrust Laws," TNEC MoNOGRAPH No.
38, 2-9 (1941); Oppenheim, ''Foreign Commerce Under the Sherman Act: Points and
Implications of the Timken Case," 42 T.M.R. 3, 7-10 (1952), and "A New Look at
Antitrust Enforcement Trends,'' CCH ANn'I'RuST LAw SYMPOSmM 69 (1950); STOCK·
ING AND WAT.KINS, MONOPOLY .AND FREE ENTllRPRISB, c. 9 and 352-353 (1951); Smith,
''Effective Competition: Hypothesis for Modernizing the Antitrust Laws,'' 26 N.Y. UNIV.
L. RBv. 405 (1951); Sunderland, "Changing Legal Concepts in the Antitrust Field,'' 3
SYRAcusB L. RBv. 60 (1951); Symposium, "Divestiture As A Remedy Under the Federal
Antitrust Laws,'' 19 GEo. WASH. L. RBv. 119 (1950); Timberg, "The Antitrust Laws
from the Point of View of a Government Attorney,'' PRACTICING LAw lNsTITtlTll 31 at 39-40
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Historically, the impetus to per se violation doctrine came from the
celebrated opinion of Judge Taft in the Addyston Pipe & Steel Company case.34 He concluded that the Rule of Reason was applied at
common law only to covenants in restraint of trade which were ancillary
to the main purpose of a lawful contract and "necessary to protect the
covenantee in the enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract, or
to protect him against the dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by
the other party." A naked restrictive agreement among competitors was
considered barren of such a main lawful purpose since its sole purpose
is "to avoid the competition which it has always been the policy of the
common law to foster."
In 1927, the Trenton Potteries decision311 was regarded as crystallizing the per se violation rule in price fixing cases. Thereafter, the
Socony Vacuum opinion of Justice Douglas in 194()36 reaffirmed the
Trenton Potteries rationale and announced many dicta that included
in their prohibitions numerous indirect means of tampering with the
price structure through joint actions of competitors. A year later, the
Supreme Court condemned group boycotts by associations of competitors having the avowed purpose of ending widespread piracy of
dress designs and millinery styles.37 By 1952, the Supreme Court had
repeatedly restated the proposition that price fixing agreements and
group refusals to deal are illegal per se and, in the National Lead and
Timken cases,38 the Court applied the same doctrine to foreign commerce agreements among competitors to divide world-wide markets.
The Department of Justice has consistently maintained that similar
agreements with restrictions on production, allocations of customers,
and the like are likewise within the ban of the per se violation rules.
Tying clauses and requirements contracts under section 3 of the Clayton
Act and certain practices under the Robinson-Patman Act have also
been placed in virtual per se violation categories by judicial decisions
mentioned in other parts of this article .

•

(1949); Van Cise, "The Antitrust Laws from the Point of View of a Private Practitioner,"
PRACTICING I.Aw lNsTITtITE 1 at 14-15 (1949); Kittelle and Lamb, ''The Implied Conspiracy
Doctrine and Delivered Pricing," 15 I.Aw & CoNTEM. PnoB. 227 (1950); Hale, "Agreements
Among Competitors-Incidental and Reasonable Restraints of Trade," 33 MINN. L. REv.
331 (1949).
34 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
35 273 U.S. 392, 47 S.Ct. 377 (1927).
86 310 U.S. 150, 60 S.Ct. 811 (1940).
37 Fashion Originators' Guild of America v.

Co., (6th Cir. 189_8) 85 F. 271.

Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457,
61 S.Ct. 703 (1941).
38 United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 67 S.Ct. 1634 (1947); Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 71 S.Ct. 971 (1951).
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There is little doubt that there has been a marked increase in the
area of applicability of the per se illegality doctrine, especially since
1940, with corresponding attenuation of the Rule of Reason so far as
these restrictive agreements are concerned. Indeed, the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission are alert to prevent any infusion of vitality into the earlier decisions
where the Rule of Reason was given the Supreme Court's blessing as
applied to price fixing arrangements.39
The steady advance of the per se violation doctrine, if continued,
threatens to dilute the Rule of Reason to the point where it will be so
limited in scope as to apply only in exceptional cases. This erosion
of the Rule of Reason achieves expeditious enforcement of the antitrust
laws through a mechanization of per se violation rules at the expense of
the benefits to the competitive system as a whole that are preserved by
_an assumption of the more arduous burdens of the "Rule of Reason"
approach. While there are still areas in which the Rule of Reason is
applied, there is an unmistakable danger that the process of attrition, if
unchecked, will eventually nullify this standard of reasonableness and
reduce the Rule of Reason to a ghostly hue without corporeal substance.

F. Congress Should Expressly Adopt Rule of Reason Approach
There is a diversity of opinion regarding the correspondence of this
trend of judicial interpretation to the intention of the Congress. 40 . Some
writers have shown that the common-law doctrines of restraints of
trade, which the Sherman Act was intended to codify, were in fact conflicting and that the federal judges themselves have differed in their
conclusions regarding that body of common law. Whatever position
one may take in this controversy, the fact remains that the last word
thus far has rested with the courts. The courts necessarily have the
final say about the meaning of words in the Sherman Act that are too
general to be considered plain in meaning. Congress can intervene
in the controversy, however, by providing clearer guides for the courts
to follow in interpreting this general language. Thus, a:· paramount
39 See Board of Trade and Appalachian Coals cases, supra note 21, and for other
areas, see Brief for the United States, Timken Roller Bearing Company v. United States,
filed April 20, 1951, in the Supreme Court of the United States, No. 352, Oct. Term
1950, at 83-86; Brief for the United States on Liability, United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corporation, filed January 29, 1952, in The United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts, Civil No. 7198, at 74-95.
40 Handler, "A Study of the Construction and Enforcement of the Federal Antitrust
Laws," TNEC MoNOGRAPH No. 38 (1941); Peppin, "Price-Fixing Agreements Under the
Sherman Anti-Trust Law," 28 CALIF. L. REv. 297, 677 (1940); STOCKING AND WATKINS,
MoNOl'OLY AND FREE EN-rmu>msE, c. 9 (1951).
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public policy question is whether Congress should now make a deliberate choice by express adoption of the Rule of Reason for application to these restrictive agreements. The effect of this congressional
choice would be a repudiation of the present trend toward entrenchment in the law and in the administrative process of the per se violation
rules.
In thinking about the ~onsequences of an erosion of the Rule of
Reason, there are certain first principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence which should be kept in mind. They should be in the forefront of any revision of existing legislation to achieve a proper balance
between private and public interests with regard to these restrictive
joint actions of competitors.
Of paramount importance is the preservation of a defendant's constitutional right to a fair and full hearing on questions of fact on discordant issues of antitrust policy. A sine qua non of this right is the
proper apportionment of the burden of proof. On the issue of the facts
of violation, the government has the burden of proof in its authentic
sense of the burden of establishing the existence of such violation. In
an antitrust civil proceeding instituted by the Department of Justice,
this requires a preponderance of evidence, whereas in Federal Trade
Commission proceedings, the applicable standard of proof is substantial
evidence shown by the whole record. 41
The respondent's view of whether he has been accorded due justice
in an antitrust proceeding is guided by the traditional concept of his
right to have a full day in court. To him this is the indispensable
element of procedural due process. Fairness of the hearing given to the
respondent on questions of fact is linked with fullness of the hearing.
Both are deemed minimal to the rudimentary requirements of fair
play.42
Applied to the realm of possible defenses to charges of antitrust
violation, the per se violation doctrine is repugnant to these fundamental
constitutional safeguards. It selects a particular fact-the restrictive
agreement or, in industrial concentration cases, a particular market
condition-as the decisive fact frol}l which an irrebuttable presumption
of antitrust illegality is derived as an immutable rule of law. This at
once forecloses a respondent from introducing evidence on the panoply
of possible legal and economic justifications in harmony with an over41 See OPPENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICEs-CAsEs, CoMMENTS AND MATERIALS,
779-780 (1950).
42 Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 56 S.Ct. 906 (1936); DAVIS, Al>MINis·
TRATIVE LAW, c. 8 (1951).
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riding public interest of which the antitrust laws may properly take
cognizance.
Only the Rule of Reason provides relief from this impasse. Postponing, until later, consideration of the application of the Rule of
Reason to industrial concentration issues, let us here analyze the nature
of the process and the manner in which it would operate with respect
to the apportionment of the burden of proof regarding issues pertinent
to restrictive joint conduct of competitors.
It should be recognized at the outset that a congressional code of
specified types of lawful and unlawful conduct under the antitrust laws
would be only a snare and a delusion. Congress therefore chose the
right course when it embodied general standards in the greater part
of the principal antitrust statutes. The introduction through administrative and judicial interpretations of per se specific violation rules in
displacement of the general legislative standard is equally illusory, if
not a distortion of the existing congressional intention.

G. Proposal for Prima Facie Case of Illegality
Once this is accepted as a common ground of belief for government
and business, the road to a realistic accommodation of the public interest
in effective antitrust enforcement and the private interest in conservation of the constitutional safeguards of a fair and full- hearing on
questions of fact is clearly marked out. That accommodation lies in
the direction of utilizing firmly settled devices of procedure and evidence with which every lawyer is familiar. For the areas of antitrust
law where -the per se violation approach has been most pronouncedin price fixing and other restrictive agreements among competitors
under the Sherman Act and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act-a prima facie case of illegality should be substituted for the rigidity
of the per se doctrine. 43
In any given civil antitrust proceeding, the initial burden of the
government is to introduce evidence of the fact of violation. Upon the
government throughout the litigation is fixed the burden of establishing the antitrust violation either by the weight of the evidence, or in
Federal Trade Commission proceedirigs, by substantial evidence in the
light of the whole record.44 This is the true burden of proof in the
sense of the assumption of the risk of non-persuasion concerning the
existence of the violation.
48 This is also recommended for tying clauses under section 3 of the Clayton Act,
infra Part ill E.
44 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456 (1951).
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Substitution of a prima facie case of illegality for the present per se
violation rule in the field of restrictive agreements fully preserves this
true burden of proof. In accordance with traditional rules, the respondent should have the burden of proof as to any affirmative defenses,
again in the real sense of assuming the risk of non-persuasion. 45 When
the government reaches the evidentiary stage of showing the existence
of a restrictive agreement alleged to be in violation of the antitrust
laws, it would be regarded as having established thereby a prima facie
case of violation of the statute. Under the per se violation approach,
such proof by the government automatically establishes the fact of
illegality. Under the suggested prima facie case, however, the respondent at this point would no longer be foreclosed from proceeding to
prove other factors in the way of an affirmative defense. Instead, he
would then have the burden of proceeding with rebuttal evidence to
show justification within the allowable limits of the antitrust statutory
standards. If he fails to make such showing, the government will then
have adequately made its showing of illegality.
The burden of going forward with the evidence would shift as the
trial of issues of fact in such cases proceeds, requiring either the government or the respondent, as the case may be, to come forward with
evidence. When all of the evidence is introduced, the trier of fact
would then apply the Rule of Reason to the entire record. He would
exercise discretion in evaluation of this evidence to arrive at a value
judgment guided by the standard of proof applicable to government and
to the respondent. Throughout the whole course of the proceeding,
then, the respondent would have a full opportunity to present all the
relevant facts he can muster to justify, as an affirmative defense, the
merits of his course of conduct. He would, in short, have a full day
in court with the knowledge that the trier of fact would give due weight
to his side of the controversy. This prima facie case approach appears
far more in harmony with due process of law than the present reliance
upon per se violation rules in proceedings involving restrictive agreements among competitors.
There is one aspect of the foregoing suggested process of proof
which requires special mention. One of the general propositions of
this writer's credo is rejection of the blueprint of cartel-like agreements
among competitors which, as one writer has put it, substitutes an order
of peace for the order of competitive struggle46 that American national antitrust policy seeks to maintain. There should be no misunder45 See 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§2485-2486 (1940).
46 CALLMANN, llNFAm CoMPEnnoN AND TRADE MAnxs, 2d

ed., §15.1 (1950).
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standing of the writer's antitrust philosophy on this score. There is no
intention, in making this proposal, to give aid to any mechanisms fostering erosion of the basic concept of Workable Competition to which
reference has heretofore been made. The writer's plea for a full-scale
application of the Rule of Reason in the types of situations here under
discussion is not to be taken as an invitation to return to the roseate
hues of industrial self-regulation through joint agreements among
trade association members or other groups of competitors as advocated_
in the 1920's47 and as they flourished in the NM Codes of Fair Competition during the brief life of the National Industrial Recovery Act.48
For want of a better shorthand expression than the one which has
widespread usage, American antitrust policy has properly been characterized as an anti-cartel policy. The policy itself should remain unimpaired, but without the semantic enslavement of a catchword like
"cartel," which may prove to be a tyrannous label misdescriptive 0f the
actualities of a particular arrangement or agreement.
One way of giving assurance that the Rule of Reason would not
be misused to give judicial countenance to subterfuge and evasion of
the salutary antitrust prohibitions upon unreasonable restrictions upon
competition through joint action of competitors is to place upon the
defendant the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the
legal justifications set up in his affirmative defense.49 This standard
of proof may well be for this purpose a desirable alternative to the less
strict standard of the preponderance or weight of the evidence and is
one which is sometimes applied in common law and statutory standards
of .proof. In particular factual situations, evidence of legal, economic,
and social justifications can then be weighed under close judicial
scrutiny to arrive at a determination of whether the restrictions are
reasonable or unreasonable when measured against the effects upon
competition. Neither government nor business should object to this
realistic adjustment between the rigidity of per se illegality and the
up.certainty of the Rule of Reason. - There would be no weakening of
the enforcement of the federal antitrust laws since the standard of
47 See EDDY, THE NEw COMPETITION (1912); JoNEs, TRADE AssoCIATION ACTIVITIES
AND THE LAw (1922); NAYLOR, TRADE AssoCIATIONs (1921); HEERMANcE, CoDES 011
ETHics (1924); NATIONAL hmusTRIAL CoNPERENCE BoARD, TRADE AssoCIATIONs:
THEIR ECONOMIC SIGNII'ICANCE AND LEGAL STATUS (1925); JAvrrs, BUSINESS AND THE
PtrnX:m lNTEREsT, c.
(1932); MILLER, UNPAIR CoMPETITioN, c.
(1941).
48 Held unconstitutional in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837 (1935).
49 Cf. United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326, 72 S.Ct. 690
(1952). Wigmore has stated this as the sense of being safely and surely convinced. W1c·
MORE, CoDE OP EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2861 (1942); W1cMoRE, EVIDENCE §2498 (1940).

xi
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clear and convincing evidence would serve notice that exceptions to
independent actions of competitors will have a limited range of tolerance
in individualized situations where there are overriding legal, economic
and social justifications for the restrictions of joint conduct.

H. Agencies of Government Should Be Equipped
for Rule of Reason Responsibilities
It is not a convincing refutation of the views just stated to contend
that the antitrust enforcement agencies of the federal government are
not equipped to cope with the burdens that will be imposed upon them
by opening Pandora's box of perplexities incident to a thoroughgoing
application of the elastic Rule of Reason. American antitrust policy
will never come to grips with the inescapable task inherent in the administration and enforcement of the federal antitrust laws so long as
either government or business hides its head in the sand to shut out the
constantly changing and varied conditions in American industries and
markets as they actually exist in structure, behavior, and accomplishments. The relative uncertainty of judicial decisions under the Rule
of Reason is a price worth paying for the general standards in antitrust
legislation by which flexibility and broad coverage can be achieved.
The alternative quest for certainty by blind devotion to per se violation
rules produces a rigid formulary system of mechanical rules of law
which does violence to the facts of the American economic order. This
is too high a price to pay for the government's merely chalking up an
impressive record of enforcement successes no matter how hollow those
victories may prove to be when they fail to square with the ineradicable
facts of industrial life in the United States.
It is disturbing to find that Justice Frankfurter, speaking for a
majority of the Supreme Court, has recently given encouragement to
the continued dilution, if not the vitiation, of the Rule of Reason by
expressions of serious doubts regarding the capacity of the judicial
process to measure up to its demands. In his majority opinion in the
Standard of California case/ 0 Justice Frankfurter made certain observations on this subject which are refuted by what the Supreme Court
has said and done in other cases in giving meaning and content to the
bare words. of the federal antitrust laws.151
i;o Standard on Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 at 310, 69 S.Ct.
1051 (1949). See also United States v. Richfield on Corp., (D.C. Cal. 1951) 99 F. Supp.
280, alfd. per curiam, 343 U.S. 922, 72 S.Ct. 665 (1952).
51 Supra note 21.
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As shown in a subsequent part of this article, the Standard of
California decision was based upon illegality attached per se to inferences of prohibited effects on competition drawn from mere proof of
the fact of substantially affected commerce. Conjoining his dictum
with a misreading of the legislative history of section 3 of the Clayton
Act,5 2 Justice Frankfurter asserted that a Rule of Reason standard of
proof would be "if not virtually impossible to meet, at least most illsuited for ascertainment by courts." He then supported his conclusion
with the following statement appended in a footnote: 53
"The dual system of enforcement provided for by the Clayton
Act must have contemplated standards of proof capable of administration by the courts as well as by the Federal Trade Commission and other designated agencies . . . . Our interpretation
of the Act, therefore, should recognize that an appraisal of economic data which might be practicable if only the latter were
faced with the task may be quite otherwise for judges unequipped
for it either by experience or by the availability of skilled assistance. "

If the foregoing comments of the Justice are taken at face value,
there would be no scope for the Rule of Reason in any antitrust proceeding where economic data must be evaluated without prior intervention of an administrative agency. This would repudiate any
evidence of congressional intention to apply the Rule of Reason in
construing the Sherman Act and sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act
when the case is initiated by the Department of Justice rather than the
fact-finding Federal Trade Commission. This effect reached by the
Standard of California interpretation of section 3 of the Clayton Act has
been subsequently reaffirmed in the Rich-field Oil case. 54 Yet such an
escape from the judicial obligation was rio more warranted in these latter
instances that it would have been in other cases where the Supreme Court
has taken a contrary approach.
Without the aid of the intervention of an administrative tribunal
like the Federal Trade Commission, the Supreme Court has nevertheless faced up to the task of applying the Rule of Reason whenever it
concluded- that such was the intention of the Congress.55 Making
52 As shown in Lockhart and Sacks, "The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act," 65 HARv.
L. REv. 913 (1952).
53 Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 69 S.Ct. 1051,
n. 13 (1949).
·
54 (D.C. Cal. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 280, affd. per curiam 343 U.S. 922, 72 S.Ct. 665
(1952).
55 See cases cited supra note 21.
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allowances for the dissenting views of the justices at different periods
in judicial interpretations of the federal antitrust laws, Justice Frankfurter's conclusion is diametrically opposed to what the Supreme Court
actually said and did in classic instances of Rule of Reason applications
in both the field of restrictive agreements among competitors and
industrial concentration. Such application of the Rule of Reason is
indeed the inescapable judicial task inherent in antitrust so long as
there is legal and economic necessity for legislative standards that have
"a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable
in constitutional provisions."56 Justice Frankfurter himself exposed a
self-contradictory rationalization of his interpretation of section 3 of the
Clayton Act, when he conceded that relevant economic evidence would
have been admissible if the Court had found it necessary to decide the
issues under the Sherman Act. In the Timken case he also declared
his preference for the Rule of Reason applied to foreign commerce
transactions.
- Finally, it is especially noteworthy that however much the Supreme
Court justices have differed on the scope of application of the Rule of
Reason in determining the existence of antitrust violations, the Rule
of Reason has been methodically used by the Court in deciding- upon
remedies to correct antitrust violations found to exist.57 Surely, in civil
antitrust proceedings, this same Court, acting as a Court of Equity,
could hardly be said to have a dual-personality, one ill suited to appraisi1:1g economic evidence when antitrust violation is in issue, the other
well suited to such a task when antitrust r_§medies are in issue.
If the courts need expert assistance on economic aspects of antitrust, consideration should be given to appropriate methods of providing judges with advisory assistance of experienced economists of
recognized competence. 58 As an alternative, the device of a Master
56 Appalachian Coals'Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 at 360, 53 S.Ct. 471 (1933).
57Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 71 S.Ct. 971 (1951);
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 68 S.Ct. 788 (1948); United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 71 S.Ct. 160 (1950); United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 68 S.Ct. 915 (1948); United States v. National
Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 67 S.Ct. 1634 (1947); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States,
323 U.S. 386, 65 S.Ct. 373 (1944), 324 U.S. 570, 65 S.Ct. 815 (1945); United States
v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 65 S.Ct. 254 (1944); United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 40 S.Ct. 425 (1920); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
(D.C. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 333. See also Symposium, "Divestiture As a Remedy
Under the Federal Antitrust Laws," 19 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 119 (1950); Timberg, "Equitable Relief Under the Sherman Act," UNIV. ILL. LAw FonuM 629 (1950).
58 See recommendations by Adams, "Dissolution, Divorcement Divestiture: The Pyrrhic Victories of Antitrust," 27 Ind. L.J. 1 at 33·34 (1951); Oppenheim, in Symposium
on "Divestiture As A Remedy Under the Federal Antitrust Laws," 19 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
119, 130-131 (1950) and on "A New Look At Antitrust Enforcement Trends," CCH
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in Chancery might be given a new use by its extension to the antitrust
field through appointment of an economist to advise the Master in
Chancery.59 Either form of assistance should help the judges in
appraising the relative merits of opposing economic views and data
as developed in the record of particular cases and upon which a Rule
of Reason determination of antitrust violation and scope of remedies
depend.
. If the executive and administrative agencies of government are not
now equipped to handle the Rule of Reason burdens of substance and
procedure demanded by constitutional limitations upon governmental
actions affecting private business rights, then the solution lies in supplying the needed equipment in the form of adequate personnel and
adequate congressional appropriations.60 This is so even though the
art of using the Rule of Reason obviously can never rise higher than
its source in the imperfections of knowledge and skills common to all
human instruments of government. Let it not be forgotten that the
respondents in antitrust proceedings will face similar difficulties in
presenting their defenses by evidence subject to close administrative
and judicial scrutiny under the standards of the burden of proof. The
reciprocal Rule of Reason evidentiary -burdens of government and
respondents will doubtless more often show disparity in the greater
antitrust enforcement resources of the federal government-than in the
exceptional ~ases where the collective defense counsel resources of
associations of competitors outstrip those available to the government.61
It is accordingly recommended that the congressional declaration
of national antitrust policy, outlined in this article, should incorporate
a prima facie case of illegality for restrictive agreements covering any
ANrrrnusT I.Aw SYMPOSIUM 69 at 83 (1950). Cf. GRIFPIN, AN EcONOMIC APPROACH
TO ANrrrnuST PROBLEMS, Am. Enterprise Assn. (1951); Dession, "The Trial of Economic
and Technological Issues of Fact," 58 YALB L.J. 1019, 1242, 1260-1266 (1949).
59 Section 7 of the Federal Trade Commission Act empowers the Commission, upon
the request of the district courts, to serve as a master in chancery in framing appropriate
decrees in antitrust suits "brought by the· Attorney General. Section 6(c) authorizes the
Commission to investigate compliance with ~titrust decrees upon application of the Attorney General and to report its findings and recommendations to him. 38 Stat. L. 717
at 721-722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §§47, 46(c). See United States Versus Economic
Concentration and Monopoly, A Staff Report to the Monopoly Subcommittee, H. Res. 64,
79th Cong., 23 (1946); TNEC, Final Report 40 (1941).
60 See H. Rep. No. 3236, 81st Cong., 2d sess., Part I, §VII (1951); Hoov.BR CoM•
MISSION, TASK FoRCBRi!PORT ON REGULATORY CoMMISSIONS 127-128 (1949). In this connection, the work of the Economic Section of the Antitrust Division and the Bureau of
Industrial Economics of the Federal Trade Commission is especially significant.
61 H. Rep. No. 3236, supra note 60 at 44 where it is stated: "In one case before the
Commission at the time this was being written, the respondents were represented by 102
separate law firms. To meet this force of legal talent the Commission had the services of
one principal attorney and two part-time assistants."
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type of joint action among competitors. The Rule of Reason, also to
be incorporated in the declaration, should then be made applicable to
such horizontal agreements, with the proviso that upon proof by the
government of the restrictive agreement, the burden of rebutting the
prima facie case of illegality thereby established shall be upon the
respondent charged with violation of the antitrust laws. It should be
further provided that the defendant shall have the ultimate burden
of establishing his affirmative defenses by clear and convincing
evidence.
. In further confirmation of the need for the foregoing revisions of
the federal antitrust laws, other significant trends in administrative and
judicial interpretations of the three principal antitrust statutes should be
understood.

III
SoME TRENDS TowARD PER SE VIOLATION APPROACH

In the field of restrictive agreements among competitors, the present
tendency to resort to per se violation rules has been fostered by the
fallacy of an assumption by the courts that questions of fact and of law
can be readily resolved by automatic identification and isolation of the
illegal courses of conduct.
In practice, this rule of thumb approach has precipitated a controversy which requires a fresh examination of certain fundamental
legal and economic concepts which appear to be lost in the maze of
abracadabra.
No pretense will be made of exploring here the refinements in
analysis of legal and economic issues and the interchange of conflicting
viewpoints readily available in the existing large volume of literature
on recent trends in judicial interpretations of the antitrust laws in their
bearing upon these significant public policy issues. Only an abbreviated characterization of these trends is presented to reveal the implications of the tug-of-war between the per se illegality and the Rule of
Reason doctrines in the controversial zones in question.

A. Sprawling Nature of Implied Conspiracy Doctrine
One sector of divergent views concerns the delimitation of the
proper scope of application of the implied conspiracy doctrine in civil
antitrust proceedings initiated by the Department of Justice and the
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Federal Trade Commission charging illegal restramts. of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. 62
The concept of conspiracy is of ancient lineage in the law. It is a
chief concept under the Sherman Act. In antitrust cases, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly stated that no formal agreement and no overt act
beyond the act of conspiring is necessary to constitute an unlawful
conspiracy under the Sherman Act. 63 It is accordingly plain that an
implied conspiracy may be based upon circumstantial evidence of collusive action among competitors achieved through the medium of
restrictive agreem~nts. The federal courts and the Federal Trade
Commission have broad discretion and great latitude in the reception of
such circumstantial evidence.
There has been mounting criticism in recent years of the looseness
of the application of this ·concept of implied conspiracy in antitrust
.cases. 64 Some writers have vigorously asserted that this tendency has
been due primarily to the dicta in the opinions of the courts which
went far beyond the ambit of the decisions themselves in their narrow
boundaries as precedents on the facts of the particular case.
A storm center of this dispute has been the price conspiracy cases
of recent date, especially those which have adjudicated antitrust issues
pertinent to the use of the basing point or other types of delivered or
geographic pricing.65
62 The following are representative of the views and problems involved: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee On Study of Monopoly Power of the Committee On The Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st sess., Serial No. 14, Pt. 1, 366-371 (1949); Dession, "The Trial of
Economic and Technological Issues of Fact," 58 YALE L.J. 1019, 1242 (1940); Handler,
"Anti-Trust, New Frontiers and New Perplexities," 6 THE REcoRD (N.Y.C. Bar) 59
(1951); Kittelle and Lamb, "The Implied Conspiracy Doctrine and Delivered Pricing," 15
LAw & CoNrEM. PROB. 227 (1950); Rahl, "Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws," 44
JI.I.. L. REv. 743 (1950); note, "Conscious Parallelism-Fact Or Fancy?" 3 STAN. L. REv.
679 (1951).
63 Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Assn. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 34
S.Ct. 951 (1914); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 59 S.Ct. 467
(1939); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 62 S.Ct. 1070 (1942); William
Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., (D.C. Pa. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 1011, (3d Cir. 1945)
150 F. (2d) 738, cert. den. 334 U.S. 811, 68 S.Ct. 1016 (1948); Bigelow v. RKO Radio
Pictures, Inc., (7th Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 877, revd. on grounds not here pertinent, 327
U.S. 251, 66 S.Ct. 574 (1946); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781,
66 S.Ct. 1125 (1946); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 68 S.Ct. 550
(1948); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 68 S.Ct. 525 (1948).
See also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 71 S.Ct. 160 (1950).
64 See concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S.
440 at 445, 451-452, 69 S.Ct. 716 (1949); Kittelle and Lamb, "The Implied Conspiracy
Doctrine and Delivered Pricing," 15 LAw & CoNrEM. PROB. 227 (1950); Sunderland,
"Changing Legal Concepts in the Antitrust Field," 3 SYRACUSE L. REv. 60 at 68-71
(1951); Wood, "The Supreme Court and a Changing Antitrust Concept," 97 UNIV. PA.
L. REv. 309 at 329-335 (1949).
65 E.g., Kittelle and Lamb, "The Implied Conspiracy Doctrine and Delivered Pricing," .
15 LAw & CoNrEM. PnoB. 227 (1950).
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There is a piece of common ground on which government and
business are in fundamental accord. Both agree that proof of conspiracy
requires a finding of the fact of an agreement or understanding among
competitors to achieve an unlawful end or to use unlawful means
prohibited by the antitrust laws. An essential element of this offense
is collusive or concerted action. There is no denial that such actual
agreement may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
Controversy begins when the line between concerted and independent action needs to be drawn. A series of civil cases instituted by both
the Department of Justice ana the Federal Trade Commission produced judicial opinions that countenanced in decision or dicta a deep
thrust of the implied conspiracy doctrine. 66 The nub of the divergent
views of government and business is found in the question of what is
reliable circumstantial evidence of probative value in establishing the
fact of an agreement. What caused the flare-up of controversy was the
extension of proof to inferences of concerted action based upon a common course of action among competitors, each knowing that the others
follow the same practice, and a substantial uniformity or identity of
result in prices or other elements of market behavior.
Justice Jackson raised his voice in protest against the '1oose practice"
of applying the conspiracy doctrine, characterized by him as an "elastic,
sprawling and pervasive· offense."67 When circumstantial evidence is
used in a dragnet or "shotgun" fashion to facilitate proof of an implied
conspiracy based largely upon inferences, the disparity between such
an inflated legal concept and the businessman's margin of safety in
using long established market practices, previously regarded in law
and in economics as competitive practices, results in dangling over the
heads of businessmen a Damocles sword of antitrust violation. 68
66 FTC. v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 68 S.Ct. 793 (1948); Triangle Conduit
& Cable Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (7th Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 175, affd. (by
an equally divided Court) sub nom. Clayton Mark & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,
336 U.S. 956, 69 S.Ct. 888 (1949); Bond Crown & Cork Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (4th Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 974; Allied Paper Mills v. Federal Trade Commission,
(7th Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 600; Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,
(7th Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 899; Milk and Ice Cream Can Institute -v. Federal Trade
Commission, (7th Cir. 1946) 152 F. (2d) 478; United States Maltsters Assn. v. Federal
Trade Commission, (7th Cir. 1945) 152 F. (2d) 161. Cf. Milgram v. Loew's Inc., (3d
Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 579, cert. den. 343 U.S. 929, 72 S.Ct. 762 (1952); Milwaukee
Towne Corp. v. Loew's Inc., (7th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 561, cross petitions for cert.
den. 342 U.S. 909, 72 S.Ct. 302, 303 (1952); United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 333 U.S. 364, 68 S.Ct. 525 (1948). Contra: Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, (8th
Cir. 1949) 178 F. (2d) 363, cert. den. 339 U.S. 942, 70 S.Ct. 794 (1950).
67Concurring opinion in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 at 445, 69 S.Ct.
716 (1949).
68 See expressions of such views in Burns, "If You're in Business You're Probably
Guilty,'' 28 BARRoN's WEEKLY 5 (1948); Simon, "The Case Against the Federal Trade
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Once again there is confirmation in this evolution of the iII].plied.
conspiracy doctrine of the salutary value of the application of the Rule
of Reason instead of per se illegality rules. Price fixing conspiracies
are but one species of restrictive agreements among competitors. Government has insisted that it is merely attacking collusive action. In the
delivered price controversy, the Federal Trade Commission has publicly
disclaimed any intention to outlaw geographic pricing as such or to
condemn the voluntary absorption of freight by the independent decision of an individual producer who penetrates distant markets to
compete for volume of sales.69
Out of the morass of arguments and counter-arguments emerges
the conclusion that the underlying cause of the disagreement is the
government's search for a particular fact or a narrowly circumscribed
set of facts from which a per se violation rule can be applied in this
_implied conspiracy field. This is highlighted by the frequency with
which labels have been used as a leverage for the per se illegality
approach. "Conscious parallelism of action," "uniformity of conduct,"
"planned common course of action," "systematic matching of prices,"
and the like are catch-phrases which at the very least may sometimes
inhibit judicial scrutiny of the record evidence to determine whether
there is a predetermined or planned-actual agreement to fix prices.70
Critics who have analyzed the judicial decisions in this area have
insisted that the record evidence in many of these cases does not support a :finding of conspiracy in the traditional sense of actual concerted
action:11 On this, judgments of appraisal of the evidence may well dif-fer. An important point of agreement is recognition of the hazard that
Commission,'' 19 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 297 (1951); Van Cise, "The Antitrust Laws from
the Point of View of a Private Practitioner,'' PRACTICING LAw INSTITUTE (1949); Letter
of Transmittal and Memorandum for The President's Committee on Business and Government Relations, N.Y. State Bar Assn. Section on Antitrust (1950).
69 For example, see Federal Trade Commission Notice to the Staff, In re Commission
Policy Toward Geographic Pricing Practices, October 12, 1948, and the following articles
by members of the Federal Trade Commission Staff: Edwards, "Geographic Price Formulas
And The Concentration Of Economic Power," 37 GEo. L.J. 135 (1949); Johnson, ''The
Restrictive Incidence of Basing Point Pricing On Regional Development,'' id. 149; Wooden,
''The Concept Of Unlawful Discrimination As It Applies To Geographic Price Differences,'' id. 166; Sheehy, ''The Legal And Factual Content Of Recent Geographic Pricing
Cases," id. 183; Wright, "Collusion and Parallel Action in Delivered Price Systems,'' id.
201; Dawkins, "Defenses Available in Cases of Geographic Price Discriminations," id. 217.
70 For illustrative cases involving such characterizations of conduct, see cases cited
supra note 66, and note "Conscious Parallelism-Fact or Fancy?" 3 STAN. L. REv. 679
(1951); SIMON, GEOGRAPmc Pru:CING PRACTICES (1950).
71 See Kittelle and Lamb, ''The Implied Conspiracy Doctrine and Delivered Pricing,"
15 LAW & CoNTEM. PROB. 227 (1950); Hilder, ''The Attack Upon Delivered Price Sys·
terns,'' 14 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 397 (1946) and reply by Wooden, ''The Defense of Delivered Price Systems,'' 15 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1946).
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per se illegality rules applied to this field inherently tend toward reliance
on a slender reed of positive evidence of conspiracy distilled from inferences drawn from only a few facts. The Rule of Reason would counteract this tendency to set an extremely low minimum of proof of implied
conspiracy, especially in cases where the Federal Trade Commission has
the latitude of the substantial evidence rule and the advantage of a
narrow scope of judicial review of the findings of fact of administrative
bodies deemed expert under the law of their creation. Through the
Rule of Reason approach, every facet of the evidence would be examined to ascertain both the true nature of the challenged arrangement
and its actual or reasonably probable economic effects upon competition
in the relevant products and markets in question.
Closely allied to this process of proof is the question of what in fact
and in law is a price-fixing agreement.72 The per se illegality doctrine
glosses over this aspect by assuming that price fixing can be readily
defined and segregated whenever parallel action of competitors is directed toward any feature of the price structure, as in the case of delivered prices. Price leadership in markets where oligopoly fewness of
large sellers and standardized commodities are involved is another
phenomenon of business behavior on which viewpoints differ concerning whether price leadership amounts to an implied conspiracy or
reflects price competition in imperfect but effective competitive markets. 73

B. Conspiracy Doctrine Applied to Intercorporate Relationships
Another focal point of controversy about the pliant conspiracy doctrine is the flowering of conceptions of intercorporate and internal
corporate conspiratorial action to bring such arrangements within the
circle of the federal antitrust laws.74 The recent Timken decision of
72 See discussion of borderline price fixing cases by Blackwell Smith in "Effective Competition: Hypothesis for Modernizing Antitrust Laws," 26 N.Y. Umv. L. REv. 405 at 424
(1951).
•
78 See BURNS, THB DECLINE 0I' COM.PETITION, c. ill (1936); Comer, ''Price Leadership," 7 I.Aw & CoNTEM, Pnon. 61 (1940); Handler, "A Study of the Construction and Enforcement of the Federal Antitrust Laws," TNEC MoNOGRAPH No. 38, 40-45 (1941 ); Markham, "The Nature and Significance of Price Leadership," 41 AM. EcoN. REv. 891 (1951);
STOCKING.AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE, c. 6 (1951); Wilcox, "Competition and Monopoly in American Industry," TNEC MONOGRAPH No. 21, 121-132 (1940);
OPPENHEIM, CASES ON FEDERAL ANnntusT LAws 182-184 (1948).
74 See note, "Are Two or More Persons Necessary to Have a Conspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act?" 43 ILL. L. REv. 551 (1948); Kramer, "Does Concerted Action
Solely Between A Corporation and Its Officers Acting on Its Behalf in Unreasonable Restraint of Interstate Commerce Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act," 11 FED. B. J. 130
(1951); Rahl, "Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws," 44 ILL. L. REv. 743 at 762-768
(1950); Sunderland, "Changing Legal Concepts in the Antitrust Field,'' 3 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 60 at 71-72 (1951).
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the Supreme Courf 5 has stirred anew the anxiety of businessmen that
the inherent necessity of coordinated conduct of corporate affairs within or among the managerial organizations of corporate entities may become the nemesis of the pervasive corporate form of doing business if
the antitrust conspiracy doctrine overflows its traditional bounds.
In a series of cases prior to the Timken case, the Supreme Court
strengthened by reaffirmation the proposition that "The corporate interrelationships of the conspirators are not determinative of the applicability of the Sherman Act." 76 This has been applied to a parent corporation
and its subsidiaries or affiliates. The mere existence of two corporate
entities under common control thus becomes the basis for rejecting the
contention that the two should be treated as a single firm legally incapable of conspiring with itself.
•
·
A vagrant application of the antitrust conspiracy doctrine to parentsubsidiary or affiliated corporations would cause a metamorphosis of
present-day corporate enterprise and would disrupt the inherent nature
of its operations. There is still hope that heed will be given to the
warning in Justice Jackson's vigorous dissenting opinion in the Timken
case against carrying the "two corporate entities" theory of conspiracy
to its drily logical and conceptual extreme, a caveat just as pertinent to
American domestic commerce as it is to the foreign commerce of the
United States involved in the Timken case.77 The present tendency
toward per se illegality applicable to implied conspiracy in restrictive
agreements should not be permitted to convert intercorporate relationships as such into a per se conspiracy. The real antitrust issue is the
establishment of the misuse of such relationships by proof of an actual
combination or conspiracy to achieve an unlawful main purpose, or to
accomplish a lawful objective by unlawful means. 78 The same rationale
should apply to internal relations of a single corporate entity and its
directors, officers and employees, about which there have been signs of
rather fanciful theorizing. Once again the Rule of Reason approach
advocated in this article emphasizes the need for considering all of the
75 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 71 S.Ct. 971 (1951).
See United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., (D.C. Cal. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 280, affd. per
curiam, 343 U.S. 922, 72 S.Ct. 665 (1952).
76 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 71 S.Ct. 259 (1951);
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 67 S.Ct. 1560 (1947), and see second
appeal, 338 U.S. 338, 70 S.Ct. 177 (1949); Schine Chain Theatres v. United States, 334
U.S. 110, 68 S.Ct. 947 (1948). See also, United States v. General Motors Corp., (7th
Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 376, cert. den. 314 U.S. 618, 62 S.Ct. 105 (1941).
77 See discussion in Oppenheim, "Foreign Commerce Under the Sherman Act: Points
and Implications of the Timken Case," 42 T.M.R. 3 at 5-7 (1952).
78 But cf. dicta of Justice Jackson in United States v. Oregon State Medical Society,
343 U.S. 326, 72 S.Ct. 690 (1952).
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factors.and circumstances of the various forms of single and multiple
corporate actions. Otherwise an unconfined antitrust conspiracy doctrine might become the cause of forcing corporate subsidiaries or affiliates into one fused entity only to be confronted with the clutching
hand of the restraint of trade and monopoly provisions of the antitrust
laws.

C. Antitrust Policy Applicable to Trade Association Activities
Another closely related topic of broad significance is the demarcation
of the sphere of constructive activities of trade associations consistent
with the public policy of the federal antitrust laws.79 Here also the
approach should be to evaluate the nature, purpose, and effects of a
particular joint or cooperative activity of a trade association by application of the Rule of Reason in the total setting of the circumstances of the
specific factual situation.
Admittedly the administrative and judicial decisions on trade asser
ciation activities underscore the difficulties of drawing a line between
legally permissible cooperative action mutually beneficial to business
and the public and joint courses of conduct in violation of the antitrust prohibitions that suppress competition among the members of the
association and forestall outside competition.
Per se violation rules applied to trade association activities are on
their face and in actual application at odds with the economic and business necessity of supplementing individual actions of competitors with
cooperation. Certain functions of trade associations are generally recognized as socially useful. Cooperative research on product innovation,
production, and distribution efficiency, market and merchandising
surveys, cooperative advertising, recommended product and quality
standards, publication of trade journals, circulation of information concerning government activities and conduct of relations with government,
representation of the industry or trade in dealing with labor and con79 See Pearce, "Trade Association Survey," TNEC MONOGRAPH No. 18 (1941);
KmsH AND SHAPIRO, TRADE AssocrATIONS IN LAw AND BusIN:Ess (1938); Handler, "A
Study of the Construction and Enforcement of the Federal Antitrust Laws," TNEC MoNoGRAPH No. 38, 18-27 (1941); BURNs, TH:E DEcLIN:E oF CoMPETITION, c. 2 (1936); EnwARDs, MAINTAINING CoMPETITION 19-31 (1949); Wilcox, "Competition and Monopoly
in American Industry," TNEC MONOGRAPH No. 21, 225 et seq. (1940); STOCKING AND
WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND Frum ENTERPRISE, c. 8 (1951); MUND, GovERNMENT AND
BusINEss 167-172 (1950); Timberlake, "Standardization and Simplification Under the AntiTrust Laws," 29 CoRN. L.Q. 301 (1944); Rugg, "Trade Associations," CCH ANTITRUST
LAw SYMPOSIUM 145 (1952); comment, "Trade Association Statistics and the Anti-Trust
Laws," 18 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 380 (1951); McAllister, "Legal Aspects of Trade Association Statistics," No. 4, CuRRENT BusINESS STUDIES, TRADE AND lNDusTRY LAw lNsnTUTE

19 (1949).
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sumer groups, and the like, are illustrative of concededly laudable objectives.80 Within the range of trade association activities are also the
gathering and dissemination of statistics covering cost, price, ~redit, and
a variety of other statistical information. Some of these activities may
or may not run afoul the antitrust laws depending upon a multiplicity
of factors which have been considered in the decisions of the Supreme
Court and the lower federal courts.81
There is no simple antitrust formula for reconciling the concept of
independent competitive rivalry among members of a trade association
with the concept of legal sanctions for cooperative endeavors. Conflicting views on how this accommodation should be made persist and have
been accentuated by the judicial trends toward per se violation rules.
The underlying problem of delimiting the appropriate "functional
area of cooperative action"82 in harmony with the objectives of the
federal anti-trust laws present issues of public policy on which the guiding yardstick of the Rule of Reason offers the best prospects of solution.
When one considers the diversity in trade association organization and
operations, as well as the differentiations in the size, membership structure, geographic area, extent of control, and coverage of functions, how
can the market impact of specific practices be appraised except by considering all phases of their nature and effects in any given situation
pursuant to a Rule of Reason approach?
·
Since trade association activities sometimes involve arrangements
of the type herein discussed in connection with restrictive agreements
among competitors, it is not surprising that the per se illegality rules
have been prominent in antitrust proceedings against such trade groups.
Trade associations have been charged most often with being the instrumentality of price fixing agreements and, as subsidiary thereto, there
have been charges of !,"elated restrictions also aimed at price control,
some of them associated with charges of "freezing" distribution channels

so Berge, ''Trade Associations and the Antitrust Laws," Address before the Washington
Trade Association Executives, May 16, 1945. These activities, financed to a great extent
by the large companies in an industry, have greatly benefited the small business firms
which pay only nominal dues and also cannot afford to conduct independently many of
the group activities of the trade association.
s1 Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 56 S.Ct. 629 (1936); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 42 S.Ct. 114 (1921); United
States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 43 S.Ct. 607 (1923); Maple Flooring
Mfrs. Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 45 S.Ct. 578 (1925); Cement Mfrs. Protective
Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 45 S.Ct. 586 (1925); Tag Mfrs. Institute v. FTC,
(1st Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 452.
82See Pearce, "Trade Association Survey," TNEC MoNOGRAPH No. 18 (1941),
Letter of Transmittal, at xiii.
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through organized group boycotts.83 Some of these effects are perhaps
in part attributable to loose language in the dicta in court opinions.84
Regardless of the position one may take on the basic philosophy of
the trade association movement in its hearing upon independent private competitive enterprise, trade association executives and their legal
counsel have ample ground for contending that the suhleties and refinements of the rules of evidence and burden of proof, manifested in the
broadening of the implied conspiracy doctrine through per se violation
rules, have shaken the foundation of trade associations to an alarming
degree. The trade journals are replete with assertions that the trade
association has fallen to the lowest point in the history of that institution of American business. Trade association membership, it is said,
has not only been discouraged, but the existing membership is so constantly confronted with the threat of antitrust that membership has become a ticket to decrees of antitrust violation.
This mental attitude, irrespective of whether it corresponds to actual
conditions or whether it is an exaggerated psychological consequence of
the per se violation trend in judicial decisions, is a matter of serious public concern. Industrial self-regulation through trade associations with
adequate governmental safeguards against antitrust abuses occupies
an important place in the American business structure. 85 Government
and business stand on common ground more readily when there is mutual recognition of the constructive accomplishments trade associations
have already made toward elevation of the legal plane of competition
through cooperative means of eliminating unfair trade practices, particularly misrepresentation practices. This common ground is much less
evident when some government officials express little faith in the
readiness and ability of trade associations to exercise self-restraint by
avoidance of collusive .action with the purpose or effect of imposing
83 See Guthrie, "Federal Trade Commission Price Conspiracy Cases," 8 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 620 (1940); OPPENHEIM, CASES ON FEDERAL A.NrrrauST LAws 335-336 (1948).
84 See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S.Ct. 811 (1940);
Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 68 S.Ct. 793 (1948); Fort
Howard Paper Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (7th Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 899; Phelps
Dodge Refining Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, (2d Cir. 1943) 139 F. (2d) 393;
Eugene Dietzgen Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (7th Cir. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 321, cert.
den. 323 U.S. 730, 65 S.Ct. 66 (1944).
85 See TNEC MoNOGRAl'H No. 34, "Control of Unfair Competitive Practices Through
Trade Practice Conference Procedure of the Federal Trade Commission" (1941); Kittelle
& Mostow, "A Review of the Trade Practice Conferences of the Federal Trade Commission,"
8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 427 (1940); Nelson, "Trade Practice Conference Rules and the
Consumer," id. 452 (1940); McAllister, "Basic Trends in Progress of the FTC Act," CCH
A.NrrrausT I.Aw SYMPOSIUM 95, 102 (1949); OPPENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICEsCAsEs, CoMMENTS AND MATERIALS 747-777 (1950); United States Versus Economic Concentration and Monopoly, A Staff Report to the Monopoly Subcommittee, H. Res. 64, 79th
Cong. at 29 and 33 (1946); H. Rep. No. 3236, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 30-34 (1951).
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cartel types of restrictions to stiHe competition among members inter
sese and to control the market by blocking competition of outsiders. 86
This school of government thinking tends to make the word "cooperation" synonymous with "collusion" and to stress the necessity for per
se violation rules. The approach has strong traces of the cynicism expressed by Adam Smith in the frequently quoted passage from his
Wealth of Nations that "people of the same trade seldom meet together
even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public or in some contrivance to raise prices."
A much more tenable hypothesis from the standpoint of the public
interest under the antitrust laws is the belief that the modern day trade
association is an essential democratic institution for providing business
leadership with the opportunity to promote coordination of competitive
forces without sacrifice of the benefits of individual initiative and independence of decision of the individual business firm. 87 Various alternative ways of more fully translating this philosophy of approach into the
public policy of antitrust should be re-examined and reappraised. As one
former government official summed up the matter,88 the question
whether effective enforcement of the federal antitrust laws and trade
association activities can proceed side by side, "each functioning cooperatively. as a part of American effort to keep business activity free
from illegal restraints," depends upon what he described as the "fundamental attitude" of trade associations.
The task ·of making such an adjustment of the private and public
interest related to the trade association movement is an unfinished one.
A new chapter should be written to chart a course of national antitrust public policy which makes the Rule of Reason the corner-stone
of the administrative and judicial processes by which this reconciliation
can be better achieved. There need be no fear that such an approach
would give trade associations an "immunity bath" for cooperative activities or that the way would be paved for a revival of the ill-fated NM
Codes of Fair Competition without adequate governmental safeguards.
Rather, the Rule of Reason poses public policy issues never better
SSTNEC HEARINGS, Part 25, 13311 et seq. (1941).
87The TNEC "Trade Association Survey" TNEC MONOGRAPH No. 18 at 348 (1941),
supports this thesis by concluding that ".Although trade associations from time to time are
implicated in charges of collusive restraints on competition, there appears to be ground for
the often-repeated contention of trade association leaders that a large majority of trade associations, at least those of national and regional scope, avoid sponsoring or participating in
this type of concerted action." See also "Trade Associations in the Present Emergency,"
TRADE AND INDUSTRY LAW lNsnTIJTE, CURRENT BusINEss STUDIES No. 9 (1951).
88 Berge, "Trade Associations and the Antitrust Laws," Address before the Washington Trade Association Executives, May 16, 1945.
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stated than in these words of Chief Justice Hughes when he referred to
the prohibitions of the Sherman Act: 89
"Designed to frustrate unreasonable restraints, they do not prevent the adoption of reasonable means to protect interstate commerce from destructive or injurious practices and to promote competition upon a sound basis. Voluntary action to end abuses and to
foster fair competitive opportunities in the public interest may be
more effective than legal processes. And co-operative endeavor
may appropriately have wider objectives than merely the removal
of evils which are infractions of positive law."

D. Foreign Commerce Restrictions
A spirited controversy regarding alternatives in antitrust policy
applicable to the foreign commerce of the United States has been given
renewed emphasis since the decision of the Supreme. Court in the recent Timken case.90 The writer has elsewhere analyzed the highlights
of that case and the trends in judicial decisions on foreign commerce
under the Sherman Act.91 A recapitulation of the views therein expressed on this topic is appropriate here.
In keeping with the thesis of the present article, the Rule of Reason
and the concept of Workable Competition should be made expressly
applicable to antitrust issues involving American foreign commerce in
the same manner as it is recommended those yardsticks should be applied in the field of American domestic commerce.
To date most of the judicial interpretations of the foreign commerce
provisions of the federal antitrust laws have adhered to the per se violation doctrine. In a series of decisions; violation has been based upon
findings of fact of a combination or conspiracy to achieve by concerted
action an unlawful main purpose.92 This is frequently equivalent to
findings of fact that the means employed by the defendants are illegal
per se. The net result is that these foreign commerce cases may be
89 Sugar

Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 at 597-598, 56 S.Ct. 629

(1936).

90Timken Roller Bearing Company v. United States, 341 U.S. 593; 71 S.Ct. 971
(1951).
91 Oppenheim, ''Foreign Commerce Under The Sherman Act-Points and Implications
of the Timken Case," 42 T.M.R. 3 (1952).
92 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 31 S.Ct. 632 (1911);
United States v. National Lead Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 513, mod. and affd.,
332 U.S. 319, 67 S.Ct. 1634 (1947); United States v. General Electric Co., (D.C. N.Y.
1948) 80 F. Supp. 989; United States v. General Electric Co., (D.C. N.J. 1949) 82 F.
Supp. 753; United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., (D.C. Mass. 1950) 92 F.
Supp. 947; United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., (D.C. N.Y. 1951) 100 F.
Supp. 504, decision of the district court on remedies rendered May 16, 1952.
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classified as international cartel arrangements involving collusive action
with respect to division of territories, price fixing, or similar conspiratorial restrictions upon competition.
So far as section I ( or section 3) of the Sherman Act is concerned,
the government in these cases was able to sustain its burden of proof of
violation merely by establishing the fact of the restrictive arrangement
among domestic companies, or domestic and foreign companies. From
this fact the restraint on American domestic or foreign commerce, or
both, was held to be unreasonable per se.
With respect to section 2 of the Sherman Act, the government must
adduce additional evidence to prove the existence of monopoly power,
or specific intent to monopolize or attempt to monopolize when monopoly
power has not been achieved, as shown in a subsequent part of this
article.
·
In the Timken case, the dissenting opinions of Justices Jackson and
Frankfurter espoused a Rule of Reason approach under the Sherman
Act to foreign commerce activities of American companies. Both Justices showed awareness of the importance of weighing ,the economic
effects of the network of world trade barriers as factors which may
justify restrictive agreements among competitors affecting American
foreign commerce, whereas like arrangements affecting American commerce that is solely domestic would·not escape condemnation under the
per se violation rules.
This differentiation would be a half loaf Rule of Reason, but
better than none at all. However, the whole loaf of the Rule of Reason
should be made expressly available through a congressional declaration
that it is to be applied to issues involving both the domestic and foreign
commerce of the United States. There is little likelihood that the present
Supreme Court will reverse the current trend of its interpretation of the
Sherman Act to arrive at such a conception of the congressional intention as herein set forth. Yet the considerations which make that public policy desirable are the same as those previously analyzed in this article in connection with purely domestic transactions.
It is undeniable that the conditions affecting foreign commerce are
usually strikingly different from those affecting domestic commerce.
The strength of the Rule of Reason nevertheless lies precisely in its
capacity to be sufficiently flexible to take into account all differentiated
conditions, whether in domestic or in foreign commerce. When all relevant economic and factual data are considered, the Rule of Reason
enables a judgment to be made regarding the effects of any arrange-
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rnent in resolving the question whether it promotes more competition
than it restrains, or the reverse.
In the writings of economists, most of their attention has been given
to the theory and actualities of imperfect competition as demonstrated
in American domestic rnarkets. 93 Without here analyzing the radiations
of that thinking in connection with domestic antitrust issues of industrial concentration, and the overlaps with the area of restrictive agreements previously discussed, it is suggested that the combination of the
Rule of Reason and the Workable Competition concept has equal validjty and usefulness in the foreign commerce sphere. This should open
the way to challenging tasks for the antitrust lawyer and economist
along the lines hereinafter indicated in the discussion of domestic antitrust problems relevant to those two master guides of national antitrust
policy.
As in the domestic commerce antitrust cases, the foreign commerce
activities of American companies, which seek to promote their overseas
business, require judicial appraisal of the main purpose of the specific
arrangement and the means used to accomplish that purpose. If the
purpose or the means are judicially branded as illegal per se, defendants
are as completely foreclosed from presenting defensive evidence of economic or other justifications, as if the proceeding involved domestic commerce. In the foreign commerce field, this barrier to affirmative defenses compounds the probabilities of thwarting legitimate expansion
of the overseas commerce of American companies faced with the parochial restrictions of foreign governrnents. 94 Untenable as the automatism of the per se violation rules is in domestic antitrust cases, it is
apparent that in the face of the frequently greater complications of antitrust cases that involve international trade, rigid rules of law for separating the legal from the illegal are particularly unrealistic and self-defeating. These differences in degree do not, however, warrant different
yardsticks in resolving questions of fact and of law. Both domestic and
foreign commerce problems in antitrust should be approached with the
guidance of a unified national antitrust policy as outlined in various
parts of this article.
At present there is little judicial guidance in the antitrust decisions
on foreign commerce regarding the legally permissible alternatives in
business devices for expansion of the int~rnational operations of Arner93

See Workable Competition: An Approach to Bigness and Monopoly Issues, Part IV

infra.
94 See Bronz, "The International Trade Organization Charter," 62 HARV. L. REv. 1089
(1949); Havana Charter for An International Trade Organization, Department of State,
March 24, 1948.
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jean firms. 95 Individual action by an American company is obviously
differentiated from concerted action among competitive firms. 96 The
readiness with which the courts have tainted the various specific means
with the finding of fact of an unlawful main purpose, thus assimilating
objectives and means under the per se violation doctrine, has avoided
judicial determination of the legal status of particular business instrumentalities in their separable aspects. Accordingly, on all levels of business enterprise-research and development, production, and distribution-restrictive covenants have not been independently weighed to ascertain through a Rule of Reason process whether they are ancillary
to a main lawful purpose, in substance and in economic effects compatible with the goals of national antitrust policy. If such judicial scrutiny of all relevant factors had been undertaken, many restrictions on
competition now labelled as per se illegal might have taken on a different hue had the economic and social justifications of the main purpose
and the means been judged without making "cartel" a talismanic word. 91

95 The writer's article, ''Foreign Commerce under the Sherman Act: Points and Implications of the Timken Case," 4 T.M.R. 3 (1952) suggests guides to counseling on foreign
commerce transactions of American companies involving jointly-owned companies ("joint
ventures"), the effect of the amendment to section 7 of the Clayton Act on acquisitions of
stock or assets of foreign companies, the commercial use of trade-marks or trade names,
patent rights, and other information and interchange of such rights, and exclusive arrangements. See also ~aton, "Joint Ventures," CCH A.Nn-rnusT LAw SYMPOSIUM 135 (1952);
Proceedings of Round-Table on "The Impact of the Antitrust Laws on Patents and TradeMarks in Foreign Commerce," (1952) (to be published); Derenberg, "The Impact of the
Anti-trust Laws on Trade-Marks in Foreign Commerce," 42 T.M.R. 365 (1952).
96 In Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., (D.C. Mass. 1950) 92 F. Supp. 947 at 962, Judge
Wyzanski emphasized this when he said: " •.• nothing in this opinion can properly be read
as a prohibition against an American manufacturer seeking to make larger profits through
the mere ownership and operation of a branch factory abroad which is not conducted as part
of a combination, conspiracy or monopoly."
91 ''Even 'cartel' is not a talismanic word, so as to displace the rule of reason by which
breaches of the Sherman Act are determined." Dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter in
Timken Roller Bearing Company v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 at 605, 71 S.Ct. 971
(1951).
· In my opinion, the exemption of associations engaged solely in export trade in the
Webb-Pomerene Act, 40 Stat. L. 516 (1918), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §§61-65, should not be
repealed. But see contrary views. in EDWARDS, MAINTAINING CoMPBTinON 54 (1949);
STOCXING .AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FRBB ENTBru>msB 561 (1951). This matter
is appropriate for consideration in connection with a re-examination of other exemptions
from the operation of the federal antitrust laws as indicated in a later part of this article.
See generally, Diamond, "The Webb-Pomerene Act and Export Trade Associations," 44
CoL. L. RBv. 805 (1944); Phelps, ''Export and the Webb-Pomerene Act," CCH BusrNBss
PBAcnCBs UNDBR FEDERAL A.Nn-rnusT LAWS SYMPOSIUM 178 (1951). See also divergent reactions to United States v. United States Alkali Export Assn., (D.C. N.Y. 1949) 86
F. Supp. 59, in 17 UNIV. Cm. L. RBv. 654 (1950); 63 HARv. L. RBv. 364 (1949); 44
Iu.. L. fuv. 835 (1950); 28 TBX. L. RBv. 868 (1950). Cf. United States Alkali Export
Assn. v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 65 S.Ct. 1120 (1945); Branch v. Federal Trade Com•
mission, (7th Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 31.
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E. Exclusive Arrangements and Tying Clauses Under Section 3
of Clayton Act98
Section 3 of the Clayton Act prohibits specified forms of transactions
in leases, sales, or contr~cts for sales of commodities containing express or
implied restrictions by way of tying clauses and exclusive arrangements,
where the effect "may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce."99
This qualifying language was interpreted by the Supreme Court
in an earlier series of cases as requiring only proof of reasonable probability of the adverse economic effects on competition stated in the above
quoted words.100 This was in substance a Rule of Reason judicial approach believed to be what Congress intended. Dominance of the
market by the supplier was regarded as in itself a basis of inferring the
prohibited effects upon competition, but other economic factors were
deemed relevant to determination of such questions of fact. 101
In the International Salt Company case102 came the transformation
of the Rule of Reason into a virtual per se illegality approach to tying
98 See generally, Lockhart and Sacks, "The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act," 65
HAnv. L. REv. 913 (1952); Schwartz, "Potential Impairment of Competition-The Impact
of Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States on the Standard of Legality Under the
Clayton Act," 98 Umv. PA. L. REv. 10 at 13-19 (1949); McLaren, ''Related Problems of 'Requirements' Contracts and Acquisitions in Vertical Integration Under the Anti-Trust Laws,"
45 ILL. L. REv. 141 (1950); NATIONAL hmuSTRIAL CONFERENCE BoARD, PuBuc REcuLATION OF CoMPEnnvE PRACTICES, 3d ed., 209-219 (1940); Rose, ''Federal Trade Commission
Enforcement of Section 3 of the Clayton Act," 8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 639 (1940).
99 ''It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption,
or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or
any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, or fix a
price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods,
wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors
of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 38 Stat. L. 730 at 731, §3 (1914), 15 U.S.C.
(1946) §14.
100 Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 42 S.Ct. 360
(1922); United Shoe Machinery Corporation v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 42 S.Ct. 363
(1922); International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 56 S.Ct.
701 (1936). Cf. Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457,
61 S.Ct. 703 (1941); Federal Trade Commission v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463,
43 S.Ct. 450 (1923); United States v. Western Union Telegraph Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1943)
53 F. Supp. 377; Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., (2d Cir. 1942) 124 F. (2d)
822, cert. den. 317 U.S. 695, 63 S.Ct. 433 (1943). Cf. Federal Trade Commission v.
Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568, 43 S.Ct. 210 (1923).
101 United Shoe Machinery Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 42 S.
Ct. 363 (1922); International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 56
S.Ct. 701 (1936).
102 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S.Ct. 12 (1947).
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clauses announced in the proposition that it is unreasonable per se to
foreclose competitors from any substantial market. In the Standard of
California case,103 the Supreme Court extended this per se violation
rule by holding that as applied to requirements contracts the qualifying
clause of section 3 was satisfied "by proof that competition has been foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected."
By attaching per se illegality merely to a quantum of "not insignificant" affected commerce, the Supreme Court has virtually closed the
door to admission of evidence of defenses that any form of transaction
under section 3 of the Clayton Act has both quantitative and qualitative economic effects promotive of more competition than it restrains.104
There are indications that this per se illegality doctrine has filtered dicta
to the same effect into the Sherman Act, even though the majority opinion of Justice Frankfurter in the Standard of California case left undecided the status of this issue under section I of the Sherman Act. 10 G
There is impressive recognition in economic literature106 and in
some court opinions1° 7 of the legitimate purposes and advantages of
certain forms of economic exclusive arrangements. Equally pertinent
here are the considerations previously discussed showing that the Rule
of Reason is the pathway to separation of the misuse of these methods
to stiHe competition from their use to wage competition. - As previously
indicated, it is an escape unwarranted by constitutional standards and
the intended _congressional intention in the statutory standards of sec103 Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 69 S.Ct. 1051
(1949). Cf. United States v. American Can Co., (D.C. Cal. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 18.
104 For full analysis see Lockhart and Sacks, "The Relevance of Economic Factors in
Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act," 65
HARV. L. REv. 913 (1952) and compare Schwartz, supra note 98.
105 See dicta in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 at 522, 68 S.Ct.
1107 (1948); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158, 68 S.Ct. 915
(1948).
19s NEw YoRK UNIVERSITY, BUREAu OF BusINEss REsEARcH, THE ExcLusIVE
AGENCY (1923); NATIONAL lNDuSTRIAL CoNFERENCE BoARD, Public Regulation of Competitive Practices, 3d ed. (1940); Stockhausen, "The Commercial and Anti-Trust Aspects
of Term Requirements Contracts,'' 23 N.Y. Umv. L. Q. REv. 412 (1948); Lockhart and
Sacks, ''The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act," 65 HARv. L. REv. 913 (1952).
101 Standard Oil of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 at 306-307, 69 S.Ct.
1051 (1949); see opinions of both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court in Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (3d Cir. 1921) 270 F. 881, 902, 912, affd.,
Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Company, 260 U.S. 568, 43 S.Ct. 210
(1923); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1942) 45 F. Supp.
387, mod. and affd. 321 U.S. 707, 64 S.Ct. 805 (1944). See note, "Agency as a Concept
and Marketing Device Under the Anti-Trust Laws," 13 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 93 at 99-100
(1944); CoNTRACTS REsTATEMENT, §516(e); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §1645
(1937); Cf. STEVENS, UNFAIR CoMPETITION, c. V (1917). See also Brosious v. PepsiCola Co., (3d Cir. 1946) 155 F. (2d) 99; United States v. J. I. Case Co., CCH Trade
Cases (1950-1951) 1162,921.
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tion 3108 to deny the defendant a fair and full hearing on all relevant
evidence because the standard of proof of the Rule of Reason is "if not
virtually impossible to meet, at least most ill-suited for ascertainment
by the courts."109
Tying clauses should be dealt with under the prima facie case
of illegality heretofore discussed.110 The effects of foreclosure of competitors from access to the market for the tied materials prima facie is
logically and economically measureable by the amount of that commerce, especially when the materials are tied to either patented or other
subject matter which gives the owner a leverage for acpieving a substantial control of the market. For that reason, in recognition of the
government's assumption of the burden of proving the ultimate fact
of illegality, fairness of apportionment of the risk of non-persuasion of
the trier of the fact may properly place the defendant under the burden
of establishing legal justification for tying clauses by clear and convincing evidence. A residuum of justification based on protection of the
good will of the maker of the tied device is now judicially recognized.
A broad application of the Rule of Reason, limited by the prima facie
case of illegality, would permit the court to weigh all circumstances
bearing upon any other affirmative defense based upon clear and convincing evidence that the beneficial economic effects outweigh the tying
clause clog on actual or potential competition.11 1

F. Suggested Approach to Interpretation of Federal Trade Commission's Jurisdiction Over Incipient Suppression of Competition

In a number of its opinions the Supreme Court has plainly stated
that the Federal Trade Commission, as distinct from the Department
of Justice, has jurisdiction to proceed against restraint of trade practices
under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act which are an
"incipient menace" to free competition, even though not yet of Sherman
Act violation dimensions.112 This gives the phrase "unfair methods of
competition" a potential scope as broad as the Commission's interpretation of the word "incipiency."
108 For an analysis of the legislative history of section 3 see Lockhart and Sacks, "The
Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate
Section 3 of the Clayton Act," 65 HARv. L. REv. 913 (1952).
109 See supra note 53.
110 Supra Part II G.
111 Compare a similar idea proposed by Lockhart and Sacks, supra note 108, but limited
to tying clauses only and without specification of the clear and convincing evidence rule.
112 Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 68 S.Ct. 793
(1948), and other cases therein cited.
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The Commission's jurisdiction in this zone should be squared with
the Rule of Reason. In Clayton Act cases, the "incipiency" concept
is somewhat hazy because of the use in the Morton Salt case113 of the
words "reasonable possibility" instead of "reasonable probability" as a
test of the effects on competition. It is to the credit of the Commission
that in subsequent Robinson-Patman Act proceedings its policy apparently has been not to take advantage of the low standard of proof allowed
by "reasonable possibility." Justice Jackson's criticisms of this "slender
thread of inference" are sound.114 It is of equal importance to recognize
the unsoundness of using a per se violation rule to measure effects on
competition, as has been done in the substantial volume of affected
commerce test under section 3 of the Clayton Act.
As a minimum, the Commission's jurisdiction over "unfair methods
of competition" of Sherman Act species pertinent to the "incipiency"
concept should be limited by applying the Rule of Reason through the
yardstick of "reasonable probability" and the Workable Competition
concept. The fairness and practicality of this approach to congressional
intention is evident when it is considered that the "incipiency" test, combined with the conclusiveness of the Commission's finding of fact under
the substantial evidence rule, gives the Commission a marked advantage
in proof of violation.

IV
WoRKABLE COMPETITION:

AN APPROACH

MoNOPOLY

TO BIGNESS AND

IssuEs

Another preponderant antitrust area, much more complex and
baffiing than the subject of restrictive agreements among competitors,
is industrial concentration through internal growth of an individual
£rm, through acquisitions of stock or assets of other firms, and through
any mode of horizontal or vertical integration.115
11s Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 68 S.Ct. 822 (1948).
114 Id. at 58.
115 lliustrative of the large volume of literature on this subject are BERLE AND MEANS,
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); BURNS, THE DECLINE OF
CoMPETITION (1936); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, Brn BusINEss: !Ts GROWTH AND !Ts
PLACE (1937); NATIONAL RESOURCES CoMMITrEE, THE STRUCTURE OF THE AMERIQAN
EcoNOMY (1939); Wilcox, "Competition and Monopoly in American Industry," TNEC
MONOGRAPH No. 21 (1940); Thorp and Crowder, "The Structure of Industry," TNEC
MoNoGRAPH No. 27 (1941); EnwARDs, MAINTAINING COMPETITION (1949); STOCKING
AND WATKINS, MoNOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE (1951); Rostow, "Problems of Size and
Integration," CCH, BusINEss PRACTICES UNDER FEDERAL ANTITRusT LAws, SYMPosmM
117 (1951); Adelman, ''Is Big Business Getting Bigger?" 45 FORTUNE MAGAZINE (No. 1) 59
(1952); Lintner and Butters, ''Effect of Mergers on Industrial Concentration," 32 REv.
EcoN. AND STAT. 30 (1950); Wilcox, "Concentration of Power in the American Economy,"
28 HARV. Bus. REv. (No. 6) 54 (1950). See other references in footnotes to this section.
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There is no pretense of being able to portray within the limits of
this article all of the ramifications of public policy issues affecting bigness and monopoly. As in other parts of this paper, the purpose is to
identify, in broad strokes, areas of common ground which both government and business have occupied or may be willing to occupy, as well
as the differentiated legal and economic approaches to national antitrust policy toward industrial concentration.
The problem of where and how the line can be drawn between
legally permissible bigness of industrial units and illicit monopoly is
still being thrashed out in the forums and frontiers of legal and economic antitrust concepts. There are many gaps to be filled-gaps between the thinking of those who fear and those who admire Big Business; gaps between those who approve and those who frown upon
judicial interpretations which bring large size and monopoly bigness
into n~rrower boundaries of coincidence in applying tests of violation
under the general standards of the federal antitrust laws; and gaps in
factual data and in the economic tools for measuring the effects of industrial concentration.

A. Points of Agreement Among Ec_onomists
Before dealing with the dominant trends in judicial interpretations
jn this field, it may be clarifying first to identify the points of general
agreement among economists in their reassessment of economic concepts of competition and monopoly as instruments of antitrust public
policy.
The common ground developed over more than two past decades
consists of the following elements:
Agreement that the polar conceptions of perfect competition
and perfect monopoly of neoclassical economics are abstractions
that do not reflect .the realities of the American industrial structure.116

Agreement that between these theoretical extremes there are
various forms of imperfect competition in most American industries or markets which should be taken into consideration in weighing the public policy legal issues of antitrust and in resolving
questions of fact compatible with the actualities of diversified
markets.117
116 STOCKING .AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY .AND FREE ENTERPRISE, c. IV (1951); Oppenheim, ''Economic Background," in Divestiture As A Remedy Under The Federal AntiTrust Laws, A Symposium, 19 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 120 (1950).
117 EnwARDs, MAlNrAINING CoMPEnTioN, c. I (1949); Clark, ''Toward A Concept of
Workable Competition," 30 AM.. EcoN. REv. 241 (1940); Mason, "The Cunent Status of
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Agreement that given varying degrees of imperfect competition in most markets, the task of economics is to formulate standards and devise tools for determining whether competition in
realistic harmony with the objectives of the federal antitrust
laws exists in specific markets. 118

B. Points of Disagreement Among Economists
The plurality of views of economists and their overlapping make it
unsafe to develop further generalizations concerning consensus of
opinion about concepts of competition and monopoly. There is, however, recognition of the need for a general re-examination of views
in the abridged frame of reference stated above. It may also be helpful to summarize the points of divergence among economists:
Differences in the definition and content of the concept of
effective or Workable Competition, which many economists today accept as the guide to national antitrust policy for determining
questions as to whether or not in a specific industry or market
essentially competitive conditions exist.119
Differences in the standards, tests and methods of measuring
degrees of industrial concentration deemed compatible or out of
line with national antitrust policy in any given species of an imperfect competitive market.12° From this flow many other points
of dissension in viewpoints subsequently discussed.
the Monopoly Pr~blem in the United States," 62 HARv. L. REv. 1265 (1949); FELLNER,
COMPETITION AMONG THE FEW (1949); CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC
COMPETITION, 6th ed., (1950); RoBINSON, Tira EcoNoMics oF IMPERFECT CoMPETITION
(1934); Wilcox, "Concentration of Power in the American Economy," 28 HARV. Bus. REv.
54 (1950); GRIFFIN, AN EcoNOMIC APPROACH To ANTITnusT PROBLEMS, American Enterprise Association (1951); Adelman, "Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws,"
61 HARv. L. REv. 1289 (1948); STOCKING AND WATKINS, MoNoPLY ,wp FREE ENTERPRISE (1951); Oppenheim, "Economic Background," in Symposium, 19 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 120 (1950).
118 illustrative of these efforts are Kreps and Wright, "Measurement of the Social Performance of Business,'' TNEC MoNOGRAPH No. 7 (1940); Adelman, supra note 117;
Mason, supra note 117; Edwards, supra note 115; Meriam, "Bigness and the Economic
Analysis of Competition,'' 28 HARv. Bus. REv. (No. 2) 109 (1950); Panel Discussion on
the Economics and Legality of ''Bigness," Current Business Studies No. 5, Trade and Industry Law Institute, Inc. (1950); ADAMs (ed.), THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN hmusTRY
(1950); GruFFIN, supra note 117; Bain, "Workable Competition in Oligopoly," 40 AM.
EcoN. REv. (No. 2, Proc. Am. Econ. Assn.) 35 (1950).
119 Economists who have expounded this concept are Clark, supra note 117; Mason,
supra note 117; Adelman, supra note 117; Griffin, supra note 117; Edwards, supra note 115;
Markham, "An Alternative Approach to the Concept of Workable Competition," 40 AM.
EcoN. REv. 349 (1950). Cf. ScHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SocIALisM, AND DEMOCRACY,
(1942); STOCKING AND WATKINS, supra note 117, c. 4; GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM
(1952); Galbraith, "Monopoly and the Concentration of Economic Power," in ELLIS (ed.)
A SURVEY oF CoNTEMPORARY EcoNoMics (1948).
·
120 For analysis of the positions of various writers, see STOCKING AND WATKINS, MoNOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPlUSE (1951) passim.
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Most important of all are the differences regarding the economic
effects in markets where sellers are few. This is the major sector of
disagreement as to how to determine whether Workable Competition,
in fact, exists in particular markets. Economic vocabulary now gives
currency to the definition of these "oligopoly" markets as those where
industrial concentration is manifested in the "Big Three," the "Big
Four," the "Big Five" or any fewness of relatively large sellers, who
account for the major part of total production and sales, with proportionate power appreciably to inB.uence market price through decreases or increases in output.121
Viewpoints interact also on whether American industrial concentration under particular technological conditions must be accepted as
inevitable, with resulting reorientation of political and economic values
and new approaches to a modernized antitrust policy. A checklist of
specific matters on which there is controversy includes problems of the
size of the business unit relative to the market structure and absolute
size;122 the relative economy and efficiency of large, medium sized and
small firms in different industries;123 the nature and effectiveness of
potential competition with respect to opportunity for entry of new
firms into an industry and the presence of adequate substitute products
within or between industries;124 the need for and consequences of
dynamic modem technology and its relation to the optimum size of
the single plant or multiplant operations, horizontal mergers of corn-

1 2 1 For a classification of oligopoly markets see TNEC MoNOGRAPH No. 21, supra
note ll5, and see Bain, supra note ll8; Wilcox, "On The Alleged Ubiquity of Oligopoly,"
40 Pnoc. AM. EcoN. AssN. 67 (1950).
122 TNEC Monograph No. 21, supra note 115; STOCKING AND WATKINS, MoNOPOLY
AND FREE ENTERPRISE (1951); Adelman, "Is Big Business Getting Bigger?" 45 FoRTONE
MAGAZINE (No. 1) 59 (1952); Stigler, ''The Case Against Big Business," 45 FoRTUNE MAG·
AZINE (No. 5) 123 (1952); Stigler, "Extent and Bases of Monopoly,'' 32 AM. EcoN. REv.
(Supp.) 1 (1942). See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in Standard Oil Co.
of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 69 S.Ct. 1051 (1949); dissenting opinion of
Justice Brandeis in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 53 S.Ct. 481 (1933).
123 See Wilcox, "Competition and Monopoly in American Industry," TNEC MoNoGRAPH No. 21 (1940) and TNEC Monograph No. 13, "Relative Efficiency of Large,
Medium-Sized, and Small Business" (1941); Osborn, "Efficiency and Profitability in Relation to Size," 29 HARv. Bus. REv. (No. 2) 82 (1951).
124 Clark, supra note 117; Mason, ''Methods of Developing a Proper Control of Big
Business,'' READINGS IN THE SoCIAL CoNTRoL oF lNDuSTRY 215 (1942); Edwards, supra
note ll5 at 186-188; Meriam, "The Sherman Antitrust Act and Business Economics,"
CCH AmrrnusT LAw SYMPOSIUM 98 (1950). Cf. Lewis in ''The Effectiveness of the
Federal Antitrust Laws: A Symposium,'' 39 AM. EcoN. REv. 689, 707 (1949); Wallace,
"Monopolistic Competition and Public Policy," 26 AM. EcoN. REv. 77 (1936) (Papers and
Proc. of Amer. Econ. Assn.); STOCKING AND WATKINS, MoNOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE
(1951).
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panies, and integration on a vertical or conglomerate scale;125 the significance of strategic resources arising from incorporation and tax laws
and issuance of corporate securities, banking and financial connections, technical personnel and research facilities and the like;126 and
the influence of patents, trade-marks, secondary meaning trade names,
and similar differential advantages.127 Many other facets of industrial
concentration could be mentioned, but these are sufficiently illustrative to indicate the plurality of cross-currents in contemporary economic
thinking about these baffiing matters and their meaningfulness for
antitrust. There are many federal governmental policies other than
antitrust which affect the texture and vitality of the competitive process
in American markets.
C. Need for Reorientation of Economic Approach to Antitrust
The core of the resolution of problems of industrial concentration
is the widening of the common ground on the kind, the amount, and
the quality of competition that can be reasonably expected in the
prevalent imperfect markets where elements of competition and elements of differential advantage, characterized as monopolistic, blend
in the pattern ·of the contemporary American industrial structure of
private competitive enterprise.
A common obstacle to clear thinking is overstress on semantics of
law and economics. This leads to oversimplification and overgeneralization of concepts that have different meanings in different factual
situations. For example, heed should be given to the warning of one
judge who said: 128 "Monopoly-phobia, like most phobias, is both a
symptom and a cause of a neurotic tendency which, in refusing bravely
to face facts, cannot yield intelligent guidance."
Antitrust lawyers and antitrust economists face a joint task of overcoming the existing barriers to greater coalescence of the judicial and
125 Hale, "Vertical Integration: Impact of the Antitrust Laws Upon Combinations
of Successive States of Production and Distribution," 49 CoL. L. REv. 921 (1949); Hale,
"Diversification: Impact of Monopoly Policy Upon Multi-Product Firms," 98 UNIV. PA.
L. REv. 320 (1950); Hale "Size and Shape: The Individual Enterprise as a Monopoly,''
UNIV. ILL. LAw FoRUM 515 (1950); FTC Report on Divergence Between Plant and Company Concentration, 1947 (1950); Rostow, supra note 115; Spengler, "Vertical Integration
and Antitrust Policy," 58 J. PoL. EcoN. 347 (1950).
126 STOCXING AND WAT.KINS, MONOPOLY AND FllEE..ENTERPRISE, c. 13 (1951); BERLE
AND MEANs, THE MoDERN CoRPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); Dimock and
Hyde, TNEC Monograph No. 11, "Bureaucracy and Trusteeship in Large Corporations"
(1940).
127 See Yardsticks for Reconciling Industrial Property Rights With Antitrust Policy,
infra Part VII.
12s See concurring opinion of Frank, J., in Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, (2d Cir.
1945) 151 F. (2d) 34 at 42.
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the economic doctrines of antitrust. They are the ones who should
provide the guides to clarification of the fundamental antitrust issues
of industrial concentration so that by occupation of a wider area of
agreement bridges may be built to intelligent exploration of frontier
zones where intolerable confusion now exists in both government and
business. This need is dramatically brought into focus by the request
of the trial judge in the pending United Shoe Machinery case for submission of a government brief on the question whether the term
"monopoly" is "the equivalent of the economist's definition, or whether
it means something else."129
In filling the gap that presently exists between legal and economic
concepts of competition and monopoly, basic choices must be made from
among alternatives in national antitrust policy to resolve as much as
possible the endless controversy about the effects of industrial concentration.

D. Workable Competition Concept Applied Through Rule of Reason:
A Sound Basis of National Antitrust Policy

This writer believes that the main bridge for connecting economic
and legal concepts with realistic national antitrust policy should be
built on the engineering foundation of the Rule of Reason applied
through utilization of the concept of Workable Competition. These
are the two synthesizing antitrust concepts previously recommended
for incorporation in the proposed congressional declaration of national
antitrust policy. Subjective value judgments cannot be avoided no matter what alternatives to this approach may be espoused except by blind
reliance on automatic rules of law in the delusive quest for certainty
of what is competition and what is monopoly, or what is legal or illegal
conduct or market conditions, under the federal antitrust laws. The
price of using such mechanistic per se violation rules in the futile hope
that they will provide an escape hatch from the in~capable burdens
of the Rule of Reason is too high to pay when one considers the unreality of reducing industrial concentration problems to rigid formulae.

E. Standards and Tests for Determining Existence of Workable
Competition

National antitrust policy will never find its way toward feasible
solutions to problems in the accommodation of the facts of industrial
120 Brief for the United States on Liability, United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Corporation, Civil No. 7198, (D.C. Mass.), filed January 29, 1952, containing a review
and analysis of legal and economic concepts of competition and monopoly in judicial interpretations of the- Sherman Act and in economic literature.
·
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concentration and the preservation of competition in price, quality,
and service until it accepts the necessity of weighing all of the salient
economic variables in any specific industry or market factual situation.
It is undeniable that the Rule of Reason and Workable Competition
need the support of a larger reservoir of knowleqge and skills than now
exists-greater factual knowledge, better instruments of measurements
of economic effects to test the validity of assumptions and to determine
the probative value of evidence admissible in antitrust proceedings,
greater skills of private and government attorneys and economists in
legal and economic analysis. In recent years a good beginning has
been made in filling this gap. 1 ~ 0 We should press on toward greater
progress in that direction.
If Workable Competition in realistic harmony with the federal
antitrust laws should be adopted by Congress as the dominant principle for Rule of Reason applications, then it is obvious that in any
given situation the broad discretion of government antitrust should be
guided by subsidiary standards or tests for determining when Workable Competition is existent or non-existent.131 Here, too, controversial
aspects need greater reconciliation, but, as is so frequently the case,
superficial differences arising from catchword semantics may mask an
underlying common ground of understanding of the substance of the
public policy issues.

· F. Interacting Viewpoints of Economists
In a previous article this writer has summarized the opposing contentions among economists.132 In so doing, two points were em1~0 See supra
131 Blackwell

note 118.
Smith, ''Effective Competition:. Hypothesis for Modernizing the Antitrust Laws," 26 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 405 (1951), suggests a statutory amendment specifically providing a procedure under the Rule of Reason whereby certain circumstances would
be illustratively specified as relevant to findings of fact on Effective Competition. He
mentions the following actual or probable results of conduct, as the increase or decrease of:
"(I) Alternatives available to customers or sellers; (2) Volume of production or services;
(3) Quality of the services or goods; (4) Number of people benefited; (5) Incentives to
entrepreneurs; (6) Efficiency and economy in manufacturing or distribution; (7) The
welfare of employees; (8) The tendency to progress in technical development; (9) Prices
to customers; (IO) Conditions favorable to the public interest in defending the country
from aggression; (II) The tendency to conserve the country's natural resources; (12)
Benefits to the public interest assuming the relief requested by the government in the
proceedings."
Even if the foregoing criteria are not set forth in a revised antitrust statute, one aspect
of the work of the economists on the staff of the Committee on Revision of National Antitrust Policy, which I have proposed herein, would be to formulate tests of Workable
Competition. These should have industry or market operational significance and should be
capable of translation into steps toward collection of meaningful facts to show whether the
tests have or have not been met in any given factual situation.
132 Oppenheim, "Economic Background," in a Symposium on Divestiture as a Remedy
Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 19 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 119-155 (1950).
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phasized. One is a caveat that any classification of the different approaches taken in the viewpoints of economic thought does not represent sealed-tight compartments, one completely insulated from the
other. The other is that economic values cannot be always sharply
separated from political and social values of the American democratic
system.
Without attempting to repeat here the details of these differentiated
approaches analyzed with precision in the compendious literature on
the subject, the following is a simplified outline of the main positions
on the appropriate economic criteria for testing whether or not the
conditions of Workable Competition exist in harmony with the objectives of national antitrust policy:
Some economists emphasize the structure of the relevant industry
or market.133 Is it a single-firm monopoly, a duopoly, or an oligopoly,
or is it a decentralized structure with predominantly small business
units?
Other economists emphasize the actual behavior and accomplishments of the firms in the relevant industry or market in testing the
compatibility of economic and legal antitrust conceptions.134
In order to avoid imputing dogma to any of these economists, it
should again be kept in mind that there is interaction and overlapping
of structure, behavior, and accomplishments in any given situation. Any
emphasis given to one of these elements becomes a generic difference
only when it is in and of itself made the sole test of whether there
exists the kind, amount, and quality of competition contemplated by
the federal antitrust laws. If such is the case, then the weighing of any
one of the three elements is no longer a matter of degree for consideration under a Rule of Reason approach. It then becomes a per se fac133 See such emphasis in following: Blair, "Technology and Size," 38 AM. EcoN.
RBv., Pt. II, 121 (1948); address of Corwin D. Edwards, Director, Bureau of Industrial
Economics Federal Trade Commission, before The American Business Law Institute, New
York City, December 28, 1949 (mimeographed) at 8; RosTow, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR
THE O!L INDusTRY 127 (1948); Rostow, "The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument
of Progress," 14 Umv. Cm.·L. RBv. 567 (1947); Adams, "Dissolution, Divorcement,
Divestiture: The Pyrrhic Victories of Antitrust," 27 IND. L.J. 1 (1951); Levi, "The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly," 14 Umv. Cm. L. RBv. 153 (1947); Lewis, supra note 124.
134 See Clark, "Toward a Concept of Workable Competition," 30 AM. EcoN. RBv.
241 (1940); Mason, "The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States,"
62 HARv. L. RBv. 1265 (1949); Mason, "Workable Competition Versus Workable Monopoly," CCH SYMPOSIUM ON BusINEss PRACTICES UNDER FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
67 (1951); Meriam, ''The Sherman Antitrust Act and Business Economics," CCH ANTITRUST LAw SYMPOSIUM 93 (1950); GRIFFIN, AN EcoNOMIC APPROACH To ANTITRUST
PROBLEMS, American Enterprise Association (1951). Cf. Wright, "Toward Coherent Antitrust," 35 Va. L. Rev. 665 (1949); NICHOLL, PRICE PoLicIEs IN THE CIGARETTE INDusTRY,
Pt. IV (1951); GALIIRAlTH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM (1952).
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tor upon which a judgment is made according to an inflexible rule of
law for dividing the legal from the illegal.
If this distinction is observed, it will furnish the key to an understanding of the dissident subjective judgments of economists in defining
the nature and scope of the Workable Competition concept and in making proposals for objective tests of its measurement. When the emphasis
on market structure reaches the point where it is contended that the
"oligopoly" structure, a crucial one for testing, inherently breeds mechanisms of behavior in violation of the antitrust laws, the rigidity of
the assumed causal connection tends to assimilate the "oligopoly"
situations to single-firm monopoly situations. The consequence would
be that "oligopoly" is thus defined as tacit group monopoly and the
conduct of the "oligopolists," in the absence of proof of actual collusion,
is branded as equivalent to the abuses associated with restrictive agreements among competitors.
This circumstantial evidence that links oligopoly structure to a
conscious parallelism of behavior has the form and content of the extensions of the implied conspiracy doctrine previously discussed. In
the process, the accomplishments of the oligopoly industry are given
little or no weight at all.
· Leaving aside for the moment the single-firm monopoly and duopoly
situations, it is fair to say that in the oligopoly situations, the identification of any economic evaluation as a Rule of Reason approach
necessarily depends upon whether there is genuine willingness to consider all of the relevant economic factors bearing upon the interaction
of structure, behavior, and accomplishments in the particular case.
This is the approach to which this writer subscribes in company with
other writers who have advocated that approach. As previously stated,
it is not claimed that the subsidiary economic standards and tests for a
sound application of the Rule of Reason have been fully crystallized,
although there is encouraging agreement on many of the formulations
of these economic fundamentals. Increasing this common ground will
initially depend upon bringing together more of the threads of common thinking that in the oligopoly industries no one of the three
elements-structure, behavior, and accomplishments-should be made
the sole basis for determining questions of antitrust law and economic fact. It would aid in dissipating misunderstanding to introduce
into the vocabulary of antitrust the term "interactionists," defined to
mean those who, like this writer,1 35 believe that the Rule of Reason
135 See Oppenheim, ''Economic Background," supra note 132; Oppenheim, "A New
Approach to Evaluation of the American Patent System," 33 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 555 (1951);
Clark, Mason and Griffin, supra note 117 and Meriam, supra note 118.
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applied to Workable Competition tests c;:ontemplates that structure,
behavior, and accomplishmens will be each weighed in the context
of all of the circumstances of the particular case.
This should go a long way toward lessening the discordant notes
in the debates on Big Business or Industrial Giantism. For if anything has shown its head in the public debates, it is on the one hand,
the protest from some writers that the government is using an unproved
theory of the identity of oligopoly with antitrust violation to reorganize
the structure of American concentrated industries1 36 and, on the other,
the refutations from government sources1 31 that government is only
seeking to strike at monopoly bigness, sometimes used as synonymous
with domination of an industry or excessive concentration. These are
merely symptoms of the underlying problem of discovering what is
good bigness and what is bad bigness, a distinction which is another
way of stating the task set for the Workable Competition approach
recommended in the foregoing discussion.
There is no reason why an application of the Rqle of Reason to
the newer concept of Workable Competition should not take intq consideration the teachings of neoclassical economic theories of the price
making mechanisms in relation to elements of market structures and
behavior.138 While economists may differ about the importance of
the price system as against other market adjustment mechanisms, the
preservation of price competition is a vital component of antitrust
policy. The real question is what form and degree of price competition can be realistically expected under specified conditions of imperfect competition.

136 See Drucker, ''How Big Is Too Big?" 201 HAm>ER's 23 Quly 1950); Wood,
"The Supreme Court and a Changing Antitrust Concept," 97 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 309
(1949); Sunderland, "Changing Legal Concepts in the Antitrust Field," 3 SYRA.cusB L.
RBv. 60 (1951); Smith, "Effective Competition: Hypothesis for Modernizing The Antitrust Laws," 26 N.Y. UNIV. L. RBv. 405 (1951); Adelman, ''The A & P Case: A Study
in Applied Economic Theory,'' 63 Q.J. EcoN. 238 (1949); WRIGHT, CAPITALISM (1951);
Madison, "Proposed Amendments of the Federal Antitrust Law and Its Relation to 'Big
Business,'" CCH ANrrrnusT LAw SYMPOSIUM 106 (1952). See also Knauth, ''Monopoly
Reconsidered," 60 PoL. SCI. Q. 563 (1945); Boulding, "In Defense of Monopoly," 59
Q.J. EcoN. 524 (1945); Johnston and Stevens, ''Monopoly or Monopolization-A Reply
to Professor Rostow,'' 44 h.r.. L. RBv. 269 (1949).
137 Bergson, "Bigness in Business," CCH .ANrrrnuST LAw SYMPOSIUM 85 (1950);
.AIINoLD, THB BOTTLENECKS oP BuSINEss 125 (1940).
138 STOCKING AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FRBB E.....-n!RPRISB 107-108 (1951),
seems to underestimate the extent to which this reconciliation of neoclassical economics
and workable competition might be made.
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G. Trends in Judicial Interpretation of Monopoly Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act
Turning to the evolution of judicial doctrines, only a sketch of some
of the highlights is presented with reference to the extent to which
there is a union of legal and economic concepts of competition and
monopoly in judicial interpretations of section 2 of the Sherman Act.
In this sector of antitrust, the :first. milestone in judicial recognition
of the applicatipn of the Rule of Reason to close-knit combinations
was reached in the previously mentioned celebrated dicta of the
Standard Oil and.American Tobacco cases of 1911.139 The sweeping
general language of the statute, however, has given the majority and
dissenting Justices of the Supreme Court a basis for vacillating between
the stifling literalness of a per se violation doctrine and insistence on a
distinction between reasonable and unreasonable restrictions of competi·tion arising ejther from expansion of an individual company or from
capital combinations through acquisitions of other :firms.140
In the industrial concentration :field, the Rule of Reason proved to
be more diffi_cult for the Supreme Court to resist than in the :field of
collusive agreements among otherwise independent competitors. Its
scope of application has nevertheless been marked by a checkered
and uneven course of judicial interpretations.141 This reflects a variety
of factors. The transformation of the American economic ·system from
a predominantly agricultural, local market, and small business organism
to a Leviathan of large-sca).e corporate organizations, with accompanying large-scale technology, and mass production and distribution, is
clearly the principal cause of the puzzling antitrust policy issues affecting big business. Shifts ~ public opinion, the swings of the business
cycle, the changing personnel of the Supreme Court, and other factors
have also contributed to the ups and downs of the Rule of Reason
in this zone of antitrust. Above all, the moving political currents of
the American system have come into confluence with changes in the
meanings of competition and monopoly as the industrial life of the
country progressed to new forms of industry and market structures.
1s9 Standard Oil Co. of New JeISeY v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 31 S.Ct. 502
(1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 31 S.Ct. 632 (1911).
140 For analysis of these decisions, see Handler, "Industrial Mergers and the Anti-trust
Laws," 32 CoL. L. REv. 179 (1932).
141For example, compare United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417,
40 S.Ct. 293 (1920); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co. of New Jersey, 247
U.S. 32, 38 S.Ct. 473 (1918); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 68
S.Ct. 1107 (1948).
-
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Like section I of the Sherman Act, section 2 of the act1 42 -the socalled monopoly section-also represents an evolution in the delimitation of its general terms by the gradual process of judicial inclusion and
exclusion through the case-by-case process.
In looking back over the entire life of the statute, there has been no
single unbroken pattern of tests for ascertaining the boundaries of section 2 violations.
In the early period of interpretation, the percentage share of the
market was stressed. In the United States Steel Corporation case,148
the Supreme Court announced the doctrine that mere size is not an
offense unless accompanied by abusive practices, but thereafter this
was limited by the warnings that size may be magnified to the point
of a monopoly and carries with it opportunity for abuse, especially if
there has been past proclivity toward such conduct.144
As of 1952, the recent section 2 cases1 45 have crystallized the
doctrine that the indicia of monopolization are the existence of either
the power or the intent to exclude competition or to fix prices. If such
power is present, a general intent to monopolize is presumed because
of the natural and probable consequences of the existence of such
power. If monopoly power has nQt been actually achieved, then a
specific intent to acquire monopoly power must be shown.
142 "Evezy person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars,
or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion
of the court." 26 Stat. L. 209, 15 U.S.C. (1946) §2.
148 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 40 S.Ct. 293 (1920); see
also United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 47 S.Ct. 748 (1927).
144 Justice Cardow in United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 52 S.Ct. 460
(1932). Cf. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 68 S.Ct. 915 (1948).
In United States v. United Shoe Machinezy Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918) the dominance
of United Shoe was held not to be illegal chiefly because it resulted from a merger of
non-competitive companies. The Department of Justice has recently stated that "At most,.
the case can be said to hold that monopoly power does not constitute monopolization if the
power was lawfully acquired." Brief of United States, in United States v. United Shoe
Machinecy Corp., Civil No. 7198 at 9 (D.C. Mass.) pending.
145 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416;
United States v. Pullman Co., (D.C. Pa. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 123. See also American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 66 S.Ct. 1125 (1946); United States v.
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 68 S.Ct. 941 (1948); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334
U.S. 131, 68 S.Ct. 915 (1948); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173,
65 S.Ct. 254 (1944); Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 68
S.Ct. 947 (1948). In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 91
F. Supp. 333, Chief Judge Knox, referring to United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334
U.S. 495 (1948) said at 346: "The conclusion is inescapable, from the Columbia Steel
decision, that the possession of monopoly power is something other than the status in a
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H. (}reater Coalescence of Legal and Economic Concepts Needed
It is understandable why, in the present state of judicial precedents
under section 2 of the Sherman Act, many commentators hesitate to
state with precision the extent to which there is a coincidence of
judicial and economic antitrust concepts.146 The decisions and dicta
in the Pullman, Aluminum and second American Tobacco cases147
together can be explained as achieving such a coalescence applied to
a factual situation where a single £rm controls all or nearly all of the
output of an entire industry with consequent power to £x prices, control production, and exclude potential competition and prevent the
marketing of adequate intra-industry and inter-industry substitute
products. This is the kind of monopoly pqwer the businessman readily
understands, but determining when it exists is another matter.
Economists differ on the tests for determining the existence of such
single-firm monopoly power. Some of them stress the importance of
first delimiting the relevant product industry and market in any given
case as steps preceding an evaluation of the economic effects of dynamic
elements in structure, behavior, and accomplishments. Otherwise, they
contend, no consideration would be given to the different forms and
degrees of economic power which may not amount to the monopoly
power condemned by section 2 of the Sherman Act: In the spectrum
of this approach are found various shades of distinction. Calculation
-0f the percentage share and resulting extent of power of the alleged
single-firm monopolist would depend on the economic boundaries
marked out for a product, industry, or a market relevant to the antitrust issues. Contours within and between industries, product differentiation of heterogeneity, geographic areas of markets, functional distinctions among customers, and other definitional demarcations warn
against the oversimplification of a unitary monopoly concept clothed
market of a dominant firm. The dominant firm may have neither the power to exclude
competitors, nor the power to fix prices."
Pending at the present time are the following significant monopoly civil suits instituted
by the government, indicated below by case numbers in CCH Blue Book, The Federal
Antitrust Laws-1890-1951 (1952), where the proceedings are summarized: United Shoe
Machinery Corp., Case No. 912; E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Case No. 911, 987;
Western Electric Co. and American Tel. & Tel. Co., Case No. 971; International Business
Machines Corp., Case No. 1115; New York A. & P. Tea Co., Case No. 990.
146 The evolution of doctrines has been traced in the Brief For The United States
On Liability, United States of America v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation, supra note
144. See also United States v. Aluminum Company of America, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 91 F.
Supp. 333 at 340-347, opinion by Knox, Chief Judge.
147 See supra notes 20, 145.
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in unrealistic universals of existence of power to fix prices and to exclude competitors.148
The same considerations are pertinent to duopoly situations where
two firms are alleged to share power to control an entire industry, a
market, or a product.149 On this question there are no conclusive
judicial precedents under the Sherman Act. In oligopoly situations,
untainted by abuses of power or collusion among the few large firms,
there are indications of an emergence of a small area of coalescence
of judicial and economic concepts as previously indicated. Much more
clarification by the slow-moving case-by-case process of judicial inclusion and exclusion is needed before it can be known whether the federal
courts will consider all of the aspects of Workable Competition under
a full-blown application of a Rule of Reason in oligopoly cases.

I. Congressional Adoption of Workable Competition Concept
Necessary

If the credo of this article has validity, it calls for congressional
action to avoid the effects of the undue uncertainty and confusion in
national antitrust policy resulting from the lack of legislative adoption
·of the Rule of Reason and the concept of Workable Competition as
master guides of an improved approach to industrial concentration
problems. We cannot afford to wait until judicial decisions under the
federal antitrust laws fully determine whether these same guides will
be considered as the intention of Congress under the existing principal
antitrust statutes. The wisdom of the recommended congressional
action is already demonstrated by the vacillations in interpretations of
these provisions during the past sixty-two years of antitrust. Explicit
congressional enactment of the suggested declaration of national antitrust policy will itself provide positive unifying principles. It will give
greater stimulus to advancement of knowledge, skills, and procedures
for equipping government antitrust officials, and attorneys and economists who advise businessmen, with improved tool~ whereby the pub148 For views of economists, see STOCKING AND WATKINS, MoNOPOLY AND Fmm
ENTERPRISE cc. 4-6, 15 (1?51); Hale, "Size and Shape: The Individual Enterprise as a
Monopoly," Umv. Ju.. L. FoRUM 515 (1950); Mason, "The Current Status of the
Monopoly Problem in the United States," 62 · HAB.v. L. REv. 1265 (1949); Wright,
"Toward Coherent Anti-Trust," 35 VA, L. REv. 665 (1949); GmPPIN, AN EcoNoMic
APPROACH TO .ANnnlaST PROBLEMS, Am. Enterprise Assn. (1951); Adelman, "Integration and Antitrust Policy," 63 HAB.v. L. REv. 27 (1949); Adelman, "The Measurement of
Industrial Concentration," 33 REv. EcoN. AND STAT. 269 (1951).
149 For a definition of duopoly see: Wilcox, "Competition and Monopoly in American
Industry,'' TNEC Monograph No. 21 at 10 (1940).
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lie and private interests may be brought into better balance in the
administration and enforcement of the federal antitrust laws.
Thus implemented, the broad discretion delegated by Congress in
the Rule of Reason and Workable Competition rule need not be feared
as an erosion of antitrust administration and enforcement. If government and business cultivate the common ground of fundamental thinking delimited in the introduction of this article, both should invite a
much needed mutual respect and confidence in their respective spheres
of responsibility without sacrifice or weakening of the basic premises
of private competitive enterprise.
Utilization of this coherent approach will increase the probabilities
of a strengthened empirical basis of antitrust on all levels-in initiation
of proceedings, in informal settlements, in formal proceedings, and in
court trials and appellate review where the 6.nal judgments are rendered
on questions of fact and law in determining whether antitrust violation
exists and the equitable remedies for correction of violation.

J.

Acquisition of Stock or Assets Under Amended Section 7
of Clayton AcfM

Expansion of a husines_s may he achieved by bringing previously
independent companies under control of a single enterprise through
acquisition of stock or assets. Such acquisitions involve antitrust issues
arising either. under the Sherman Act or under section 7 of the Clayton
Act, as amended by the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, popularly known
as the Anti-Merger Act.151
So far as the Sherman Act is concerned, the legality of the acquisition will depend upon the principles developed in the merger cases,
culminating in the most recent statement of the rationale in the Columbia Steel case.152
For the purpose of indicating the relation of section 7 to the Sherman Act and its integration with the proposals made in this article,
150 See generally, Montague, "The Celler Anti-Merger Act: An Administrative Problem in an Economic Crisis," 37 A.B.A.J. 253 (1950); Celler, ''The New Antimerger
Statute," 37 A.B.A.J. 897 (1951); note, 46 !LI.. L. Rnv. 444 (1951); Carson, "Corporate
Mergers," CCH ANnTRusT LAw SYMPOSIUM 167 (1952); Chadwell and McLaren, ''The
Current Status of the Antitrust Laws,'' Umv. !LI.. L. FonuM 491, 492496 (1950); Hernacki, "Mergerism and Section 7 of the Clayton Act,'' 20 GEo. WASH. L. Rnv. 659 (1952).
As applied to foreign commerce of the United States, see Oppenheim, ''Foreign Commerce
Under the Sherman Act-Points and Implications of The Timken Case," 42 T.M.R. 3,
14-17 (1952).
•
151 Amended by Pub. L. No. 899, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 64 Stat L. 1125 (1950) 15
U.S.C.A. (Supp. 12, 1951) §18.
152 334 U.S. 495, 68 S.Ct. 1107 (1948), and Handler, supra notes 33 and 140.
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the followil,!g features are stressed. Section 7, as amended, applies to
the acquisition by a corporation engaged in commerce of the whole or
part of the capital stock or assets of another corporation also engaged
in commerce "where in any line of commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
Stated in summary form, the government must define and prove the
relevant market and the relevant products involved in the acquisition.
The "line of commerce" need not be industry-wide; any part of the
domestic commerce is included. "In any section of the country" is
apparently intended to cover any market area in the United States in
which the acquiring or acquired corporation is doing business and to
embrace potential as well as actual competition. The words '~may be"
in the qualifying clause are intended to require proof of the effect of
the acquisition as creating a reasonable probability of a substantial
lessening of competition or tendency to create a monopoly. The government, therefore, has a lesser burden of proof under section 7 than
under the Sherman Act, which requires a proof of an unreasonable
restraint of trade.1153
At this writing, no judicial interpretations of section 7 have been
made. It is hoped that the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission will determine the probable effects of a specific
merger by resort to standards compatible with the concept of Workable
Competition and the Rule of Reason as proposed throughout this
article. There are encouraging signs that such an approach might be
taken.1154 In that event, no amendment to the language of section 7
would be required. There is one beclouded aspect that needs clarification. Unless section 7 is interpret~d, as recommended herein for the
comparable qualifying language in section 3 of the Clayton Act, in a
manner which departs from the substantially affected volume of commerce test of the Standard of California case,1 515 it would not be in
harmony with the proposed concept of Workable Competition and the
Rule of Reason. Measurement of the probable effects of a particular
merger should be made by consideration of all relevant economic factors. As heretofore stated, the "incipiency" test embodied in the "reasonable probability" standard is compatible with a Rule of Reason so
long as it is applied in the context of the impact of the merger upon
1153 See H. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (1949); S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong.,
2d sess. (1950).
154 See Sheehy, "Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act," Statement Before Association of Bar of the City of New York, Oct. 18, 1951.
ms See supra ill E.
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the relevant competitive fabric affected by the acqms1t1.on. In this
· way, section 7 would be harmonized with the standards of the proposed
declaration of national antitrust policy.156

V
PROPOSALS FOR REcoNCILING ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT WITH
'
ANTITRUST POLICY

Now we come to an area in which the public policy of maintaining
competition has been diluted by discordant trends in administrative
and judicial interpretation of the Robinson-P,atman Act.157 Both the
Federal Trade Commission and the courts have construed the various
provisions of the act in a manner that encourages "soft competition"
irreconcilable with the ''hard competition" set forth as the national
antitrust policy of Congress in the Sherman Act, the restraint of trade
156 On interlocking directorates under section 8 of the Clayton Act, see Kramer, "Interlocking Directorships and the Clayton Act after 35 Years," 59 YALE L.J. 1266 (1950);
Federal Trade Commission Report on Interlocking Directorates (1950); Copeland, ''The
Federal Trade Commission Indicts Itself," 29 HARv. Bus. REv., No. 5 (1951); Madison,
''Proposed Amendments of the Federal Antitrust Law and Its Relation to 'Big Business,' "
CCH ANnntusT I.Aw SYMPOSIUM, 1952, 106, 119-120 (1952); proposed amendment to
section 8, Federal Trade Commission, Annual Report 8 (1951).
157 49 Stat. L. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §13. On the Robinson-Patman Act
generally, see: Thorp and George, "Check List of Possible Effects of the Robinson-Patman
Act," 44 DUN & 'BRADSTREET Mo. RBv. (Spec. No.) (Aug. 1936); Copeland, ''The Problem of Administering the Robinson-Patman Act," 15 HARv. Bus. REv. 156 (1937);
Learned and Isaacs, ''The Robinson-Patman Law: Some Assumptions and Expectations," 15
HARv. Bus. RBv. 137 (1937); McAllister, ''Price Control by Law in the United States,''
4 I.Aw & CoNT.llM. PROB. 273 (1937); Price Discrimination and Price Cutting, 4 I.Aw
& CoNT.llM. PROB. No. 3 (a symposium) (1947); Smith, ''The Patman Act in Practice," 35
MICH. L. REv. 705 (1937); ZoRN AND FELDMAN, Busurass UNDER nm NEw PRICE
LAws (1937); PATMAN, Tm; ROBINSON-PATMAN Ac:r (1938); Burling and Sheldon, ''Price
Competition as Affected by the Robinson-Patman Act," l WASH. & LEE L. RBv. 31 (1939);
Bayly, ''Four Years Under the Robinson Patman Act," 25 MINN. L. RBv. 131 (1941);
MILLER, UNFAIR CoMPEnTION, c. VIII (1941); Commerce Clearing House (CCH),
Symposium on Robinson-Patman Act for 1946, 1947 and 1948; Crowley, ''Equal Price
Treatment Under Robinson-Patman .Act," 95 Umv. PA. L. RBv. 306 (1947); Shniderman, ''The Tyranny of Labels-A Study of Functional Discounts under the RobinsonPatman Act," 60 HARv. L. RBv. 571 (1947); Adelman, ''Effective Competition and the
Antitrust Laws," 61 HARv. L. RBv. 1289 (1948); Haslett, "Price Discriminations and
Their Justifications under the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936,'' 46 MICH. L. RBv. 450
(1948); EDWARDS, MAINTAINING CoMPBnnoN 164-169 (1949); OPPENHEIM, PmCB AND
SBRVlCE DrsCRIMINA'I'IONS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Ac:r (American Law Institute,
1949); AusTIN, PRICE DrsCRIMINA'I'ION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE RoBINSONPATMAN Ac:r (American Law Institute, 1950); Fuchs, ''The Requirement of Exactness in
the Justification of Price and Service Differentials Under the Robinson-Patman Act," 30
Tm:. L. RBv. 1 (1951); Hansen and Smith, ''The Champion Case: What is Competition?"
29 HARv. Bus. RBv. 89 (1951); Rowe, ''Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Patman,'' 60 YALE L.J. 929 (1951); Shniderman, ''Federal
Trade Commission Orders Under the Robinson-Patman Act: An Argument For Liniiting
Their Impact On Subsequent Pricing Conduct,'' 65 HARv. L. RBv. 750 (1952).
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jurisdiction under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
and sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act.158
Apart from its restraint of trade jurisdiction under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, the Commission has jurisdiction thereunder to regulate the equity or quality of the plane of competition between particular competitors. The exercise of this function does not
encourage "soft competition." The Commission's authority extends to
prohibition of unfair methods of competition which injure competitors
or competition in general through misrepresentation and other related
practices.159 This does not confer authority to regulate affirmatively
competition in price, service, and quality.
The Robinson-Patman Act, however, relates solely to price, service,
and quality discriminations and embodies dual legislative objectivesone aimed at the preservation of competition in general and the other
toward preventing injury between particular competitors.160 It is
the latter objective which has promoted "soft competition."161
158 Justice Jackson put the problem succinctly during the oral argument of the
Standard of Indiana case involving the meeting competition provision of the act:
"The whole philosophy-what troubles me-the whole philosophy of the Sherman Act
is go out and compete, get business, fight for it.
"Now, the whole philosophy we are asked to enforce here is that you really must not,
you should let this business go and not meet the competition. I have difficulty in knowing
where we are with this, and I should think the people who are trying to do business would
find it much more troublesome than we do, for it does not trouble me but once a term, but
it must trouble them every day.'' (Emphasis supplied). Quoted in Simon, "Price Discrimination to Meet Competition," Umv. h.t. I.Aw FomJM 575 at 581 (1950). See also
reports of oral· arguments, 18 I.Aw WEEK 3208 and 19 I.Aw Wl!l!K 3101.
And, in deciding the Standard of Indiana case, the majority of the Court showed its
awareness that the Robinson-Patman Act as a whole may be out of line in its economic
theory with the other principal antitrust laws by stating: "We need not now reconcile, in
its entirety, the economic theory which underlies the Robinson-Patman Act with that of
the Sherman and Clayton Acts." Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Federal Trade Commission,
340 U.S. 231, 249, 71 S.Ct. 240, 249 (1951).
See Rowe, note 157 supra at p. 974, and authorities there cited.
159 As a jurisdictional fact, the Supreme Court has held that the Commission must
show "present or potential substantial competition, which is shown by proof, or appears
by necessary inference, to have been injured, or to be clearly threatened with injury, to a
substantial extent, by the use of the unfair methods complained of.'' Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 51 S.Ct. 587 (1931), reaffirmed on this point,
Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149, 62 S.Ct. 966 (1942).
160 The legislative standard provides: ". • • where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person. • • .'' 49 Stat. L.
1526 (1936) §l(a), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §13.
161 The present perplexities of the act have stemmed from this unsound commingling
of legislative standards. Congress should have concentrated on the prime evil demonstrated by the legislative history as its primary intention. This was the evil of outright
discriminatory rebates through special and secret allowances. Conceived in large part as an
act aimed at such discriminatory practices to the unfair advantage of chain stores and other
mass distributors, the objective of getting rid of such abuses might have been effectuated
by clear-cut negative prohibitions upon such conduct. Instead of limiting itself, however,

1200

MrcHIGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 50

Discriminatory practices, on the one hand, may involve genuine
antitrust issues when either the individual business firm or a group of
business firms engages in a course of discriminatory conduct through
contracts, combinations, or conspiracies which unreasonably restrain
trade, or which monopolize or attempt to monopolize any part of interstate commerce. This is the area that is covered by the Sherman Act
and the concurrent restraint of trade jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.162
The latter provision, it should be noted, gives the Commission, in addition, power to restrain incipient threats of stifling competition.
On the other hand, discriminatory practices may involve conduct
which diverts trade from particular competitors without substantial
impa_irment of the competitive system as such.
In the Robinson-Patman Act, this duality of objectives was mixed
l,y Congress into the legislative standards of the act. However, it .is
especially the provisions pointed toward the regulation of the plane of
competition between individual competitors which have brought the
act under vigorous attack. These are the provisions which commentators have characterized as being analogous to a public utility concept,
establishing the Federal Trade Commission as a protector of certain
elements in the business community against the effective price and
service competition of others.168
The crux of the problem clearly is that the Robinson-Patman Act
is not an exclusively antitrust statute.164 Provisions aimed at curbing
to squeezing out only those price differentials which cannot be justified by cost savings or
other market justifications, Congress in effect undertook to write a code of pricing policies
and practices on various matters which, from the lessons of experience, should have been
left to the discretion of private business for testing against the forces of competition in the
market place.
162 Discriminatory practices are clearly illegal when used to implement prohibited
restraints of trade or monopolistic schemes. E B. Muller & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,. (6th Cir. 1944) 142 F. (2d) SU.
las For example, the basic fault that marks subsections (d) and (e) is the establishment of the unsound standard of "proportionally equal terms" that can be enforced by the
Commission only by treating sellers and distributors as though they were under a pµblic
utility duty of serving all buyers on equal terms. This is a flagrant oversimplification
of the conceptions of competition and monopoly. The wise approach is set forth by Justice
Frankfurter in a different factual situation but in language appropriate to this _problem:
''The Procrustean bed is not a symbol of equality. It is no less inequality to have equality
among unequals." New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284 at 353, 67 S.Ct. 1207
(1947). See Learned and Isaacs, Copeland, Rowe, Adelman, supra note 157.
164 In the strict antitrust sense, only a part of the basic provision in 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act includes qualifying language similar to that found in sections 3 and 7
of the Clayton Act. When different prices are given to two or more purchasers from the
same seller, an illegal price discrimination results only when it is proved that the effect
"may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
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practices believed to be unfair methods of price and service competition are intermixed with provisions aimed at preventing restraint of
trade and monopoly.165 The result has been that the enforcement
activities of the Commission tend to give artificial protection to the
individual competitor, thus bringing about the "soft" competition that,
in effect, lends a crutch to the inefficient in the economy. The solution for this confusing situation obviously is to restore consistency to
the antitrust laws by bringing the Robinson-Patman Act into harmony
with them.166
In practical terms, this means that the Robinson-Patman Act should
be revised to make it coherent with the Sherman Act, the antitrust
jurisdiction under section 5 of th~ Federal Trade Commission Act,
and sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act. The concept of Workable
Competition and the Rule of Reason, as heretofore discussed, should
be made expressly applicable to the revised section 2 of the Clayton
Act. This would give assurance that rival systems of distribution may
be permitted to compete on the basis of price, quality, and service,
taking into account the necessary tolerances of imperfections in such
competition. This revision would reduce section 2 of the Clayton Act
to more specific and .realistic objectives .consistent with the revisions
of the National Antitrust Policy suggested in other parts of this article.
This is not the place or occasion to present a technical draft of a
revision of the Robinson-Patman Act. Such a task would come within
the functions of the Committee on Revision of National Antitrust
Policy proposed at the conclusion of this article, if that committee
should concur in the recommendations here made. At this juncture
commerce." This refei:s to effects upon the industry as a whole or the relevant line of
commerce or market. It contemplates a showing of injury to the competitive processes as
such.
165 ·The record of enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act discloses relatively few
instances where the Commission was concerned with genuine antitrust issues. The outstanding instances are found in the delivered price proceedings of the Federal Trade Commission. The leading court case is Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 3~3
U.S. 683, 68 S.Ct. 793 (1948). The Commission's activity in this area is discussed in a
symposium by members of the Commission's staff, 37 GBo. L.J. 135, 149, 166, 183, 201,
217 (1949).
166 This writer, in an earlier appraisal of the act, prior to the decision in Federal Trade
Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 68 S.Ct. 822 (1948), approved the general
standards of section 2(a) in the belief that they would be construed as manifesting congressional intention to adopt the Rule of Reason approach. Oppenheim, "Should the
Robinson-Patman Act Be Amended?" CCH RoBINSON-PATMAN Am: SYMPOSIUM 141,
143 (1948). While the Morton Salt Company rationale may possibly be whittled down
in the reach of its oversimplified version in these respects, the safest course is an explicit
congressional mandate to require the Commission and the courts to apply that standard of
reasonableness in all price discrimination proceedings.
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there is offered merely a framework of the nature and extent of necessary changes.
I. The revision would have the main objective of converting the
present Robinson-Patman Act into an antitrust section 2 of the Clayton Act supplementary to the Sherman Act and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The revised section 2 would then be
comparable to similar supplementary provisions in sections 3 and 7
of the Clayton Act, each of which is also aimed at dealing with specific
transactions in terms of antitrust prohibitions.167
To accomplish this, the present Robinson-Patman Act should be
revised to make section 2 of the Clayton Act applicable to the prohibition of price and service discriminations only where the effect may
be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly at
any level of competition-the seller's level, the intermediate buyer level,
and the level of the customers of such buyers. In the absence of proof
of such effects, there would be no violation of section 2.168
The revision would preserve the "hard competition" resulting from
differential -prices or services which can be legally justified. Absolute
defenses would be expressly sanctioned when differential prices or
services are legally justified by cost savings, the good faith meeting
of competition, or other legitimate economic justifications in the distribution system, consistent with the antitrust policy of maintaining
1a1 Note comment by Lindley, J., in United States v. New York Great A. & P. Tea
Co., (D.C. ill. 1946) 67 F. Supp. 626 at 676: "Sometimes I doubt whether we ever
needed the Robinson-Patman Act with all its elusive uncertainty. I have thought that the
Sherman Act, properly interpreted and administered, would have remedied all the ills
meant to be cured."
Judge Lindley's view has considerable cogency in one basic respect. If Congress in
1914 had not enacted old section 2 of the Clayton Act, the general standard of the Sherman Act and the "unfair methods of competition" standard of section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act were sufficiently broad, if properly utilized, to comprehend species
of restraint of trade resulting from price and service discriminations having the effects prohibited by those statutes. Indeed, the more specific provisions of old section 2 of the Clayton Act were intended as a supplement to section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
tQ, prohibit price discriminations with the effect of driving out competitors or stilling competition. This was clearly an antitrust prohibition against predatory or destructive price
cutting. The word "destroy" written into section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act preserved this enforcement tool.
168 Resort to general standards offers a sound method of approaching the legislative
formulation of public policy involved in revision of the Robinson-Patman Act. The revised
act should vest in the Commission a broad range of initial administrative discretion in
applying a Rule of Reason approach to all of its provisions. This will lay the foundation
£or judicial review ·of the Commission's orders through a similar approach in a case-by-oise
process of inclusion and exclusion, depending upon all of the facts of a particular situation.
Any attempt to formulate an all-embracing specific enumeration of unlawful price discriminations will be foredoomed to failure. See the writer's elaboration of this principle in a
previous article on the Robinson-Patman Act, supra note 166.
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Workable Competition applied through the Rule of Reason as incorporated in the congressional declaration heretofore suggested.
If the Commission were to proceed against discriminations which
arise from contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in unreasonable
restraint of trade or monopolizing, or attempts to monopolize in violation of sections l and 2 of the Sherman Act, it would either charge
such violations in a separate count for violation of section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act in a complaint containing another
count for violation of the revised section 2 of the Clayton Act, or it
would issue a complaint based entirely on charges of violation of the
Sherman Act. The Department of Justice would, of course, have
concurrent jurisdiction to attack such discriminatory conduct under
the Sherman Act. This would bring the revised section 2 into harmony
with the other antitrust laws. The supplementary antitrust provisions
of section 2 would make specific the prohibitions directed against price
or service discriminations where the effects stated in the qualifying
clause are proved. The Sherman Act would be the instrument of antitrust enforcement when the discriminations are related to factual situations in which concentration of economic power of sellers or buyers
amounts to an unreasonable restraint of trade or monopoly power. The
absolute defenses under the revised section 2 of the Clayton Act would
thus remain operative unless the government can meet the more stringent standard of proof of the Sherman Act. This would also preclude
the Commission from nullifying the "hard competition" of the absolute defenses under section 2 by erroneously claiming it has authority
to proceed against price or service discriminations under its exclusive
zone of jurisdiction under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
to prevent "incipient" threats to competition. By vesting the "incipiency" jurisdiction with respect to discriminations in the more specific provisions of section 2, Congress would thereby be reaffirming
its intention to limit the Commission's jurisdiction under the Clayton
Act to the standards formulated in the revised section 2.
2. The following provisos now in section 2 (a) of the act should
be retained:
a. The proviso concerning cost-justified differential prices.169
169 The proviso states "that nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which
make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such
purchasers sold or delivered••••" 49 Stat. L. 1526 (1936) §l(a), 15 U.S.C. (1946)
§13(.aJ.
The translation of this statutory language into a workable defense to a charge of price
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b. The proviso regarding the right to select customers in bona £de
transactions and not in restraint of trade.
c. The proviso governing price changes due to changed conditions
affecting the market or marketability of the goods in question.
3. The quantity limits proviso now in 2 (a) should be repealed.170
The objective of this proviso is in essence related to the restraint of
trade and monopoly provisions of the Sherman Act and the concurrent
antitrust jurisdiction of the Commission under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. This objective, however, was sought to
be attained by authorizing the Commission to fix quantity limits as a
ceiling upon which differential quantity discounts could thereafter be
granted. Such a grant of power of affirmative regulation of the pricing
policies of private business is contrary to the principle stated at the outset of this article, which would limit congressiQnal antitrust policy
.applicable in such private businesses to general negative prohibitions
upon conduct declared unlawful in the statute. The recent Commission quantity-limits order 71 covering replacement tires vividly illustrates the enormous complications, not to mention the basic unsoundness, of vesting in an agency of government what is in substance and
effe~t.a price fixing function.
violation has, however, proved to be one of the most perplexing problems the act poses to
businessmen. Despite the explicit recognition in the proviso of cost justification, the defense has ·proved to be illusory for most respondents. The Commission has thus far failed
to provide businessmen with workable guides as to what accounting principles will be
acceptable in a cost savings defense. Distribution cost accounting, on which the defense
necessarily rests, has been stated by one commentator to be still in its "pioneering stage."
Sawyer, "Accounting and Statistical Proof in Price Discrimination Cases," 36 low.& L
Rav. 244 (1951). illustrative of the literature on this wonderland of accounting are:
Freer, Accounting Problems Under the Robinson-Patman Act,- address before Pennsylvania
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, March 24, 1938; Sawyer, ''Robinson-Patman
Act, Section 2(a)," 8 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 469 (1940); Federal Trade Commission, Case
Studies in Distribution Cost Accounting for Maµufacturing and Wholesaling, H.R. Doc.
No. 287, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941); Masse!, "Cost Factors Considered Under the Due
Allowance Clause of Section 2(a) of the Act as Justification for Price Differences," Sn.tPOSIUM ON ROBINSON-PATMAN Acrr oP CmCAco BAR AsSN. (1947); Warmack, "Cost
Accounting Problems Under the Robinson-Patman Act," CCH, RoBINSON-PATMAN Acrr
SYMPOSIUM 105 (1947); Fuchs, ''The Requirement of Exactness in the Justification of
Price and Service Differentials Under the Robinson-Patman Act," 30 TEL L. Rav. 1 (1951).
It should be a major responsibility of the Committee on Revision of National Antitrust
Policy suggested in this article to draw upon the experience of accountants, economists,
attorneys, and businessmen to formulate acceptable standards for cost accounting justification of price differentials in harmony with the general guideposts of Workable Competition and the Rule of Reason. The need for clarification in this field is urgent.
170This recommendation is also made by STOOXING AND WATKINS, MoNOPOLY AND
FREE Em:mu>msE 561 (1951). But cf. Fuchs, note 169 supra at pp. 27-28.
171 Federal Trade Commission, Quantity Limit Rule 203-1, issued December 13, 1951,
effective April 7, 1952, 17 FED. Rae. 113 (1952). Commissioner Lowell B. Mason filed
Minority Findings and Statement of Basis and Reasons Therefor. By consent of all parties,
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia entered an order staying the
effective date of the Rule until the Court's final disposition.
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4. Subsection 2(b)1 72 of the present act would be repealed. In its
place, the revised statute would contain a proviso expressly adopting the
principle of the recent Standard of Indiana case.173 This would provide
that it would be an absolute defense where the seller shows that his
lower price, or his furnishing of services or facilities, was made in good
faith to meet an equally low lawful price of, or the lawful services or
facilities furnished by, a competitor.174
•
The prima facie case rule now contained in 2(b) is unsound.175
Under the suggested provision, the Commission would be required to
172 For discussion of section 2(b) see: Austem, "Required Competitive Injury and
Permitted Meeting of Competition," CCH RoBINSON-PATMAN Acrr SYMJ?OSIUM 63, 73
(1947); Haslett, "Price Discriminations and Their Justifications Under the RobinsonPatman Act of 1936," 46 Mrca L. REv. 450, 474-480 (1948); Oppenheim, "Should the
Robinson-Patman Act Be Amended?" supra note 166 at p. 152; Adelman, "The A & P
Case; A Study in Applied Economic Theory," 63 Q.J. EcoN. 238 (1949); Berger and Goldstein, ''Meeting Competition under the Robinson-Patman Act," 44 Iu.. L. REv. 315
(1949); note, "Trouble Begins in the 'New' Sherman Act: The Perplexing Story of the
A & P Case," 58 YALB L.J. 969 (1949); Simon, "Legal Price Fixing,'' CCH A.NnntuS'I'
LA.w SYMPOSIUM 83 (1951); Simon, "Price Discrimination to Meet Competition," UNIV.
Iu.. LA.w FoRUM 575 (1950); Austem, "Inconsistencies in the Law,'' CCH A.NnntuS'I'
LlW SYMPOSIUM 158 (1951).
173 Standard Oil Company (Indiana) v. Federal Trade Commission, 340 U.S. 231,
71 S.Ct. 240 (1951) and see Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., (D.C. Cal.)
CCH 1952 Trade Cases ,r67,266. See also Adelman, ''Integration and Antitrust Policy,"
63 HARv. L. REv. 27, 60-74 (1949); Adelman, note 172 supra; note, "The Swinging DoorOr How to Obey One Antitrust Law By Violating Another," 59 YALB L.J. 158 (1949);
Rowe, note 157. supra at 942.
l7¼A bill to conform the Robinson-Patman Act to the Supreme Court's holding in the
Standard of Indiana case, note 173 supra, was passed by the Senate on August 2, 1951, S. 719,
82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951). See 97 CoNG. Rl!c. 9660-61 (Aug. 2, 1951). S. 791, which
also deals with the delivered price problem, would add the following new subsection to

-~~

.

"(g) In any proceeding involving an alleged violation of this section, it shall be a
complete defense to a charge of discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished
for the seller to show that his differential in price, or his furnishing of greater services or
facilities, was made in good faith to meet the equally low price of, or the equally extensive
services or facilities furnished by a competitor: Provided, That a seller shall not be deemed
to have acted in good faith if he knew or should have known that the lower price or more
extensive services or facilities which he met were in fact unlawful."
175 The Commission's construction of the proviso now in 2(b) has come perilously
close to converting the Commission's prima facie case into a virtual per se violation based
on a mere price difference. This effect is shown by the approval of the Commission's
approach in Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 68 S.Ct. 822
(1948), and in the well-known dictum of the Second Circuit in Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v.
Federal Trade Commission, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 378.
But see Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (7th
Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 786, 790, cert. granted, March 3, 1952, 342 U.S. 940, 72 S.Ct.
552 (1952).
Under the Commission's present construction of the prima facie case, differential
prices become dangerous to offer or accept since the threat of an almost impossible burden
of proof is ever present if the Commission subsequently charges that the differential price
is in violation of the act. The result tends in actuality to deprive businessmen of the right
to grant or receive price differentials fully sanctioned by cost savings. See Rowe, note 157
supra.
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prove all elements of violation. It would be required to adduce evidence
of substantial lessening of competition before the seller respondent is
put under a duty to come forward with evidence in support of his affirmative defense of justification. The seller respondent would have the
burden of proving th~s affirmative defense by a preponderance of
evidence.
There is no valid ground for giving the Commission an undue
advantage, beyond the present advantage of the substantial evidence
rule applicable to the federal regulatory agencies,176 by permitting it to
establish a prima facie case on proof of elements of violation exclusive
of adducing evidence of substantial injury to competition. Since the
Commission purports to proceed against a respondent on the basis of
being able to prove a "reasonable probability" of, or even actual substantial injury to, competition, it would not be prejudiced by the genuine procedural and substantive due process resulting from the suggested revision.
5. The present sec'tions 2(c), (d), and (e) of the Robinson-Patman Act would be eliminated. The real evil sought to be eradicated by
these provisions was outright rebates without legal or economic justifications.177 Whether or not such rebates in fact exist can be determined
only with reference to the "price," which includes every element in the
entire transaction. The effective price paid by the buyer must therefore
take into account all of the terms of sale. Through this approach the
Commission would apply the general prohibition in the revised section
2 against discriminations in price, or in services or facilities, to the facts
of the particular case. The concept of Workable Competition and the
Rule of Reason would govern the broad discretion of the Commission
so that it would proceed only where there is substantial lessening of
competition.
176 Rule

XXII of the Rules of Practice of the Federal Trade Commission provides:

'·All findings, conclusions and orders made and issued by the trial examiner shall be based
upon the whole record and suppo:i;ted by reliable, probative and substantial evidence."
177 The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act shows that these were the evils
Congress sought to eliminate. See documentation in references cited in note 157 supra.
The responsibility for the failure to administer and enforce the act with this objective in
view must be shared alike by Congress, the Commission, and the courts. Congress in the
first instance was responsible for an inept and indefinite formulation of statutory standards.
It should have drafted sections· 2(c), (d), and (e) in terms of clear-cut negative prohibitions of these specific abuses which it was universally agreed should be condemned. The
Commission construed the provisions of these subsections in the belief that the congressional
intent required a virtual per se violation approach without inquiry into injurious effects on
competition within the limitations of section 2(a); also, respondents were not allowed to
show justifications. The courts compounded these errors by affirming the Commission's
interpretations. Congressional revision of these subsections is needed to eliminate the "soft
competition" consequences which have flowed from the construction given to them thus far.
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Under this approach, it would be unlawful to pay anything of
value as a brokerage, commission, or other compensation unless such
payment is made for actual and bona :6.de services rendered to the payor
by an intermediary in the distribution system.178 If there is direct buying without any form of intermediation, the purchaser would be entitled to cost savings resulting from that method of distribution pursuant
to the cost justification proviso indicated above.
Similarly, payment of any promotional allowance to a customer of
the seller would be unlawful unless the payment is made for actual
and bona :6.de promotional services rendered to the payor. With respect
to services or facilities furnished by a seller to a customer, illegality
would result only when they are not actually and in good faith used to
promote the sale of the goods purchased from the seller. Discrimination
arising from failure of the seller to offer comparable payments or services
or facilities to all of his customers on equal terms would depend upon
whether the effect may be substantially to lessen competition. This
would rid the Commission of the plague of the fantastic standard of
"proportionally equal terms" in the present sections 2(d) and (e) of
the Robinson-Patman Act.179
1 78 The "soft competition" fostered by the act is strikingly illustrated by the island of
immunity created for independent brokers as a result of the Commission's construction of
2(c) on the basis of a mistaken analogy to the fiduciary obligations of an agent to his
principal. The courts have sustained the Commission's position that it is unlawful per se
for the buyer or anyone acting for or controlled by the buyer to pay or receive brokerage,
even where services of value are actually rendered to the seller. The result has been
virtually to read out of the section °the phrase "except for services rendered." The presence
of these words in subsection (c) affords evidence, however, that Congress recognized that
the standard of reason might be applied to certain situations where bona fide and actual
services of value were rendered by the buyer's agent. There is no justifiable reason why
independent brokers should be given a monopoly in their distribution function at the
expense of established or new methods of distribution that compete with such brokers in
rendering services of unquestioned value. The Commission's strained construction of 2(c)
has actually worked hardship to small business faced with the necessity of resorting to
cooperative buying arrangements to compete on equal terms with chain stores and other
mass buyers. See, e.g., Biddle Purchasing Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (2d Cir.
1938) 96 F. (2d) 687, cert. den. 305 U.S. 634, 59 S.Ct. 101 (1938); Modem Marketing
Service v. Federal Trade Commission, (7th Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 970; Quality Bakers
of America v. Federal Trade Commission, (1st Cir. 1940) 114 F. (2d) 393.
See also: Oppenheim, "Administration of the Brokerage Provision of the RobinsonPatman Act," 8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 511 (1940); Austem, "Section 2(c)," CCH SYM•
l'OSIUM ON ROBINSON-PATMAN Ar::r 37 (1946); Chadwell, "Section 2(c)," SYMPOSIUM
oN RoBINSON-PATMAN Ar::r OP CmCAGO BAR AssN. (1947)
179 Sections 2(d) and (e) drift from the narrow purpose of prohibiting specific abuses
through negative prohibitions to seek the untenable goal of affirmative requirement of
equality of treatment for all competing customers. The business community is legitimately
concerned over the confusing and vague attempts to force sellers to spread their advertising
and promotional allowances among all buyers instead of concentrating them among the
buyers expected to return the greatest value for advertising expenditure. As in the case of
2(c), examination of the legislative history of the act shows that this result goes beyond
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6. The present 2(£) should be revised by incorporating in the new
section a prohibition uppn a buyer's knowing inducement or receipt of
prohibited discriminations in price, subject to the limitation that the
buyer shall not be required to prove his seller's cost justification.180 To
enable cost justification to be brought into a proceeding in which a
buyer is made a respondent, the revised 2(f) should also provide that in
a proceeding against a buyer, the Commission shall be required to join
as a party respondent, either the seller, if a single seller is involved, or,
as is more likely to be the case, a representative group of sellers.
If the seller fails to appear and defend, or fails to sustain the burden
of proving cost justifications, then the buyer would be free from liability
unless the Commission further shows that the buyer acted either with
actual knowledge of lack of cost justification, or with knowledge of such
circumstances as makes his inducement or receipt of differential prices
amount to bad faith or collusive conduct with the seller. This would
amount to sustaining a charge that the buyer knowingly induced and
received unlawful price discriminations.
what Congress intended and is not necessary to achieve elimination of the rebates concealed
as fictitious services and allowances which Congress sought to curb.
The standard "proportionally equal terms," as the writer has remarked elsewhere, is
"a legislative monstrosity." It purports to establish a ratio without indicating the basis of
comparison. Oppenheim, note 166 supra at 146-147.
For discussions of sections 2(d) and 2(e), see: FTC, Distribution Methods and Costs
(Part V, Adver~g as a Factor in Distribution) (1944); Carter, "Validity of the Demonstrator Practice Under Section 2(d) and (e)," CCH SYMPOSIUM ON ROBINSON-PATMAN
Ac:r 91 (1946); Layton, "Demonstrators on Proportionally Equal Terms," CCH SYM·
l'OSIUM ON ROBINSON-PATMAN Ac:r 38 (1948); Montague, "Proportionally Equal Terms,"
CCH SYMPOSIUM ON ROBINSON-PATMAN Ac:r 51 (1948); FELDMAN AND ZoRN, Al>VERTISING AND PROMOTIONAL ALLOWANCES (Bureau of National Affairs) (1948).
180 This will avoid the untenable construction by the Commission of 2(f) approved
recently in the Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. Federal Trade Commission, (7th Cir.,
1942) 194 F. (2d) 433. In construing the language of 2(f) as requiring a buyer to prove
his seller's cost savings to justify a price differential he accepted from the seller, the case
has introduced an entirely new note of uncertainty into all interstate sales. The Seventh
Circuit affirmed the Commission's reading of section 2(f) together with 2(a) and 2(b)
to incorporate the prima facie case of 2(b) into the provisions of 2(£). This unwarranted
construction poses a serious threat to any buyer who accepts a price advantage offered by
a seller in the belief that it is cost justified or otherwise permissible under one of the provisos of 2(a). It is an obvious fact of business life that sellers will not ordinarily provide
buyers with the detailed knowledge of their business necessary to prove cost justification
under the standards established for such proof by the Commission. Without such aid from
the seller, a 2(f) charge under the theory of the Automatic Canteen case is virtually unanswerable by the buyer. Thus, the result is tantamount to a per se violation rule.
The result converts the language of the act, which recognizes the validity of price
differences based on cost savings, the good faith meeting of competition, and other exceptions, into an elusive will-of-the-wisp. It is properly characterized by the words used by
Justice Jackson in the Morton Salt Case: "a word of promise to the ear to be broken to
the hope." Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 at 58, 68 S.Ct.
822 (1948). See also, Howrey, "The Buyer and a Prima Facie Case," CCH ROBINSON·
PATMAN Acr SYMPOSIUM 87 (1948); Austin, note 157 supra at pp. 145-154.
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These suggestions are made because in every instance the buyer
is charged with liability only when the Commission has evidence that
the seller or sellers have probably granted unlawful discriminatory
prices. As matters now stand, the Commission places an indefensible
burden of proof upon the buyer when it proceeds against the buyer
alone. The burden of proving cost justification should be placed upon
the seller, since he is the onlr one who possesses the evidence relevant to
that defense. Common sense and daily observation of business purchasing activities demonstrate that buyers generally do not have the means
of proving sellers' cost justifications.
The foregoing suggestions would constitute statutory recognition
of the traditional "hard bargaining" process by which the buyer is
entitled to procure the cheapest price consistent with savings arising
from economy and efficiency. Buyer liability would arise only when
there is knowing inducement or receipt by the buyer of differential
prices that amount to price discrimination because of lack of cost
justification.
7. The Borah-Van Nuys Act:1 81 (enacted as section 3 of the
Robinson-Patman Act) should be repealed. Its penal provisions present
a constant threat to businessmen in a field of trade regulation where
criminal pro~ecutions are out of harmony with traditional Anglo-American conceptions because of the inherent uncertainties of what is unlawful in a dynamic area like distribution methods. Section 3 was
enacted as a congressional compromise. As this writer once said,1 82
it is "a grotesque manifestation of the scissors and paste pot method of
drafting a potentially drastic criminal statute." Its demise will in no
material respect weaken the enforcement of prohibitions against unjustified discriminations.
8. The present provisions regarding the return of net earnings of
cooperatives and purchases by non-profit institutions should be retained.
By making the foregoing revisions, every area of essential civil liability for illegal discriminations will have been preserved. There would
be no sacrifice of sanctions against the antitrust abuses of differential
pricing in other antitrust statutes and the prohibition under the revised
section 2 of discriminations substantially lessening competition or tending to create a monoply would be put in its proper sphere.
The suggested revision would coordinate the basic antitrust policy
of relying upon general legislative standards and prohibitions upon
181 49 Stat. L. 1528, 15 U.S.C. (1946) §13a. See Gordon, ''Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act-The Meaning of Sections 1 and 3," 22 A.B.A.J. 593 (1936).
182 Oppenheim, note 166 supra at 153.
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illegal conduct, rather than the misconceived specifications of the Robinson-Patman Act which experience has demonstrated to be a futile
effort toward affirmative regulation of pricing policies.
It is realized that the backwash of the administration and enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act will have left flotsam and jetsam of
paradoxical economic and marketing effects which must be dissipated
in order to bring the proposed revision into rational and coherent relationship to the national antitrust policy synthesized in this article.
The responsibility for suggesting guides to this purging of misconceptions would be the responsibility of the Committee on Revision of
National Antitrust Policy proposed at the end of this paper. That
Committee should analyze the legal and economic distinctions between
differential pricing consistent with Workable Competition and price
discriminations clearly. harmful to the public policy of the antitrust
laws. These guiding principles would be the basis for developing realistic criteria for application through the Rule of Reason. In performing
this task, the Committee would delimit differential pricing which injures particular competitors in ways that are the essence of "hard competition" in order that the present inconsistency of the "soft competition"
approach with the objectives of the antitrust laws may be avoided.
If this approach is adopted by Congress, the Commission would
have a broad administrative discretion in initiation and conduct of
proceedings ~gainst discriminatory practices in harmony with the objectives of the revised and coordinated antitrust policy. The Commission then would have an exceptional opportunity to display an imaginative administrative policy of eliminating the anticompetitive consequences of the "soft competition" currently encouraged under the
existing act. Instead of being faced with an unattainable objective
of affirmative price regulation, such as the present act, in effect,
requires, the Commission would proceed within the practical limits
of appropriations and staff against discriminations determined to be of·
serious public importance.

VI
SuGGESTED GumEs TO RE-EXAMINATION OF ANTITRUST EXEMPTIONS

One of the principal issues of national antitrust policy on which
there has been continuous debate is the extent to which the federal
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policy of maintaining competition should be relaxed by legislative grant
of exemptions from the operation of the antitrust laws.183
In historical perspective, it is evident that at various periods Congress has exempted certain segments of the economy, or certain activities
of private groups from the impact of the prohibitions of the antitrust
laws otherwise applicable to restrictive practices and to governmental
checks upon monopolistic forms of industrial concentration.184
The character and scope of these exemptions obviously require reexamination to ascertain their true rationale as deviations from the
national antitrust policy of preserving competition. Whatever the
different views may be, an evaluation of these exemptions must be
guided by the ultimate question whether these departures from fully
operative competition are clearly justified in the public interest of the
economy as a whole. This judgment can be made only after a weighing
of all of the factors-economic, political, and social-which in the past
have operated to induce Congress to cut down the field covered by the
sanctions of the antitrust laws.
The task of ·making such an appraisal is one that should be undertaken by the Committee on Revision of National Antitrust Policy proposed in the concluding part of this article. I _merely offer some suggestions indicative of the contours of an approach to this zone of
exemptions.
Exemptions from the antitrust laws have been made in several distinguishable situations: One class of exemptions exist in areas where
competition is maintained as the major regulator of private business
enterprise.185 In such instances, apart from the antitrust prohibitions
otherwise applicable, there is little or no governmental intervention to
control the conduct of the exempted private groups. Another class of
exemptions is found in industries subject to extensive public regulatory
controls.186 In these "public" businesses, both entry and the conduct of
those engaged in the industry are affirmatively controlled by public
183 EDwAllDs, MAINrAINING CoMPE'ITI"IoN, c. ill (1949); STOCXING AND WATKINS,
MoNOPOLY AND FREE ENniRPmsE, c. 12 (1951); LYoN, A»RAMsoN AND AssOCIATES,
GoVERNMENT AND EcoNoMic WE, Vol. II, Pt. V (1940); MUND, GoVERNMENT AND
BuSINl!ss, cc. 13, 14 (1950).
184 For checklists of activities and groups, see H. Doc. No. 599, 81st Cong., 2d sess.
(1950) 29-31; OPPENHEIM, CAsEs ON FEDERAL ANTrrnusT LAws 63-69 (1948).
185 The Sherman, Federal Trade Commission, and Clayton Acts have had various
exceptions either written into their original provisions or made by subsequent amendment.
See H. Doc. No. 599, supra note 184 at 27-28.
186 See H. Doc. No. 599, supra note 184 at 29-31.
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authority. It is accordingly obvious that the diversity in subject matter
and policy objectives of ordinary private business as against the "public"
businesses has a significant bearing upon an appraisal of the nature,
scope, and effects of the particular antitrust exemption under consideration.
A value judgment on the question of whether an antitrust exemption of private persons should be retained, revised, or repealed should
therefore be made with due regard to all of the differentiations in the
factual setting of the particular case. It may also involve consideration
of the broader interconnected issue of the wisdom of the congressional
choice between the policy of relying upon competition as against the
alternative of resorting to public controls which replace or materially
reduce competition as a regulator of economic activity.187
Irrespective of whether the antitrust exemption is made in a predominantly private business or in one where public control is the chief
feature, the history of these exemptions shows that in no two instances
have the forces giving rise to the legislative exemptions been exactly
alike. This in itself warns against the danger of oversimplifying an
evaluation by making broad generalizations which gloss over the differing rationales of public policy choices in this sphere.
It is realistic to anticipate that there will continue to be some exemptions to the general public policy of maintaining competition under the
federal antit:r1;1st laws. In the American political democracy, organized
economic groups present their claims in the halls of Congress. In the
past, areas of exemptions have been carved out in response to conflicting
political-economic pressures reflecting j;ither the sheer merits of claims
_ based upon elemental equity and justice, or demands for reducing the
disparities resulting from the impersonal forces of the competitive
process. In making its choices in recognition of either of these grounds
of exemptions from the antitrust laws, Congress may determine that
the broader political and social objectives outweigh the narrower legal
and economic objectives of the exemptions from the application of
antitrust policy.
Frequent criticism of these exemptions from the antitrust laws have
engendered recommendations188 for a reassessment of their validity in
• the context of the whole body of federal antitrust legislation. This
embraces exceptions emb<?died in provisos and amendments of antitrust
187 EDWARDS; MAINTAINING COMPETITION, c. VII (1949).
188 See supra note 183; United States versus Economic Concentration

and Monopoly,
A Staff Report To The Monopoly Subcommittee, H. Res. 64, 79th Cong. 16 (1946);
H. Rep. No. 2465, 80th Cong., 2d sess. 25 (1948); H. Doc. No. 599, supra note 184 at
130, 132.
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statutes as well as exemptions in specific statutes. This appraisal should
constitute one of the important matters of inquiry by the proposed
Committee on Revision of Antitrust Policy.

VII
YARDSTICKS FOR RECONCILING INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

WrnI A.NrrrR.usT Poucy

In other articles, the writer has elaborated his philosophy of the
reconcilation of private and public interests in legal protection of industrial property rights.189 To the extent of its relevance to national
antitrust policy, what follows is a condensation of the essentials of the
approach recommended in these prior writings.

A. Public Interest in American Patent System
With reference first to the American patent system, there should be
recognition of the soundness of assuming that prima facie the constitutional provision190 and the laws1 91 relating to the limited-time exclusiveness of patent rights are in harmony with the public interest of the
over-all objective of maintaining the private competitive enterprise
system. The stated objective is to promote the progress of science and
the industrial arts. One traditional belief is that the patent system tends
to accomplish that purpose by safeguarding incentives to invent and to
invest risk capital in entrepreneurship of technological innovations in
products, processes, and designs. This premise views the exclusiveness
of patent rights as a short-term public welfare monopoly promotive of
the competitive American economy of which it is a vital and integral
part.192

National antitrust policy applicable to business utilization of patent
rights would be misconceived unless it is constantly kept in mind that
189 "Patents, The Monopoly Issue and the War," 24 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 667 (1942);
CASES ON FEDERAL ANn:-TnuST LAws, "Outline and Commentaries on American Patent
System," 464-496 (1948); "The Public Interest In Legal Protection of Industrial and
Intellectual Property," 40 T.M.R. 613 (1950), reprinted in 32 J. PAT. ()pp. Soc. 903
(1950); "A New Approach to Evaluation of the American Patent System," 33 J. PAT.
()pp. Soc. 555 (1951).
190 U.S. CoNsT., Art. I, §8, cl. 8: "The Congress shall have Power ••• To Promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. • • ."
191 35 u.s.c. (1946) c. 2, §§31-114.
192 WooD, THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM: A Survey (American Enterprise
Assn., National Economic Problem Series No. 420) (1946); BARNE'IT, PATENT PROPERTY
AND THE ANn:-MoNoPOLY LAws (1943); Fou:, PATENTS AND lm>uSTRIAL PROGRESS
(1942).
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there is no fundamental conflict between the temporarily protected
exclusiveness of patent rights and the antitrust public policy of maintaining competition.193 \i\'hilc all sides agree that the patent system
should serve the public interest, the real issue is how shall the public
interest be defined. This is needed as a cardinal guide to a proper
demarcation of the sphere of the limited monopoly of the patent grant
and the restrictions upon competition outside the scope of the claims
of the invention and hence subject to the prohibitions of the federal
antitrust laws. In circumscribing these res:eective boundaries, one group
of writers has taken the view that the protection of the public interest
requires a restrictive judicial attitude toward the scope of the patent
grant in order to resolve doubts against the temporary immunity to
competition claimed by the patentee, thereby correspondingly widening
the area of antitrust jurisdiction.194 Dealing with this viewpoint in a
previous article, the writer refuted it in this way: 195
''To put it in graphic terms, the restrictionists look upon the
private and public interest as two separate circles, standing side
by side and in opposition to each other. The truth of the matter is
that they are concentric circles in which the smaller circle of the
.private interest is circumscribed within the larger circle of the
public interest. Whenever the law carves out of that larger public
interest circle a small circle of exclusive rights in patentli, in copyrights and in trade-marks, a judgment has been made that it serves
the public welfare to prevent others from poaching upon such
private preserves."

If the yardsticks suggested in the above quotation were to govern
judicial consideration of the relation of the patent laws to the federal
antitrust laws, it would clarify the underlying problem as one of preventing and correcting misuse of patent rights to suppress competition
193 WooD, PATENTS AND THE Am:r-TRUST LA.w (1942); Wood and Johnson, "Patents
and the Antitrust Laws," Umv. Iu.. LAw FoRUM 544 (1950); OPPENHEIM, CAsEs ON
FEDERAL Am:r-TRusT LAws, "Public Policy of The Patent Laws and Public Policy of the
Anti-Trust Laws," 482-491 (1948).
194 A definite flavor of restrictionism is reflected in Hamilton, "Patents and Free
Enterprise," TNEC MoNOGRAPH No. 31 (1941); Hamilton and Till, "What Is A Patent?"
13 LAW & CoNTEM. PROB. 246 (1948); Meyers and Lewis, ''The Patent 'Franchise' and the
Anti-Trust Laws," 30 GEo. L.J. ll7, 260, at ll7-124 and at 271-275 (1941-1942); Petro,
"Patents: Judicial Developments and Legislative Proposals," 12 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 80,
352 (1944-1945); Feuer, ''The Patent Privilege and the TNEC Proposals," 14 TEMPLE
L.Q. 180 (1940); Kahn, "Fundamental Deficiencies of the American Patent Law," 30
AM. EcoN. REv. 475 (1940); Stocking and Watkins, "Patent Monopolies and Free Enterprise," 3 VANDERBILT L. REv. 729 (1950). Cf. Rice, "Decay of Our Patent System,"
5 BROOKLYN L. REv. 357 (1936); EDwARDs, MAINTAINING CoMPEnTION 216-248 (1949).
195 "The Public Interest In Legal Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property,"
supra note 189 at 616-617.
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beyond the scope of the exclusiveness of a valid patent grant. Re- .
strictions upon competition would then be judged by misuse in violation
of either the public policy of the patent laws or the antitrust laws, or
of both.196

B. A Workable Patent System in a Workable Competition Economy
It is recommended that the Rule of Reason and the concept of
Workable Competition should be woven into the approach to the
national antitrust policy issues affecting patent rights in a manner that
integrates and coordinates their application in all relevant areas of the
American economy. How this might be done is analyzed in the author's
previously published paper on a proposed new art of evaluating the
American patent system.197 So far as this is relevant to antitrust, the
thesis is that the concept of a workable patent system can be joined
with the concept of Workable Competition as a measuring stick by
which the administrative agencies and the courts would judge the
structure, behavior, and accomplishments of the patent system as a
component of the American industrial order.
There are many parallel problems in these two spheres in spanning
gaps in factual information and tools of economic measurement, and
in bridging the gulf between abstractions of theory or generalizations
based solely upon logic or opinion evidence and factually supported
conclusions. Before passing final judgment on the suggested correlation
of the concept of the workable patent system and Workable Competition for the over-all economy, the reader is asked to examine the basic
philosophy and the details of this approach in the writer's article on
that subject. Suffice it to reaffirm here the belief that this proposed
new art of evaluatj_on portends another way of seeking an enlarged
common meeting ground for government and business in the areas of
scientific, technological, economic, and marketing problems as they
impinge upon national antitrust policy.
•
Bigness of business and correlative bigness of patent resources,1 98
as well as licensing arrangements of individual patent owners, or agree1 96 Wood and Johnson, supra note 193. Cases on "tying clauses" covering unpatented
subject matter and other types of restrictions are collected in OPPmmBIM, CASES ON FEI>ERAL A.Nn:-TnoST LAws, cc. 11, 12 (1948).
197 "A New Approach to Evaluation of the American Patent System," supra note 189.
198 See Judge Knox's Rule of Reason analysis of patent portfolio structure of Alcoa in
United States v. Aluminum Company of America, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 333,
386-392. In Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 70 S.Ct.
894 (1950), the majority opinion of Justice Minton stated that "The mere accumulation
of patents, no matter how many, is not in and of itself illegal."
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men ts among patent owners, that involve, restrictions upon competition, 1.99 are major issues of antitrust policy intertwined with similar
issues pertinent to unpatented subject matter. It is plain, therefore,
that the Rule of Reason and Workable Competition should be applied
to patent rights in a manner consonant with the approach taken to the
entire field of antitrust.

C. Trade Symbols and Antitrust
Only passing reference is made to technical trade-marks and secondary meaning trade names as forms of industrial property rights embodied
in the good will of these trade symbols which are not legal monopolies
like a patent or copyright. The preponderant body of law affecting this
field involves common law and statutory concepts of unfair trade practices related to the regulation of the legal plane of competitive rivalry
rather than to the antitrust policy of maintaining competition.200 The
former area is not within the scope of the subject matter of this article. 201
Ce~in cognate relationships, however, should be mentioned. Imperfect competition theory expounded by economists recognizes that brand
names and other means of differentiating the commercial source of
products or services are forms of monopolistic competition.202 This
means that the commercial magnetism of trade symbols reflects a monopolistic element to the extent that consumer insistence for a particular
source of the product or service has been developed through advertising
and other sales promotion efforts. Short of the resort to substitutes
when the limits of tolerance are reached in price increases or in short~
comings of quality and service, the owner of the good will enjoys a
1 9 9 The article by Wood and Johnson, supra note 193, contains a full discussion of
patent license restrictions outside and within the scope of the patent grant. The patent
laws sanction a covenant by the licensee to assign to the licensor improvement patents in the
licensed subject matter, provided that the "grant back" provision is not used as part of a
plan to violate the antitrust laws. Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith
Co., 329 U.S. 637, 67 S.Ct. 610 (1947). Compare United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, supra note 198 at 410; United States v. General Electric Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1948)
80 F. Supp. 989 at 1005-1006.
200 On various aspects of the scope of legal protection of trade-marks and trade names
see CALLMANN, UNFAIR CoMPETlTloN AND TRADE MAiixs, 2d ed., (1950); DERBNBERG,
TRADE-MARK PROTECTION AND UNFAIR TRADING (1936); NIMS, UNFAIR CoMPETlTION
AND TRADE·MARKs, 4th ed., (1947); Trade-Marks in Transition, 14 LAw & CoNTBM.
PRoB. No. 2 (Spring 1949).
201 On the problems involved in this area, see the author's discussion in "The Public
Interest In Legal Protection Of Industrial And Intellectual Property," supra note 189.
202 CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OP MoNOPousnc CoMPETlTION, 6th ed. (1948) and
"Product Heterogeneity and Public Policy,'' 40 AM. EcoN. R.Ev. 85 (1950); Wilcox,
"Competition and Monopoly in American Industry,'' TNEC MoNoGRAPH No. 21, 3-4,
(1940); OPPENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES-CASES, COMMENTS AND MATERIALS
11-24 (1950).
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partial degree of monopolistic advantage, measured by the strength
of the purchaser preference. In that sense only are these trade symbols
partial monopolies.
So far as antitrust is concerned, it is misleading and confusing to
identify these differential advantages of monopolistic competition in
trade symbols with the antimonopoly policy applied to market conditions
where effective or workable competition is stifled. There is no conflict
between the public interest and the private interest when the law gives
a full measure of protection against infringement of the good will of
these sales-building devices. Everyday observation and experience confirms the intense competition among the heterogeneous brands of
classes of products merchandised under trade-marks and trade names.
Within the judicially determined limits of the good will of these
marks, the exclusiveness they possess is not inherently an antitrust
problem. Trade symbols breed antitrust only when they are misused
through contractual arrangements, combinations, conspiracies, or other
transactions which create restrictions upon competition of unreasonable
scope and not ancillary to the main purpose of safeguarding the property
in the intangible good will. These abuses of trade symbol rights are
analogous to misuse of patents and copyrights203 to undermine the
antitrust laws. In all of these categories, the judiciary should insist
upon proof that the property right has been used as an active instrumentality for creating and implementing genuine antitrust violations.
Cliches phrased in popular usage of "monopoly" becloud the real
nature of the antitrust issues when the property right as such is treated
as though it were in opposition to the very public interest which creates
the need for its protection.204

VIII
JuruSDICTIONAL OVERLAPS IN .ANTrrn.usT ENFORCEMENT

An obvious area of study to ascertain whether coordination can be
improved in the operation and enforcement of the antitrust laws is
203 See Handler, ''Trade-Marks and Anti-Trust Laws," 38 T.M.R. 387; Taggart,
''Trade-Marks and Related Companies: A New Concept in Statutory Trade-Mark Law," 14
LAw & CoNTEM. PROB. 234 (1949). Cf. Timberg, "Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the
Restraint of Competition," 14 LAw & CoNTEM, PROB, 323 (1949); Borchardt, "Are TradeMarks An Anti-Trust Problem?" 31 GEo. L. J. 245 (1943); Diggins, ''Trade-Marks and
Restraints of Trade," 32 GEo. L. J. 113 (1944).
204 Antitrust misuse of copyrights present analogous problems. See writer's CASES ON
FEDERAL .ANnnlusT LAws, c. 11 (1948).
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in the field of jurisdictional overlaps in the powers vested in federal
agencies under the federal antitrust statutes.206

A. Some Overlapping Unavoidable
These jurisdictional overlaps are not confined to the concurrent
jurisdiction of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.206 Much light is shed upon this phase of trade regulation by
the Hoover Commission Task Force Report on Regulatory Commissions.207 The Task Force Report deals extensively with overlapping of
functions and consequent concurrent jurisdiction in policy making and
enforcement in the areas of subject matter within the statutory authority
of the related agencies. The Task Force Report points out, with convincing cogency, that these overlappings should not be considered
merely from a doctrinnaire standpoint. 208 They may be a practical
means of complementing the work of two functionally related federal
regulatory agencies of the government. Complete elimination of
jurisdictional overlaps appears to be an unrealistic approach fostered
by the fallacy that specific subjects of federal trade regulation can be
isolated for enforcement by one regulatory body and immunized against
intrusion by any other governmental unit.
There should, of course, be maximum coordination of regulatory
and enforcement functions consistent with the practical necessities of
the scope and inherent diversities of the regulated subject matter. In
the federal trade regulation field, the varying conditions in specific
industries and trades engaged in interstate and foreign commerce, combined with the unlimited varieties of conduct related to restraints of
trade, monopoly, lesser degrees of industrial concentration, and unfair
trade practices, may preclude a congressional pattern of completely
separate compartments of jurisdiction and powers for each regulatory
unit of the government. Coordination of jurisdictional limits in such
circumstances is more likely to be achieved with acceptance of degrees
of overlapping that do not have any serious effects of actual duplication
205 United States Versus Economic Concentration and Monopoly, A Staff Report to
the Monopoly Subcommittee of the Committee on Small Business, H. Res. 64, 79th Cong. 33,
54, 141,167,209, 252 (1946); Antitrust Law Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission
and the Antitrust Division, Department of Justice-A Preliminary Report, H. Rep. 3236, 81st
Cong, 2d sess., Part II, §V, 69-71 (1951).
206 See Congress and the Monopoly Problem, Fifty Years of Antitrust Development
1900-1950, H. Doc. No. 599, 81st Cong., 2d sess., Part II, 15-24 (1950).
201 Hoover Commission (Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government), Task Force Report on Regulatory Commissions Pt. One, §III, 25-28, Pt. Two,
§VII, 77, §X, 106, §Xl, 109, §XII, 131, §XIV, 149 (1949).
208 Id. at 26.
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of efforts in investigations and in the course of public antitrust proceedings.

B. Concurrent Jurisdiction of Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission Should Be Continued
The concurrent antitrust jurisdiction of the Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission is certainly a matter of public importance since the parallel area is one of considerable dimensions.
Whatever conclusions one may reach in considering the legislative
history of section 5 of the ·-Federal Trade Commission Act in relation
to the Sherman Act of 1890, the Supreme Court has firmly settled the
major questions of statutory interpretation regarding this relationship.209
The Court's interpretation is that Congress intended to vest in the
Federal Trade Commission concurrent power with the Antitrust Division to proceed against violations of the Sherman Act and, in addition,
to confer on the Commission the further-and exclusive-power to restrain practices which are an incipient menace to competition, even
though not yet ripened into Sherman Act violations.210 This zone of
the Commission's jurisdiction to restrain incipient Sherman Act violations thus supplements the other area in which the two federal agencies have a parallel jurisdiction to enforce the Sherman Act.
All factors considered, the Hoover Task Force recommendation that
this concurrent antitrust jurisdiction of the two agencies should be
continued appears to be the practical solution.211 There is oversimplification in proposals that both the Federal Trade Commission and Clayton Acts should be amended to transfer to the Department of Justice
the present jurisdiction of the Commission over antitrust matters.212
Many points need to be considered to avoid a conclusion based only
upon the delusive simplicity of theoretical and logical a priori considerations.
A duopoly of concurrent antitrust jurisdiction may have practical
values not existent under a monopoly of antitrust jurisdiction in the
Department of Justice. The magnitude of the ·antitrust coverage of
American business within the reach of the commerce clause would
impose a staggering burden on a single governmental agency responsible
209 Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 68 S.Ct. 793 (1948)
and other cases cited in the majority opinion and footnote 4 of the Court.
210 Id. at 694, and see section ill, F, supra this article.
211 Hoover Commission, Task Force Report on Regulatory Commissions, supra note
207 at 132.
212 But see argument of Simon, "The Case Against the FTC," 19 Umv. Cm. L. Rllv.
297 (1952).
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for antitrust enforcement. It is more likely that a division of labor between the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission would be a continuing practical necessity.
There is also something to be gained from the fact that the Federal
Trade Commission is not under the same degree of direct political
pressure from the Congress, its source of delegated power, as the Department of Justice is from either the Attorney General or the President
to whom the Attorney General is responsible.213
The very existence of a 6.ve-man Commission of divided political
affiliations and differing philosophies, combined with the intervention
of an administrative process through which varying internal agency
views of staff personnel are manifested, gives multiple safeguards
against misjudgments in contrast to the more centralized decision-making of an agency like the Antitrust Division. In any event, both the
Department of Justice and the Commission are subject to checks and
balances from the other branches of the government when unusual
deviations in their policies and procedures create protests that compel
a public airing of the controversy.214
Probably the most important distinction between the two agencies
is that the Federal Trade Commission utilizes the administrative process
for fact-6.nding which relieves the courts of this initial burden, whereas
the Department of Justice is a prosecuting agency functioning in a manner which does not make available to the courts the assistance of a systematized administrative process. Such assistance is particularly desirable
in connection with consideration of the complicated legal-economic issues
presented in antitrust litigation.
Apart from the foregoing controversial issues regarding the scope of
the Commission's concurrent antitrust jurisdiction and powers, there
is no reasonable likelihood that Congress will abandon the concept of an
independent regulatory agency like the Federal Trade Commission
213 On the Commission's legal status as an independent regulatory tribunal, see bibliography, legislative history and materials in OPPENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRAcnCBsCASES, CoMMENTS AND MATERIALS 620-636 (1950); DAVIS, AnMINisTRAn-vB !.Aw, passim
(1951), and Humphrey's Executor (Rathbun) v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 55 S.Ct.
869 (1935); Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 68 S.Ct. 793
(1948).
214 For example, see Hoover Commission, Task Force Report on Regulatory Commissions, supra note 207; Study of Federal Trade Commission Pricing Policies, S. Doc. No. 27,
81st Cong., 1st sess. (1949); 'Capehart Committee Report, S. Rep. No. 2627, 81st Cong.,
2d sess. (1950); United States Versus Economic Concentration and Monopoly, supra note
205; H. Rep. No. 3236 supra note 205.

1952]

FEDERAL ANTITRUST LEGISLATION

1221

either in the antimonopoly :6.eld or the adjunct unfair trade practices
:6.eld.215

C. E-ffective Liaison the Remedy for Avoidance of Duplication of
Enforcement Activities
The nub of the problem is in the working out of effective liaison between the two agencies for avoidance of duplication in enforcement proceedings. In the past, the two agencies have at times suffered from friction resulting from proceeding with enforcement activities at crosspurposes despite recurrent professions of harmonious and successful
cooperation to prevent needless duplication.216 Accordingly, there have
215 See Hoover Commission, Task Force Report on Regulatory Commissions, supra
note 207 at 137. This is not the proper occasion to deal at length with the broader questions
of the appropriate role of the administrative process without sacrifice of the judicial supremacy as the matrix of the Anglo-American legal system. See generally, DAVIS, AnMINisTRATIVE LAw (1951).
In 1948, the O'Hara Bill sought to take away from the Federal Trade Commission its
quasi-judicial powers by converting it into an initial prosecutory agency and vesting exclusively in the federal district court the trial of issues of fact in proceedings now covered
by section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Hearings before the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, on H.R. 3871, 80th Cong., 2d sess. (1948). While
the Commission was singled out for such a drastic change of congressional policy as the
O'Hara Bill proposed, the real object of the bill was to separate prosecuting and adjudication functions with resulting displacement of the administrative "substantial evidence" rule
by the judicial "preponderance of evidence" rule in support of findings of fact.
My belief that the Federal Trade Commission has a continuing place in the group
of independent federal regulatory agencies simply means that the nostalgic yearning for the
"good old days" of adversary proceedings conducted only in traditional courts of law or
equity is a hapless effort to tum back the clock to the simple economic and social order of
a bygone era. See testimony of Oppenheim, Hearings on H.R. 3871, supra 88-120.
Instead of a surgical removal of the vitals of the federal administrative process as we now
know it, Congress made a basic choice in the Administrative Procedure Act of working
toward improvement of the federal administrative procedures to reconcile the present-day
necessity of a body of administrative law with the core of fundamentalism in safeguarding
the constitutional rights of the persons whose conduct is regulated.
So far as it is relevant to an appraisal of the congressional law-making functions and the
Federal Trade Commission's work in the field, the indications are that Congress will continue to strive toward correction of defects and abuses of the federal administrative process
in a legislative framework which attempts to bring into proper balance the differentiated
functions of the administrative and judicial tribunals consistent with due process and the
common law ideal of supremacy of law. The legislative history of the Federal Trade Commission Act shows that the Commission came into existence as one of a number of federal
administrative agencies of regulation of business enterprise because of a felt need that, in
the face of the complexities of American modem industry and trade, such regulation could
be completely or effectively accomplished "neither directly through self-executing legislation nor by the judicial process." See opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 142, 60 S.Ct. 437 (1940).
Cf. dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson in Federal Trade Commission v. Ruberoid Co., decided May 26, 1952, 72 S.Ct. 800 at 807 (1952).
216 United States Versus Economic Concentration and Monopoly, supra note 205;
Simon, supra note 212.
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been grounds for criticism of the failure to recognize and meet the need
of accommodating the work of one agency to· that of the other in the
area of coexisting jurisdiction. In the very recent past, there have been
signs that the two agencies have been more responsive to these repeated
criticisms. Machinery of cooperation has been more evident. The Department of Justice and the Commission have established procedures
for referral by one agency to the other of matters which might lead to
needless duplications in the investigational, informal, and formal procedure stages.217 Clearance procedures have accordingly been worked
out by the two agencies to determine which is to proceed in a particular
case with enforcement activity. In this connection, the procedure for
expressions of opinion concerning the legality of proposed mergers under the Celler-Kefauver Amendment to section 7 of the Clayton Act
(the so-called Anti-Merger Act of 1950) is a striking instance of the
increasing consciousness of the administrative heads of the two agencies
of the adverse effect on public opinion when there is wasteful duplication of their activities. 218
If the Antitrust Division and the Commission would maintain and
promote a genuine cooperative program of cross-referrals in the investigation, selection, and prosecution of cases in order to prevent a dual attack upon the business ent~rprises charged with illegal conduct under
the antitrust laws, business might willingly accept a realistic degree of
overlapping jurisdiction between the two agencies and the accompanying rivalry in demonstrating the wisdom and the quality of their respective functions in enforcement of the antitrust laws. But businessmen can hardly be expected to be enthusiastic about a competition between these agencies by officials who are rivals merely for retention or
expansion of jurisdiction for no better reason than merely to increase
the prestige and authority of the agency. Business clearly has a just
complaint if this dual jurisdiction should result in double harrassment
and jeopardy from the two agencies of government with respect to the
same subject matter and the same parties prior to the operation of the
safeguards of the res judicata doctrine. 219
217 Antitrust Law Enforcement by the FfC and the Antitrust Division, Dept. of Jus·
rice-A Preliminary Report, H. Rep. No. 3236, supra note 205 at 69.
21s Supra note 154.
219 There was criticism of the Department of Justice's action against the Cement Institute under §4 of the Sherman Act as an unnecessary duplication of the Federal Trade
Commission's proceeding against the Institute and various defendants which culminated in
victory for the government. (See H. Rep. No. 3236, 81st Cong., 2d sess. at 71). In United
States v. Cement Institute, (D.C. Colo. 1949) 85 F. Supp. 344, the court refused to dismiss action against the same parties, rejecting the defendant's contention that the con·
troversy was moot.
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Unless the present coordination of the work of the two agencies is
continued and strengthened, demands for a merger of their antitrust
functions will persist. In any event, the proposed Committee on Revision of National Antitrust Policy should give full consideration to this
question.

D. Credit Items in Commission's Record of Antitrust Enforcement
Allegations are frequently made of the ineffectiveness of the Federal
Trade Commission in discharging its responsibilities as an antitrust enforcement agency. 220 These criticisms are usually supported by asserting that the bulk of the Commission's case load deals with misrepresentation practices and that the antimonopoly cases have been of little significance except for the Commission's intensive attack upon delivered
pricing. 221
The generalization concerning the Commission's preoccupation
with correction of deceptive practices has the appearance of validity
when measured against the mere statistics of the number of orders to
cease and desist issued by the Commission in misrepresentation cases as
against the number of orders in antimonopoly cases. It is inaccurate,
however, and to that extent misleading, unless consideration is also
given to the material differences in time, effort, and expenditure of
funds devoted to the handling of a complicated antitrust case in a contested proceeding as compared to a simple false and misleading advertising contested case. In proportion, it is obvious that the percentage
of man hours spent on litigated antitrust cases would make a much
more favorable showing in comparison with the percentage applicable
to the deceptive practices category.
Even if comparisons are made on a case load basis between the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission, there is no solid factual basis for the over-generalization
that the Commission's antitrust work has been insignificant.222 First,
2 20 Simon, ''The Case Against the FTC,''- 19 Umv. Cm. L. RBv. 297-333 (1952);
Hoover Commission, Task Force Report on Regulatory Commissions 122 (1949); United
States Versus Economic Concentration and Monopoly, supra note 205 at 19-22 (1946).
2 21 Simon, supra note 220 at 320, 335 and passim; United States Versus Economic
Concentration and Monopoly, supra note 205 at 27; Hoover Commission, Task Force
Report, supra note 207 at 122.
222 During the period from 1936 to July 1, 1948, the Federal Trade Commission issued
complaints in 481 antimonopoly cases or an average of approximately 37 cases per year.
The average number of cases filed by the Department of Justice (including both criminal
and civil) from the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890 to August, 1946, was about 15
per year. (See United States v. Economic Concentration and Monopoly, supra note 205 at
35). During that period, the Department of Justice instituted 860 criminal and civil cases
combined. In the period from 1936 to July 1, 1948, the Department of Justice initiated
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it should he recalled that the Sherman Act antitrust jurisdiction of the
Department of Justice dates from 1890, whereas the Commission's
jurisdiction in that sphere dates from 1914. In both instances, allowance must he made for the initial formulation and operation of the
agency's policies, the effects on antitrust of World War I, and World
War II, the present defense programs, and differences in manpower and
appropriations in relation to the scope of the agency's functions. Considering all factors, and conceding the defects of using numbers of
cases as a criterion without regard to qualitative •differences in content
of issues and in the informal or formal procedures involved, there is
statistical data showing that in various periods of their coexistence, the
Commission has outstripped the Department of Justice in what one
nationally known writer has characterized as "a large-scale method of
mass enforcement of the antitrust laws."223
It is especially noteworthy that in the period before the intensification of antitrust enforcement under Thurman Arnold's leadership
of the Antitrust Division, it was the Commission which carried a considerable man-hour percentage volume load in antitrust cases. A review and analysis of the Commission's antimonopoly work prior to the
advent of the Thurman Arnold administration of antitrust will show
that, contrary to the charge that the recent delivered pricing cases224
have constituted the chief antitrust activity of the Commission, most of
the Commission's proceedings in this field have been concerned with
various types of restrictive agreements among competitors, of which
delivered pricing has been only one element in numerous price-fixing
agreement cases. 225 Indeed, the intense activity of the Commission in
the 1920's and 1930's covered such an array of antitrust subject-matter
-price-fixing, combination boycotts, price discriminations, and the like
-that even though the Commission's orders were sometimes reversed
a total of 517 cases, including both criminal and civil, or an average of approximately 40
per year of which about 18 per year were civil cases. Report of Federal Trade Commission
to U.S. Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, May 27, 1949,
and see comment, 95 CoNG. REc., Pt. 7, July 14, 1949, at 9425. See also tabular summaries
of the Commission's wor:Jc in each of its Annual Reports.
228 Montague, "The Commission's Jurisdiction Over Practices in Restraint of Trade:
A Large-Scale Method of Mass Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws,'' 8 GEo. WAsH. L. REv.
365 (1940).
224 See supra note 66.
225 See supra note 83.
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in the courts and many of the proceedings were discontinued, dismissed,
or brought to a consent settlement, waves of protests from trade association circles and other business sources attested to the felt total impact
of the Commission's antitrust activity in those periods.226
What has been said is not to be taken either as an appraisal of the
quality and soundness of the Commission's approach to this body of
antitrust cases, or as an implied approval of the results of the interaction
of the legislative, administrative and judicial aspects reflected in those
proceedings. . In fairness to the Commission, the preceding paragraphs
are intended merely as a showing that some faulty conclusions have
· been reached regarding the division of the antitrust enforcement burden
between Justice and the Commission. By thus looking at the actual
record, a better understanding of the problem of coordination of antitrust policy between these two major federal agencies should ensue.

IX
SUGGESTED POLICY CONCERNING FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION WRITTEN OPINIONS

The Commission has the initial and primary responsibility for interpretation and implementation of congressional policy as expressed in
the statutes under which it functions. In applying to specific fields and
cases the broad standards of such statutes, the Commission has been
recognized as a body of experts whose determinations are to be accorded
great weight by the courts.227 It follows from a mere statement of these
propositions that the Commission, in measuring up to the expertness
attributed to it, should spell out the legal and economic policy considerations upon which its decisions rest. 228
In this connection, an important function which the Commission
should perform is the filing of written opinions. Demand for clarifi226

See references cited supra note 79.
Tzade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 68 S.Ct. 793

221 Federal

(1948).
228 Commissioner Joseph B. Eastman, a long time member of the Intezstate Commerce
Commission, mentioned as one point of his " 'Credo' As to the Judicial Functions of Administrative Tribunals,'' 30 A.B.A.J. 266 (1944), the following: "The decisions of the tribunal
should present succinctly the pertinent facts, as they are found to be, and the conclusions
reached, but also state clearly the reasons for conclusions."
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cation by the Commission of the general standards of the statutes administered by it have been made repeatedly. 229
This does not necessitate, how~ver, resort to written opinions in
every case.280 It is obvious that there is a mass of "garden variety" misrepresentation practices cases, and certain types of restraint of trade
cases, where the time and expense involved in the preparation of written opinions would far outweigh the residual value, if any, in such an
activity. In such cases, the written findings of fact may either be sufficiently detailed, or, in any event, must withstand the scrutiny of judicial
review if the respondent chooses to seek it.
On the other hand, the Commission should henceforth undertake the
filing of written opinions as a systematic policy, particularly in proceedings involving restraint of trade and monopoly, the Robinson-Patman Act, sections 3, 7 and 8 of the Clayton Act, and the Webb Ex-port Trade Act. Although there is of necessity some overlapping,
the Commission's policy should provide for written opinions in
the following situations: (1) cases of £.rst impression; (2) in the
extensions of existing law into frontier zones or new fields; (3) where
issues have not been sufficiently clarified by Commission or court decisions; ( 4) cases involving complex factual and legal issues; (5) where
prior decisions or policies are modified or overruled.
Although the Commission in recent years has £.led written opinions
in a number of the above types of cases,281 the Commission is charge229 Hoover Commission, Task Force Report on Regulatory Commissions 129-130
(1949); Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, Arn. GEN.'s MONOGRAPH,
No. 6, Federal Trade Commission 62-65 (1940); McFARLAND, Jtm1CIAL CoNTRoL OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE hrr.ERSTAT.E CoMMERCE COMMISSION 177-178
{1933); HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMiss10N 333-337 (1925); Handler, "Unfair Competition," 21 IowA L. REv. 175, 255 (1936).
In The Ruberoid Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, decided May 26, 1952, 72 S.Ct.
800 at 807 (1952), Justice Jackson, dissenting, criticized the Commission because "It wrote
no opinion and gave only the most cryptic reasons in its findings," and appended the following footnote: "A comprehensive study has pointed out the early failure of this Commission
(and it applies as well to others) to clarify and develop the law and thereby avoid litigation
by careful published opinions. Henderson, The Federal Trade Commission 334."
280 There is little practicality in the extreme position taken in the Hoover Commission
Task Force Report at p. 130, that the Commission should write opinions in all cases.
2s1 E.g., In the matter of Grocery Distributors Association of Northern California,
F.T.C. Dkt. 5177 (1948); In the matter of Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Company,
F.T.C. Dkt. 4920 (1948); In the matter of Com Products Refining Company, F.T.C. Dkt.
5502 (1949); In the matter of Automatic Canteen Company of America, F.T.C. Dkt. 4933
(1950); F.T.C. Quantity Limit Rule 203-1, December 13, 1951, 17 Fed. Reg. 113 (1952).
Written opinions would also serve to bring into focus dissenting views of commissioners.
This device for joinder of issue on significant questions of the Commission's administrative
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able with default in resisting the burden of preparing formal written
opinions even within feasible limits that might have been fixed in a policy statement. It has been mistaken in the belief that in the general
course of its adjudications its :6ndings of fact, conclusions of law and
orders to cease and desist have been as adequately informative as formal
written opinions comparable to those traditionally prepared by the
·courts. That this is not so is shown by criticisms from various sources.232
Although in the exercise of its administrative powers, the Commission is not bound by the principle of stare decisis to the same extent
as traditional courts of law, its written opinions would give assurance of
an orderly development of a body of administrative law. Such an administrative policy would go far toward counteracting the uncertainty
inherent in the application of the general standards of the statutes it
administers. The opinions might be concise but yet stress the salient
facts and underlying considerations upon which the decision is based.
In time, this would develop a better understanding by both the Commission and business of the allowable limits of business activities within
the framework of the statutory prohibitions.
In an effort to obtain greater clarity it should not be thought, however, that the Commission can set itself apart from the traditional courts
of law and from other administrative tribunals by renouncing the formalisms of legal language endemic to the Anglo-American legal system
itself. The clarity and simplicity of language in terms that the businessman can readily understand is sometimes unavoidably limited in written
opinions of legal tribunals by the technical requirements issuing from the
rules of pleading and the semantics of the rules of evidence that only
a revolution of the American legal system as a whole can change. Since
businessmen have borne up under the traditional system in other fields
of law, there is little reason to insist upon a radical departure from the
forms of technical expression historically evolved under Anglo-American jurisprudence.
interpretations and adjudicatory functions was manifested in the 1920's when Commissioners
Thompson and Nugent frequently dissented. In recent years, Commissioner Lowell B.
Mason's written dissenting opinions have been a salutory force in crystallizing issues under
the Robinson-Patman Act, as illustrated In the matter of Standard Oil Company, F.T.C.
Dkt. 4389 (1946); In the matter of Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Company, supra;
and F.T.C. Quantity Limit Rule 203-1, supra.
232 See

note 229 supra.
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X
CoNSENT DECREES SHOULD CONFORM TO THE BOUNDARIES
• OF ANTITRUST STATUTEs233

My_purpose in making special mention of the consent decree as
one of the various means of enforcing the federal antitrust laws is to
raise a fundamental question concerning the standards for determining
whether the provisions of consent decrees are within the allowable limits
of the law.
·
In a recent study of consent decrees under the Sherman Act, Professor William R. Peterson234 concluded that "the consent decree has
become a powerful weapon for enforcement of the Anti-Trust Laws
above and beyond existing precedents." He mentioned three types of
provisions in which this tendency has appeared: (1) remedial devices
'which would not he permissible in litigated cases except upon proof of
prerequisites; (2) remedial devices which go beyond the remedies which
would he forthcoming in litigated cases; and (3) prohibitions upon
certain activities without reference to their legality, reasonableness, or
pertinent statutes.
Professor Peterson's reactions to this trend are summed up in these
words:
''Whatever the reason for consent to such decree provisions, the
fact is clear that many defendants to civil actions under the AntiT rust Laws have agreed to terms beyond what might reasonably
be expected in litigated cases. In a sense, some of these decree
provisions lead ·the law in that they reflect the opinion of the enforcement officials on certain issues. Certainly, however, the de233 This discussion is addressed to the use of consent decrees in antitrust proceedings of
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. In July 1951, the Federal Trade
Commission, which has heretofore sanctioned stipulations covering an area similar to the
voluntary settlement procedure of the consent decree, formalized the procedure by amending
Rule V of its Rules of Practice. This sanctions a consent settlement procedure to expedite
disposition of formal proceedings. The revised Rule is particularly significant in its application to proceedings within the Commission's concurrent jurisdiction to restrain violations
of the Sherman Act. Under Rule V the party or parties charged with violation of the
law must admit the jurisdictional facts but need not admit the statement of acts and practices which the Commission believes to be unlawful. He merely consents to the entxy of the
Commission's statement and of the agreed order to c ~ and desist. The Commission
- - has released a mimeographed explanatory statement on i~ revised Rule V. See also
FEDBRAL TRADE CoMMISSION, ANmrAL REPORT 82 (1951).
284 Peterson, "Consent Decrees: A Weapon of Anti-Trust Enforcement," 18 Umv.
KANs. Crrr L. RBv. 34 (1950).
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crees cannot be added to decisions from litigated cases as precedents
for Anti-Trust Law enforcement. In going beyond existing law,
such consent decrees are unfortunate. While it may be considered
desirable in a given case to enforce what might be considered to be
reasonable courses of business conduct in competition, nevertheless
such decrees constitute law enforcement of non-existent laws.
Chang~ in law should come from Congress or from a court acting
after full hearing and within the framework of existing statutes
and precedents."
In concurring with the tenor of Professor Peterson's observations,
I have no intention of casting doubt upon the desirability and efficacy
of the consent decree as a legitimate escape-hatch from antitrust litigation. Indeed, Professor Peterson shares the generally recognized belief
that voluntary compliance with the sanctions of the federal antitrust
laws is a desideratum of both government and business. A consent
decree offers an effective means of saving time, expense, and resources
in personnel-a saving which ordinarily cannot be made in protracted
litigated cases, especially those involving legal and economic complexities of industry-wide significance. Such voluntary settlements should
be encouraged by agencies of the government and should be sought
by private parties when the provisions written into the consent decree
are within the boundaries of the law. The question at issue is one of
defining those legal limits.
Applying this yardstick, is there not a basis for re-examining the
nature of a consent decree as an instrumentality of antitrust administration and enforcement? Professor Peterson's article and other writings235 point the way to further study of this important aspect of public
policy. I merely outline my views regarding salient considerations.
A consent decree under the federal antitrust laws is an agreement
between the government and parties defendant in a civil suit in equity
which, when approved and entered by the court, becomes binding on
the parties with substantially the same effect as a judgment in a litigated
case.2a6

235 Donovan and McAllister, "Consent Decrees in the Enforcement of Federal AntiTrust Laws," 46 H.mv. L. REv. 885 (1933); Isenbergh and Rubin, "Antitrust Enforcement Through Consent Decrees," 53 H.mv. L. REv. 386 (1940); Katz, ''The Consent
Decree in Antitrust Administration," 53 HARV. L. REv. 415 (1940); Timberg, "Recent
Developments in Antitrust Consent Judgments,'' 10 FED. B. J. 351 (1949).
236 United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 at 115, 52 S.Ct. 460 (1932) and cases
cited infra note 243.
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This at once brings to the forefront the fundamental concept that
the antitrust consent decree is not to be viewed solely as a contracf 37
resulting from an unrestricted bargaining process between the government and the defendants. Rather, it is an agreement for voluntary
settlement of antitrust issues in which the scope and content of the
provisions therein can rise no higher than their source in the legislative
objectives and prohibitions of the standards embodied by Congress in
its national antitrust policy. From that frame of reference it follows
that the antitrust officials, the private parties defendant, and the court
of equity are all solemnly bound to observe the limits circumscribed
in the antitrust laws.
In each consent decree negotiation, the only appropriate basic aim
authorized by law is to incorporate in the agreement of the parties provisions designed to effectuate the public policy of the antitrust laws
within the bounds of the statutes which declare that policy. That is
the public interest and it is also the measure of the private interests
of the defendants. Otherwise, antitrust consent decrees would deviate
from the historic Anglo-American principle that ours is a government
of laws and not of the personal beliefs of either men of government
or men of business who bargain with government for settlement of
public antitrust issues. Unusual provisions238 in recent consent decrees
have underscored the need for an inquiry into the legal basis for the
breadth of their coverage. Certain provisions have been written into
these decrees which are identical or similar to those disapproved by the
courts in litigated cases,239 or for which there is no reasonable likelihood
237 In the Swift case, supra note 236, Justice Cardozo said: "We reject the argument
•.. that a decree entered upon consent is to be treated as a contract and not as a judicial
act."
238 It is only fair to recognize that, :in some instances, there may be reasonable differences of opinion as to whether certain provisions fall within or outside the allowable limits
of the law. These value judgments are reflected :in the critical comments of the authors of
the articles cited supra notes 234-235.
,
239 lliustrative are consent judgment providing for dedication of patents or compulsory
licensing of patents on a royalty-free basis contrary to the limits marked out :in the judgments of the Supreme Court :in Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 65
S.Ct. 373 (1945) and 324 U.S. 570, 65 S.Ct. 815 (1945); United States v. National Lead
Co., 332 U.S. 319, 67 S.Ct. 1634 (1947). Mr. Timberg, formerly Chief of the Judgment
and Judgment Enforcement Section, Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, justifies such provisions for the reason that the Department views the Supreme Court cases "as
leaving unaffected the discretion of the district judge to order patents to be made available
on a non-compensatory basis." He lists various recent consent decree provisions :in that
category. TxMBERG, THE ANrrrnusT LAws FROM THE PoINT ol' Vmw OF A GoVERNMENT AnoRNEY, PRACTICING I.Aw INsnTUTE, 61, footnotes 86, 87 (1949). See also his
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of support in the statutory structure and judicial interpretations of the
antitrust laws.240 It is provisions of this type that test whether or not
consent decrees in practice conform to the norms of the law.
It is undeniable that the generality of the standards of the antitrust
laws in themselves create a broad range of discretion with respect to
the scope and content of consent decrees. There is, therefore, no valid
basis for criticizing provisions reasonably related to the prevention and
correction of courses of conduct forbidden by the antitrust laws. In
many instances, the defendants are motivated by a plurality of inducements to arrive at a settlement with government in factual situations
where, on the balance of all factors, they believe that they are foreclosed
from presenting or are unable to present affirmative defenses. Irrespecanalysis of litigated judgments in ''Equitable Relief Under the Sherman Act," UNIV. Iu..
L.w FontIM 629 (1950).
In my opinion, provisions of this type work a forfeiture of property rights in patents
beyond the ambit of the antitrust laws and the powers of a court of equity in suits to enjoin
violation of those laws.
In United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., (D.C.N.Y. 1951) 100 F. Supp.
504, opinion on remedies delivered May 16, 1952, Judge Ryan took that position with respect to the patents involved in that litigated case. He cited the Hartford-Empire and
National Lead cases as supporting the following comments in his opinion:
"The power of the court to direct the issuance of royalty free licenses on any of
these patents is open to serious question. . . • To provide for the issuance of royalty
free licenses with respect to any of these patents would be to destroy the total value of the
patent. We fuid no statutory authority for decreeing such remedies. That the granting
of such relief would raise a substantial constitutional question has been recognized.•••
"It has apparently been the consistent policy of the Government to seek decrees
which would in effect nullify the patents which have been used as a means to accomplish the restraints imposed. • • •
"We hold that in the circumstances before us, compulsory royalty free licensing
may not be decreed in the absence of legislative authority and the sanction of explicit
interpretation of existing statutes by higher courts affinnatively permitting such action."
See also Seegert, "Compulsory Licensing By Judicial Action: A Remedy for Misuse
of Patents," 47 MrCH. L. R:Ev. 613 (1949); Holt, note, ''Economic Standards Applicable
to Limitations upon Compulsory Licensing by Judicial Decree," 19 GEo. WASH. L. R:Ev.
400 (1951).
My belief is that Judge Ryan's yardstick of remedial provisions in antitrust litigated cases
affecting patent rights should delimit as well the boundaries of consent decree provisions
regarding not only patent rights but also any type of provision involving similar forfeitures
of property rights or other legally protected interests sanctioned by the private competitive
enterprise system which the antitrust laws seek to preserve.
240 Peterson, supra note 234, gives footnote citations to consent decree provisions he
regards as questionable on this ground. Donovan and McAllister, Isenbergh and Rubin, and
Katz, supra note 235, indicate their awareness of the problem of determining the lawful
scope of consent decrees. For examples, Isenbergh and Rubin state at 404-405 that ''The
Antitrust Division is given authority to enforce the antitrust laws, not to bargain for anything
which may be thought by it to be socially desirable. Formally, the Sherman and the Clayton Acts are the laws to be enforced; and it is only within the ambit of these laws that the
Department may act, or a court may ratify."
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tive of whether the conduct is alleged to involve per se violations, or
violations determinable by application of the Rule of Reason, there are
numerous instances where the government and the defendants may
agree that the proscribed conduct pertains to "garden variety" antitrust
violations, or are clearly within the limits of similar conduct proscribed
by judicial decrees in litigated cases. There should also be some free
play for agreement upon provisions that fall within the zone of doubtful
legality when matched against the growing points of the law reflected
in litigated decisions and dicta which portend a reasonable· likelihood
of an extension of the sanctions of the antitrust laws into present frontier
areas. Within this extended scope also fall provisions comparable to
those a defendant might reasonably anticipate as clarifications of the
general standards of the antitrust laws equivalent to what might have
been done if the government had been willing to render advisory
opinions.
Since 1938, however, the Department of Justice has departed from
a concept of coverage delimited by the firmly settled and reasonably
prospective judicial interpretations of the statutory antitrust standards in
litigated cases· to the broadened concept that the consent decree authorizes provisions offering "constructive proposals which are in the public
interest and which go beyond what the law requires." 241 It is one thing
to recognize that there are obvious difficulties in determining when the
line of what the antitrust laws prohibit or require as remedial measures
is passed. It is another thing. to have official pronouncements and actions by government which define the public interest in antitrust consent decrees as embracing provisions to which the government and defendants are willing to agree even though they "go beyond what the
. "
1awreqmres.
241 This was stated as the Antitrust Division policy in an address in 1938 by Wendell
Berge, then a Special Assistant to the Attorney General and later Assistant Attorney Gen•
eral in charge of the Antitrust Division. Quoted by Isenbergh & Rubin, supra note 235,
at 388. The same authors and Katz, supra note 235, trace the beginnings of that policy
from 1938 to 1940. ''Beyond what the law requires" today would include the Antitrust
Division's policy with respect to consent decree provisions of the type mentioned in note
239 supra and not merely novel provisions reasonably within the framework of the judicial
• interpretations in existing antitrust decisions. The latest Report of the Department of
Justice to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, Subcommittee Print No. 3, 82d Cong., 2d sess. at 33 (1952), states that consent
judgments "are consistent with principles announced in litigated cases and in many instances
contain relief beyond the pronouncements of court opinions in those cases."
As of 1940, Hamilton and Till, "Antitrust in Action," 88, 89, TNEC MONOGRAPH No.
16 (1940), vividly described the potential sweep of the consent decree as an instrument that
"permits a direct attack upon problems of industrial government" but they lament that "as
yet such possibilities have been little realized."
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Since I am addressing myself entirely to the legal nature and effect
of consent decrees in antitrust cases, this is not the occasion to elaborate
upon the controversial criticisms that the government has at times
wielded the "big stick" of coercive power to exact from defendants a
''hard bargain" to which they submit in order, for example, to avoid the
expense and publicity of protracted trials, the increased peril of treble
damage suits if a judgment should be entered against them in a litigated
case, or to forestall concurrent use of government civil and criminal
prosecution.242 The realities of the processes of negotiating and consummating antitrust consent decrees have revealed advantages and disadvantages for the government and the defendants alike. Opinions may
differ whether in any given situation the government has in practical
effect used in terrorem powers to obtain from defendants a settlement
voluntary in form.
Such matters are collateral to the fundamental point that an antitrust consent decree becomes legally operative as a judicial act of the
court of equity which approves and enters it. Its validity, constitutional
and statutory, is therefore based upon jurisdiction of tlie court over
the subject matter and the parties, and an exercise of such jurisdiction
within the discretion of a court of equity authorized to enter a decree
only when it conforms to the public policy of the antitrust laws under
which the jurisdiction attaches. 243 There is no express provision in the
federal antitrust laws for the consent decree procedure. It is implied
from various sources: from the general authority delegated to officials
charged with administration and enforcement of the antitrust laws;244
from the powers vested in the District Courts of the United States sitting as a court of equity to enter decrees in actions by the United States
to enjoin violations of the antitrust laws;245 from the language of section
5 of the Clayton Act. 246
242 All

of these factors are analyzed in the articles cited supra notes 234, 235.
in this connection United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 52 S.Ct.
460 (1932); comments of Justice Brandeis in United States v. Swift & Co., 276 U.S. 311,
48 S.Ct. 311 (1928); United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 47 S.Ct.
748 (1927); comments in Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Chrysler Corp. v.
United States, 316 U.S. 566, 62 S.Ct. 1146 (1942) and in his opinion for the majority
of the Court in Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303, 69 S.Ct. 93 (1948); with
which compare comments in Justice Black's dissenting opinion in the Ford case.
244 See Timberg, "Recent Developments in Antitrust Consent Judgments," 10 FED. B. J.
351 (1949).
245 Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. L. 209 (1890), 36 Stat. L. 1167 (1911),
15 U.S.C. (1946) §4 and section 15 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. L. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C.
(1946) §25.
246 This section provides that a final judgment or decree entered in a government proceeding under the antitrust laws shall be prima facie evidence against the defendant in any
private treble damage suit, except that such provision shall not apply to consent judgments
or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken.
:MS Consider
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It follows, therefore; that neither antitrust officials nor a court of
equity has authority under law to induce or to accept provisions in consent decrees unless they are related to the prevention and correction of
violations of the antitrust laws within the congressional objectives of
that legislation. The limits of voluntary settlement under antitrust
consent decrees are thus narrower than the settlement of litigation between private individuals. 247 Whether the question at issue is violation
of the antitrust laws, or the determination of appropriate remedies for
correction of violation, there is no warrant in the antitrust laws for
consent decree provisions which are punitive or compel forfeiture by
the defendants of property rights, or of the privilege to compete with
others not adjunct to antitrust violations and within the permissible legal
limits of the antitrust laws or other general laws of the land. Apart
from raising constitutional issues of due process of law and injurious
governmental discrimination against antitrust defendants who may thus
be deprived of civil rights to continue doing a lawful business by lawful
means, consent decree provisions which exceed the bounds of the antitrust laws may preclude defendants from engaging in the precise normal
competitive activities contemplated by those laws.
An important share of the responsibility for confining consent
decree provisions to· the scope and content allowed by the antitrust
laws initially rests upon government antitrust officials and the parties
defendant. Each of these groups is under the reciprocal duty of exercising self-restraint in recognition of the paramount public interest in
reconciling the public policy of the antitrust laws with the private rights
247 In 1938 Thurman Arnold, then Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, recognized this difference when he said: "At all times, the test of whether a
consent decree should be accepted must be whether it will benefit the public, not whether it
will give relief to the Department•••• The Department will not negotiate for ••• a decree on
the basis on which private litigation is often compromised; it will not 'settle' to relieve itself
of the burden of a long-drawn-out prosecution or the risk of losing a case." Rl!PORT,
AnoRNEY GENERAL oF nm UNITED STATES 66 (1938).
In Chrysler Corporation v. United States, 316 U.S. 566 at 570, 62 S.Ct. 1146 (1942),
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, made this significant statement with respect' to the independent function of the courts in exercising control over modification of a consent decree but in
a context of a principle of more general application: "A court of equity is not just an umpire between two litigants. In a very special sense, the public interest is in its keeping as
the conscience of the law. The circumstances that one of the parties is the Government
does not in itself mean that the interest which it asserts defines and comprehends the public interest which the court must vindicate. A modification of a decree requested by the
Government is not ipso facto a modification warranted by considerations which control
equity. Regard for the proper administration of justice, which makes determinations depend upon proof and not upon unsupported assertions of one of the litigants, is a vital
aspect of the public interest••••"
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of the defendants in a manner that preserves the essentials of private
competitive enterprise envisaged by the antitrust laws themselves·.248
Much more important is the original duty of the district court, and
ultimately the appellate tribunals, to exercise independent judicial discretion to keep consent decrees within the metes and bounds of the
law. Commentators have referred to the pro forma manner in which
the district courts have in practice approved and entered antitrust consent decrees. 249 This lack of judicial control over the bargaining processes reflected in the fait accompli of the antitrust consent decree is
accentuated by the fact that the exceedingly narrow scope of appellate
review renders the consent decree, dignified by the same status as a
decree in litigated cases, virtually immune from direct attack.250
In my opinion, the increased use of the consent decree in recent
years to the point where a substantial majority of antitrust issues are
settled through this procedural device, 251 makes urgent a reconsidera-

248 See comments of Justice Frankfurter in the Chrysler and Ford cases, supra notes
243,247.
249 Hamilton and Till, "Antitrust in Action," TNEC MoNOGRAPH No. 16 at 88 ..
(1940), characterized the discrepancy in this connection between theory and practice in
these words: "As a device to escape litigation, the consent decree cannot wholly circumvent
the courts. Its origin stems from the broad power of equity. The decree, shapeft by the
immediate parties to the controversy, must receive a judicial blessing. Its legal status is that
of a decree written by the court; the violation of its command invites the action for contempt. In theory the part of the judge is that of a master in chancery; he is supposed to
lay bare the questions in controversy, and in informed judgment satisfy himself that the
agreement does justice between the industry and the public. In fact, his role is ceremonial; he brings to the accord a passive spirit and his imprimatur. The adverse parties have
been in protracted conference; they have arrived at the terms of settlement; tliey confront
the judge with a fait accompli. The jurist has only causal knowledge of the issues; he
lacks facilities for informing himself; he has no ready norms for testing the fairness of the
provisions. He asks a few perfunctory questions; he may make a minor change or two. The
lawyers for the Government appear satisfied. He accepts the instrument on faith."
As of 1933, Donovan and McAllister, supra note 235 at 914, asserted that "No court
has as yet placed any limit on what may be included in the [consent decree] agreement."
As of 1940 Isenbergh and Rubin, supra note 235 at 408, stated that "In practice, trial courts
have hitherto exercised little or no independent discretion in entering consent decrees";
that "the attitude of the courts has been the one to be found traditionally in suits between
private parties," in support of which the writers appended at 408, footnote 68: "As indicated by the large number of consent decrees which were entered on the day on which
they were submitted, or more strikingly, on the day on which the petition was filed."
2 50 See cases collected in OPPENHllIM, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws 833-873 (1948).
251 "Qf approximately 470 equity suits filed by the United States during the period
from July, 1890, to July, 1940, about 225 of such cases, or a little less than 50 per cent,
have been disposed of by consent decrees." OPPENHEIM, CAsEs ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAws 833 (1948). Timberg, ''Equitable Relief under the Sherman Act," Umv. h.r.. I.Aw
FonuM 629 at 630, note 1, cites the Report of the Attorney General of the United States
(1950) for the statement that of the civil cases filed between 1935 and 1950, 134 were
settled by consent decrees and 37 were tried.
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tion and evaluation of the proper place of that mode of antitrust enforcement within the framework of the substantive standards and procedures
of the antitrust laws. This is another area of study which should be
undertaken by the Committee on Revision of National Antitrust Policy
suggested in this article. My own views expressed in the preceding
pages look toward a conservation of the full benefits to government,
businessmen and the public of the legitimate uses of antitrust consent
decrees within the ambit of the revisions of antitrust policy I have suggested in other parts of this article. To my way of thinking, so long as
the national antitrust policy of Congress adheres to the fundamental
precepts of private competitive enterprise set forth in the writer's credo
at the beginning of this paper, there would be no lawful basis for rationalizing the antitrust con_sent decree as a means of justifying waiver of
private discretion regarding policy and managerial decisions of private
.businessmen compatible with the constitutional and statutory objective
of maintaining effective compe.tition.

XI
RECAPITULATION OF

MAIN RECOMMENDED

STEPS TOW.ARD RE-ExAM-

INATION AND REVISION OF NATIONAL ANnnlusT

PoucY

At this pqint, it may be useful to recapitulate the main steps I have
recommended for re-examination and revision of National Antitrust
Policy. This is done merely by cross-reference to the parts of this article where the particular proposal is discussed.

l. Formulation of a Congressional Declaration of National Antitrust Policy, containing:
(a) a statement of the distinctive ~haracteristics of the public
policy of maintaining a private competitive enterprise system (supra I, B);
(b) adoption of the concept of Workable Competition (supra

I, B; IV; V; VII);
(c) adoption of the Rule of Reason as master yardstick of interpretation and procedure· in applying the general standards of the antitrust laws to specific factual situations
(supr~ II, C, F, H; Ill; IV; V; VII).
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2. Adoption of prima facie case of illegality for application to
restrictive agreements among competitors and to tying clauses under
section 3 of the Clayton Act (supra II, G; III, E).
3. Retention of the generality of standards in terms of negative
prohibitions in the Sherman Act, section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act (supra I, C; II,
C, D, F; III; IV; VII).

4. Revision of section 2 of the Clayton Act (Robinson-Patman
Act) in harmony with national antitrust policy -(supra V).
5. Express provision for application of the concept of Workable
Competition and Rule of Reason to Sherman Act, restraint of trade and
monopoly jurisdiction under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the revised section 2 of the Clayton Act, and sections 3 and
7 of the Clayton Act (supra II, F; III; IV; V; VII).
6. Consideration of ways and means of equipping administrative
agencies and the courts for responsibilities under Rule of Reason approach (supra II, H).
7. Re-examination of antitrust exemptions in light of national
antitrust policy (supra VI).
8. Retention of concurrent jurisdiction of Department of Justice
and Federal Trade Commission with machinery for coordination to
avoid duplication of enforcement activities (supra VIII).
9. Formulation of Federal Trade Commission policy regarding
written opinions (supra IX).
I 0. Consideration of standards for conforming consent decrees to
boundaries of antitrust laws (supra X).
I I. Creation of Committee on Revision of National Antitrust
Policy (infra XII), including consideration of procedures, remedies,
and penalties (infra note 257).
XII
CoMMITIEE ON REVISION OF NATIONAL ANnrnusT PoLICY

What has been written here is only one man's beliefs and some
guideposts to a revised national antitrust policy. The task of revision is
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a gigantic one. It should be approached with assurance of a full and
fair consideration of all interacting viewpoints on the legal and related
social science aspects of the substantive problems involved. To that
end, it is proposed that a Committee on Revision of National Antitrust
Policy be established to make a comprehensive study of the antitrust
laws of the United States as hereinafter specified and to make specific
recommendations for their coordination and revision. If such a committee is established, this writer's credo would be only one of many
other individual statements of positions on debatable matters that must
withstand the scrutiny of the pooled expertness of the Committee's
members and staff. The fate of one's personal thinking is minor compared to the supreme importance of creating a committee, such as the
one here recommended, in order that out of _it may come a greater
common understanding of the current status of national antitrust policy
and progress toward its improvement.
My suggestions for the composition and work of this committee are
as follows:

A. A Private Committee in Role of Amicus of the Congress
The committee should be organized and financed as a private body.
Its source of funds should come from non-profit private foundations or
similar. organizations devoted to public service projects. Congress, of
course, is the organ of government which will ultimately decide what
revisions, if any, should be made in the existing antitrust laws. Initially,
however, there would be many advantages in not committing the inquiry to a government body like the ones already proposed in bills
introduced in Congress. 252 The private committee would act in the
252 Two bills have been pending before Congress, S. 1944 and H.R. 5015, [82d Cong.,
1st sess. (1951)] to establish a bipartisan commission to investigate and report on proposals
for the revision of the antitrust laws. Similarly, S. Res. 86, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951) provides for reference of the problem of revision to the Senate Judiciary Committee. illustrative of recent proposals are Madison, "Proposed Amendments of the Federal Antitrust Law
and its Relation to 'Big Business,'" CCH ANnTRus-r LAw Sn.n>osmM, 106 (1945); Smith,
"Effective Competition: Hypothesis for Modernizing the Antitrust Laws," 26 N.Y. UNIV.
L. REv. 405 at 428-430, 449-450 (1951); Wood, "The Supreme Court and a Changing
Antitrust Concept,'' 97 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 309 at 343-344 (1949); Recommendations of the
Select Committee on Small Business, 79th and 80th Congresses, House Doc. No. 599, 81st
Cong., 2d sess. 128, 131 (1950); Oppenheim, "A New Look at Antitrust Enforcement
Trends,'' CCH, ANnTRus-r LAw SYMPOSIUM 69, 80 (1950); LYNCH, THE CoNCENTRATION OP EcoNOMIC PoWER (1946); Final Report, Temporary National Economic Committee, S. Doc. No. 35; 77th Cong_., 1st sess. 34-40 (1941); and compilation of proposals
in CoNGREss AND THE MoNOPOLY PROBLEM, F1PTY YEARS OP ANnTRus-r DEVELOP?.µ!NT,
1900-1950, H. Doc. No. 599, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (1950) and Supp. (1951).
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role of an Amicus of the Congress in laying the foundation for the
revision. It would perform functions that would materially increase
the likelihood of embodying in the first draft of legislation a skilled
and thoroughly considered product which would thereafter be subjected
to all of the accustomed procedures of the federal legislative process.2113

B. Selection, Organization and Functions of Committee and Staff
Details of the organization and functions of such a committee are
matters which may well be left to future decision, but there should be
clarity in the principles by which the committee's task is to be governed.
With that aim in view, these suggestions are made to indicate the
framework of the approach.
I. Balanced Representatio?7- of Interacting Viewpoints. An overall committee of about twelve members, with a chairman and vicechairman would constitute the governing body of the survey. It would
formulate the policies and procedures of the project and render a final
report, conclusions and recommendations.
The magnitude and complexity of the inquiry will make necessary
a functional organization of a staff according to the main selected areas
of investigatjon. For each such area, a task force subcommittee would
be created with specialized personnel assigned to it. Each subcommittee would render its report, conclusions and recommendations to the
committee for evaluation and integration in its final report.
It is obvious that public confidence in the integrity, fullness and
. fairness of the committee's work will depend upon the criteria for
selection of the members of the committee, the subcommittees and the
staff personnel. Of first importance is the principle that the personnel
should reflect a balanced representation of the conflicting viewpoints
in this controversial field. Every major appointment should meet the
tests of qualifications and experience generally recognized as outstanding in competence and expertness commensurate with the assigned
functions.
Realism demands recognition of the fact that subjective judgment
values are inseparable from a person's basic beliefs regarding the objectives and limits of governmental intervention in regulation of private
competitive enterprise through national antitrust policy. Appointments
258 While a private committee is proposed, analogies for organization and operation are
suggested by the experience of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government, Concluding Report at 2 (1949).
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to the committee of nationally recognized authorities in this field will
therefore necessarily reHect differences in basic philosophies of approaches. The same will be true of selection of personnel for the subcommittees and staff. Once the illusion of cold neutrality of thinking
about the highly controversial subject of antitrust is rejected, it will be
better understood that the proposed project will command respect if it
provides an open market of ideas, each variant in the thinking of its
personnel competing with the others in a forum upon which is turned
the pitiless light of publicity. Differel,).ces in conclusions and recommendations will be tested for comprehensiveness and accuracy of factual data and fairness of appraisal in the melting pot of the committee's
work as a whole. Subjective elements will thus be counteracted by the
perspective gained in the composite record of analysis and synthesis.
Through this process there should be as much assurance of dispassionateness and curbs on emotional partisanship of political or other selfinterest as any project of human endeavor can hope to achieve.
2. Selection of Committee and Staff. In selecting the member·ship of the committee and its staff, the following sources of specialized
qualifications and experience in the antitrust field should be consid. ered:
Legal: practicing lawyers, government attorneys, law teachers, industry counsel;
·
Economics and business administration (defined to include research
and development, production, marketing and distribution and consumer
levels): teachers, industry, consultants, accountants.
Private organizations: representatives from the leading private
bodies engaged in projects related to antitrust public policy.254
3. Functions and Operation of Committee. The following is a
scaffolding of a minimum of essentials in planning the operations and
functions of the committee.
254 University research projects should also be coordinated with the work of the
committee. For example, announcement has been made of a project for establishment of a ·
Patent Foundation in The George Washington University in accordance with the terms
of a Declaration of Trust. Among the various research topics pertaining to the patent,
copyright, and trade-mark systems mentioned in a brochure of the Patent Foundation is inquiry into the interaction of the patent system and the antitrust laws. This is illustrative
of areas where the committee should endeavor to work out a program in cooperation with
such university research organizations.
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A maximum of two years should be set for completion of the project. The Hoover Commission was able to accomplish a project of
greater proportions in that period of time.
The scope of the study and investigations should be determined by
identifying the significant areas of inquiry. The Legislative Reference
Service of the Library of Congress has recently compiled the existing
federal antitrust legislation. 255 A mass of other materials is available
on legal, economic and business aspects covering every segment of the
antitrust field. From these materials the boundaries of each area of
research can be determined.
In this connection, it should be emphasized that duplication, and
waste of effort, time and expense are frequently entailed by failure to
make maximum utilization of prior contributions in the published literature of the field of inquiry. One of the first task force assignments
should be a critical survey for review, classification, analysis and synthesis of published materials on antitrust from the enactment of the
Sherman Act to date. This wiU bring to the surface areas of agreement
and of dissension distilled from the authoritative thinking on substantive and procedural questions of antitrust. This will enhance considerably the committee's perspective and will furnish it with the valuable
guides of the past literature to sharpen perception of the ramifications.
of the committee's task. A great deal of common ground of thinking
should be discovered in the process.
As previously indicated, the committee's work will be done as a
privately financed public service undertaking. It is contemplated that
Congress will be interested in having made available to it the reports,
conclusions and recommendations of the committee and its area subcommittee as worthy of serious consideration.
The lawyers on the committee would be the primary source of
technical skills in the initial drafting of any revisions in the federal
antitrust statutes with due regard for merits of the existing legislation,
the trends in its judicial interpretation, and the experience under it.
Legal research of the lawyer group would be coordinated with the
broader legislative research to be undertaken in the related social sciences. Technical drafting problems might be discussed informally with
255 CoNGIUlss AND THE MoNOPOLY PnoBLEM, FIFTY Yl!Alls OF ANrrrnuST DB-vm.OPMENT, 1900-1950, H. Doc. No. 599, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (1950) and Supp. (1951).

1242

MrcHIGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 50

the Office of the Legislative Counsel of the Congress.256 It is not fanciful to suggest that by appropriate resolution of both Houses of Congress the existence of the committee and its public purpose might be
recognized by the Congress prior to the commencement of the committee's work, without any official commitment by the Congress regarding
the results of the committee's labors but with official authorization for
the cooperation of the Office of the Legislative Counsel. If thereafter
the Congress should seek the services of the committee, the latter could
·act in an advisory capacity to the appropriate committees of both houses
of the Congress. It would be useful, moreover, for the committee to
continue in existence after its Final Report is submitted to carry on
continuous study of antitrust problems arising from any statutory revisions Congress might make.
During its existence, the committee would act as a clearing house
and coordinator of all factual and analytical materials voluntarily submitted to it from outside sources. The procedures of the committee
should conform to the best traditions of the democratic process of receiving for examination written presentations of data, views and recommendations from any responsible private and governmental source. A
formal process of reception of oral testimony of witnesses should not be
contemplated, since the committee would function as a legislative research body through its members and staff in a manner different from
a governmental commission. If Congress should decide to make use
of the committee's reports, the relevant House and Senate committees
would provide for interchange of views through public hearings on
proposed revisions of national antitrust policy.
Full publicity should be given to the work and reports of the committee and subcommittees, including minority statements of dissenting
views. At the outset, public announcement should be made through a
descriptive statement of the purposes, organization, personnel and
methods of inquiry of the committee and staff, with full disclosure of
the sources of the funds for financing the committee's work.
This article has indicated the highlights of many controversial antitrust issues which the committee would consider. Consideration of the
administration and enforcement of the existing federal antitrust laws
would require committee investigation and study of the legislative
standards of such laws, their interpretations by the executive, adminis256 See Jones, ''Bill-Drafting Services in Congress and the State Legislatures," 65 HA!lv.
L. REv. 441 (1952).
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trative and judicial branches of the federal government, and their economic and business effects on the American industrial order. Conflicts
in policy and interpretations, proposals for revisions and supplements
to existing antitrust laws and their coordination on substantive and
procedural levels would be given careful study.257

XIII
CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The revisions of National Antitrust Policy recommended in this
article should not dilute the fundamental core of provisions essential to
effectuation of the paramount objective of maintaining a competitive
private enterprise system. Changes and coordination in the federal
legislative antitrust structure have been suggested only where the sands
of the hour glass have run out in substan,tive and procedural provisions,
either outmoded since their original conception, or proven by interpretations and experience to be unequal to the contemporary functions of
antitrust.
Congress will be the architect of any revisions of the federal antitrust laws but no matter how soundly it performs that duty, the translation of antitrust into equitable and realistic decisions will likewise depend upon the imaginative ability of the cognate executive, administrative and judicial branches of the federal government. Private business, antitrust attorneys and the allied social sciences will also share in
257 The following sources should be consulted for proposals with respect to procedures,
remedies, and penalties: A Symposium, ''Divestiture As A Remedy Under The Federal
Antitrust Laws," 19 .GEo. WASH. L. REv. 119 (1950); H. Rep. No. 3236, 81st Cong., 2d
sess. 62, 71 (1951); TNEC, FINAL REPORT 34-40 (1941); TNEC MONOGRAPH No. 16,
"Antitrust in Action," Sec. ill (1941); HEAmNcs BEFORE THE StmcoMMITrEE ON THE
STUDY OP MONOPOLY PoWER, 81st Cong., 1st sess., Serial No. 14, Pt. 1, 82, 86, 99-100,
552-560 (1949); A New Look At Antitrust Enforcement Trends, CCH .ANl'lTRaST I.Aw
SYMPOSIUM (1950) 80, 109-110; H. Doc. No. 599, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (1950); REPORT OP
JUDICIAL CoNPERENCE oP THE UNITED STATES~ PnoCEDtJRE IN .ANn-TRaST AND Ormm
PROTRACTED CAsEs (1951); McAllister, ''The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust
Litigation," 64 HAnv. L. REv. 27 (1950); McAllister ''The Judicial Conference Report on the
'Big Case': Procedural Problems of Protracted Litigation," 38 A.B.A.J. 289 (1952); Business
Practices Under The Antitrust Laws, CCH SYMPOSIUM (1951) Pt. I; United States Versus
Economic Concentration and Monopoly, A Staff Report to the Monopoly Subcommittee,
H. Res. 64, 79th Cong. (1946); Madison, "Proposed Amendments of the Federal Antitrust
Law and Its Relation to 'Big Business,'" CCH .ANl'lTRaST I.Aw SYMPOSIUM 106 (1952);
Wood, ''The Supreme Court and a Changing Antitrust Concept,'' 97 UNIV. PA. L. REv.
309, 335 (1949); Smith, "Effective Competition: Hypothesis for Modernizing the Antitrust
Laws,'' 26 N.Y. Umv. L. REv. 405 at.448-449 (1951).
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the responsibility of delimiting the orbit of private interests in order to
give them a full measure of protection consistent with the public interest in antitrust. _
When this common ground is reached, the net social gain should
be considerable. Yet there will be no blueprint of antitrust for all time.
For antitrust should always be as dynamic as the industrial society it
serves. When the sands of the hour glass of revisions in antitrust also
run out, new directions will need to be taken. This ceaseless process
is the cost of maintaining a competitive system. Justice Holmes once
said that this competition is worth more to society than it costs. 258 If
workable competition is also worth more to society than it costs, as I
have ventured to show, then a workable national antitrust policy is worth
the price of achievement. That is what this article has ventured to
show in the thesis propounded by the writer's credo.
258 Vegelahn

v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896).

